Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

On The Alignment Of Consumer Surplus And Total Surplus Under Competitive Price Discrimination, Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, Stephen Morris

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A number of producers of heterogeneous goods with heterogeneous costs compete in prices. When producers know their own production costs and consumers know their values, consumer surplus and total surplus are aligned: the information structure and equilibrium that maximize consumer surplus also maximize total surplus. We report when alignment extends to the case where either consumers are uncertain about their own values or producers are uncertain about their own costs, and we also give examples showing when it does not. Less information for either producers or consumers may intensify competition in a way that benefits consumers but results in inefficient …

The No-Arbitrage Hypothesis And Inertia In Forward Markets, José Luis Ferreira, Praveen Kujal, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Working Papers

Allaz (1992) showed that the no-arbitrage condition in forward markets is obtained as a feature of the equilibrium if the model allows for strategic behavior on the part of the buyers. He showed that having active buyers is equivalent to passive buyers plus the no-arbitrage hypothesis. We test this experimentally in a forward market by allowing for active buyer’s under exogenously or endogenously determined market closure. We further test an inertia hypothesis that looks at whether past participation in a spot-market results in quantities being limited in the forward market stage. Importantly, the no-arbitrage condition can only be tested with …

Mixed Bundling In Oligopoly Markets, Jidong Zhou

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper proposes a framework for studying competitive mixed bundling with an arbitrary number of firms. We examine both a firm’s incentive to introduce mixed bundling and equilibrium tariffs when all firms adopt the mixed-bundling strategy. In the duopoly case, relative to separate sales, mixed bundling has ambiguous impacts on prices, profit and consumer surplus; with many firms, however, mixed bundling typically lowers all prices, harms firms and benefits consumers.

Fixed Costs And The Division Of Labor, Haiwen Zhou

Economics Faculty Publications

How market size and the level of coordination costs determine the degree of specialization is studied in an infinite horizon model with the amount of capital determined endogenously. Firms producing the same intermediate good engage in oligopolistic competition and choose the degree of specialization of their technologies to maximize profits. A more specialized technology is a technology with a lower marginal cost, but a higher fixed cost. Interestingly, the relationship between the level of coordination costs and a firm’s degree of specialization is ambiguous. A firm in a country with a larger market size, more patient citizens, or a higher …

Market Structure And Quality Of Service: Investigating Oligopolies And The Quality Of Nursing Home Care In California During The Covid-19 Pandemic, Tessa Ireton

Senior Independent Study Theses

Quality-of-service outcomes in nursing homes are of great social and human importance. However, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, consistently maintaining markets with high quality care has been a pervading issue in the American nursing home industry. Furthermore, the industry is strongly characterized by oligopolies, a market structure that literature indicates may be less compatible with quality service than competitive markets. With this paper, I aim to investigate the possible intersection of oligopolist market structures and the quality of nursing home care during the COVID-19 pandemic. I start by describing quality of care in nursing homes, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, …

Pricing Stallion Seasons For An Individual Stallion: The Existence Of Top Tier Pricing And Market Power, Robert L. Losey Ph.D., Thomas E. Lambert 1959-

Faculty Scholarship

This paper is an academic treatment of the pricing of stallion seasons (a “season” confers the right to breed a mare to a stallion) The commercial stallion seasons market can be represented schematically as a triangle that normally has a single-digit number of stallions offering high-priced seasons in the narrow apex, a moderate number of stallions composing the middle section, and over 150 in the $5,000-$10,000 range. We argue that it is logical for profit-maximizing stallion managers, most especially those in the apex of the stallion seasons triangle, to charge different prices for different groups of buyers of the same …

Neoliberalism And Monopoly In The Motion Picture Industry, Michael S. Wartenbe

FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Monopolies and industry concentration have returned in our time, as did the ramifications in the globalized political economy. One of the most impactful in our daily lives are the Mass Media Conglomerates who not only own the majority of film, television, and news we access, but increasingly control the means of accessing it, from cable to digital. While many are familiar with these corporations via their services and products, less known by the public are their political operations and close cooperation with Washington. This is due to the lack of holistic analysis of the industry and cooperation in the media …

Competition And Monopoly In The U.S. Economy: What Do Industrial Concentration Data Tell?, Leila Davis, ÖZgüR Orhangazi

PERI Working Papers

A recent series of academic studies, think-tank reports, and news articles shows widespread attention to rising industrial concentration and market power in the U.S. economy. In this paper, we focus on concentration in the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector to make three contributions to this literature. First, we trace the theoretical origins of the debate on industrial concentration, and show that there is a certain degree of ambiguity surrounding the expected consequences of concentration and monopolization for nonfinancial firms. Second, we use industry- level concentration data to describe recent trends in average concentration. We show that, while concentration increases across the …

“Firm Behavior In The Mid-Twentieth Century American Steel Industry”, Robert Rogers

The Journal of Economics and Politics

In the period from 1920 to 1972, the American steel industry consisted of eight large companies and a fringe composed of small domestic producers and foreign firms exporting to the United States. The market structure made it unlikely that the industry behaved in a perfectly competitive fashion. Thus, oligopoly hypotheses on firm behavior such as Nash-Bertrand and Stackelberg leadership seem plausible. This paper estimates a BLP demand model for the industry, and it, then, uses the demand parameters to estimate price equations under the different behavioral assumptions. From the information in this model, tests are made to see which hypothesis …

Simulating Hospital Merger Simulations, David J. Balan, Keith Brand

David J. Balan

Unemployment And Economic Integration For Developing Countries, Haiwen Zhou

Economics Faculty Publications

While financial or trade integration between countries may increase the size of the market and aid the adoption of more advanced technologies, will it also increase the level of urban unemployment for a developing country? In this model, there is unemployment in the urban sector. Manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Financial firms provide capital to manufacturing firms and they also engage in oligopolistic competition. We show that an increase in the wage rate in the manufacturing sector changes neither the level of technology nor the level of employment in the manufacturing …

The Choice Of Technology And Equilibrium Wage Rigidity, Haiwen Zhou

Economics Faculty Publications

In this general equilibrium model, firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Capital and labor are the two factors of production. The existence of efficiency wages leads to unemployment. The model is able to explain some interesting observations of the labor market. First, even though there is neither long-term labor contract nor costs of wage adjustment, wage rigidity is an equilibrium phenomenon: an increase in the exogenous job separation rate, the size of the population, the cost of exerting effort, and the probability that shirking is detected will not change the equilibrium wage rate. …

All-Units Discounts As A Partial Foreclosure Device, Yong Chao, Guofu Tan

Yong Chao

All-units discounts (AUD) are pricing schemes that lower a buyer’s marginal price on every unit purchased when the buyer’s purchase exceeds or is equal to a pre-specified threshold. The AUD and related conditional rebates are commonly used in both final-goods and intermediate-goods markets. Although the existing literature has thus far focused on interpreting the AUD as a price discrimination tool, investment incentive program, or rent-shifting instrument, the antitrust concerns on the AUD and related conditional rebates are often their plausible exclusionary effects.

In this article, we investigate strategic effects of volume-threshold based AUD used by a dominant firm in the …

Allocative Efficiency, Mark-Ups, And The Welfare Gains From Trade, Thomas J. Holmes, Wen-Tai Hsu, Sanghoon Lee

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper develops an index of allocative efficiency that depends upon the distribution of mark-ups across goods and is separable from an index of standard Ricardian gains from trade. It determines how changes in trade frictions affect allocative efficiency in an oligopoly model of international trade, decomposing the effect into the cost-change channel and the price-change channel. Formulas are derived shedding light on the signs and magnitudes of the two channels. In symmetric country models, trade tends to increase allocative efficiency through the cost-change channel, yielding a welfare benefit beyond productive efficiency gains. In contrast, the price-change channel has ambiguous …

Buyer Alliances As Countervailing Power In Wic Infant-Formula Auctions, David E. Davis

David E. Davis

Buyer Alliances As Countervailing Power In Wic Infant-Formula Auctions, David E. Davis

David E. Davis

Bargaining In Hospital Merger Models, David J. Balan, Keith Brand

David J. Balan

Hospital prices for commercially-insured patients are generally set through bilateral negotiations with health insurance companies. Reflecting common industry practice, contemporary models of hospital/health insurer bargaining usually assume that multi-hospital systems bargain on an all-or-nothing basis. However, hospitals within systems may bargain separately, and a commitment to do so is sometimes put forward as a remedy for an otherwise anticompetitive merger. We analyze and compare the merger-induced changes in equilibrium prices in a Nash Bargaining framework under these two modes of bargaining. We show that, while the magnitude of price effects under either mode depends critically on the degree of pre-merger …

Strategic Effects Of Three-Part Tariffs Under Oligopoly, Yong Chao

Yong Chao

The distinct element of a three-part tariff, compared with linear pricing or a two-part tariff, is its quantity target within which the marginal price is zero. This quantity target instrument enriches the firm's strategy set in dictating the competition to a specific level, even in the absence of usual price discrimination motive. With general differentiated linear demand system, the competitive effect of a three-part tariff in contrast to linear pricing depends on the degree of substitutability between products: competition is intensified when two products are more differentiated, yet softened when two products are more substitutable.

Effects Of Ad-Valorem Taxes On Location Decision Under Free Entry Cournot Oligopoly, Yeung-Nan Shieh

Faculty Publications

This paper examines the impact of the ad-valorem commodity tax as a policy device on the location decision of undifferentiated oligopolistic firms with free entry. It shows that: (1) When the distance between the plant location and the output market is held constant, the optimum location for the oligopolistic firm would be independent of the ad-valorem tax if the production function is homothetic, and (2) when the distance between the plant location and the output market is a decision variable, the optimum location for the oligopolistic firm will move closer to the output market if the demand function is linear …

Effects Of Ad-Valorem Taxes On Location Decision Under Free Entry Cournot Oligopoly, Yeung-Nan Shieh

Yeung-Nan Shieh

This paper examines the impact of the ad-valorem commodity tax as a policy device on the location decision of undifferentiated oligopolistic firms with free entry. It shows that: (1) When the distance between the plant location and the output market is held constant, the optimum location for the oligopolistic firm would be independent of the ad-valorem tax if the production function is homothetic, and (2) when the distance between the plant location and the output market is a decision variable, the optimum location for the oligopolistic firm will move closer to the output market if the demand function is linear …

Product Markets And Industry-Specific Training, Armin Schmutzler, Hans Gersbach

Armin Schmutzler

We develop a product market theory to explain why firms provide their workers with skills that are also useful to their competitors. Firms first decide whether to invest in industry-specific training, then make wage offers for each others’ trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product market competition. Equilibria with and without training can emerge. If competition is soft, firms invest in training if others do. Thereby, they avoid having to pay high wages for trained workers. Furthermore, we draw welfare conclusions from the analysis. Finally, we discuss how our ideas apply to supplier relationships and to general training.

Essays On Industrial Organization And Environmental Economics, Cristina Marie Reiser

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine how regulation by a central authority motivates changes in behavior.

Chapter 1 identifies the role of a tolerance policy as a manager’s regulatory mechanism which can deter worker misconduct in rank-order tournaments. When contestants’ actions cannot be perfectly monitored or doing so is prohibitively costly, misconduct takes place. This chapter develops a theoretical model in which contestants compete for a prize in a symmetric tournament and in which the organizer tolerates some level of misconduct. In addition to showing that zero tolerance does not minimize equilibrium misconduct, it also shows there exists …

Competition Policy Issues In The Consumer Payments Industry, Nicholas Economides

Nicholas Economides

We discuss the current structure of card networks that facilitate transactions between merchants and consumers. We find that presently fees for this intermediation are considerably higher than costs. This is facilitated by rules imposed by the card networks on the merchants that do not allow merchants to steer competition to cards that have lower fees. It has also been facilitated by the requirement that a merchant has to accept all cards of the same network (honor all cards rule) -- recently abolished in the US, as well as by the fact that the networks set the maximum interface fee between …

Regional Unemployment And Productivity In Europe, Luca De Benedictis, Roberto Basile

Luca De Benedictis

We analyse the relationship between regional unemployment and labour productivity in Europe, basing our empirical analysis on the predictions of a Neary-type General Oligopolistic Equilibrium trade model with efficiency-wages. Using semiparametric and dynamic panel data estimators and controlling for other factors, we give evidence of a nonlinear relationship between productivity and regional unemployment in Europe: with a level of productivity smaller than a certain threshold, this relationship is negative, while no relation occurs in the case of higher productivity regions. This evidence proves an important role of a wage-floor (induced by efficiency wages and exacerbated by institutional factors) under which …

Strategic Environmental Policy And International Trade In Asymmetric Oligopoly Markets, Yann Duval, Stephen F. Hamilton

Economics

This paper examines optimal cooperative and non-cooperative environmental taxes for the case in which a polluting input is used to produce an internationally-traded finished product. The model allows for terms-of-trade effects under oligopoly and employs a general specification of the environmental damage function that encompasses special cases of local, global, and transboundary externalities. The model has several implications for public finance. For example, inefficiently high environmental taxes may be optimal for a net exporting country in non-cooperative circumstances, as the motive to shift rent by selecting an inefficiently low tax rate is countervailed by the incentive to shift the burden …

Returns To Public Investments In Agriculture With Imperfect Downstream Competition, Stephen F. Hamilton, David L. Sunding

Economics

A multiple-market framework is developed to measure the size and distribution of research benefits. The model considers an upstream raw product market and a downstream finished product market and allows for imperfect competition in the intermediary food-processing sector. A central conceptual result is derived: an increase in raw product output is a sufficient condition for cost- reducing innovations in the farm sector to increase social welfare. A special case of linear farm supply and isoelastic processing production functions reveals that necessary conditions for welfare to decrease are a convergent farm supply shift, an oligopsonistic upstream market configuration, and increasing returns-to-scale …

Repeated Trade And The Velocity Of Money, Pradeep Dubey, Siddhartha Sahi, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

There are two sources of inefficiency of strategic equilibria (SE) in market mechanisms. The first is the oligopolistic effect, which occurs when an agent can single-handedly influence prices. With a continuum of agents we get “perfect competition” and this effect is, of course, wiped out. But the inefficiency of SE’s may nevertheless persist because agents are not “perfectly liquid,” i.e., the constraints of the mechanism are such that they cannot carry out arbitrary trades at the market prices. Our main result is that, if enough repeated rounds of trade are permitted within a single utility period, then the liquidity problem …

Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, Joseph F. Brodley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Oligopoly Power Under The Sherman And Clayton Acts -- From Economic Theory To Legal Policy, Joseph F. Brodley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

An Experimental Study Of Competitive Market Behavior, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in experimental games such as management decision-making games and games designed to simulate oligopolistic market phenomena. This article reports on a series of experimental games designed to study some of the hypotheses of neoclassical competitive market theory.