Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Essays On Macroeconomics, Mauricio Torres Ferro

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

My dissertation consists of three essays on Macroeconomics. In the first two chapters, I study the implications of uncertain expenses for households' savings and for their consumption adjustment in response to monetary policy. In the third chapter, I study how asset liquidity affects households’ ability to smooth idiosyncratic income shocks.

In the first chapter, I characterize uncertain expenses using U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey data. Here, my goals are twofold. First, I classify households’ spending that captures uncertainties in expenses (for example, car and home repairs or out-of-pocket medical expenses) and measure their overall importance. Second, I aim to understand how …

Essays On Public Policy Analysis Using Macroeconomic Models, Akihiro Nomura

Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)

This thesis is composed of three separate essays.

Differential Mortality And The Progressivity Of Social Security, Shantanu Bagchi

Upjohn Institute Working Papers

I examine if the positive correlation between wealth and survivorship has any implications for the progressivity of Social Security’s current benefit-earnings rule. Using a general-equilibrium macroeconomic model calibrated to the U.S. economy, I show that the optimal benefit-earnings link for Social Security is largely insensitive to wealth-dependent mortality risk. This is because while a more progressive benefit-earnings rule provides increased insurance for households with relatively unfavorable earnings histories, and therefore lower savings and survivorship, their relatively high mortality risk heavily discounts the utility from old-age consumption. I find that these two effects roughly offset each other, yielding nearly identical optimal …

Constrained Inefficiency And Optimal Taxation With Uninsurable Risks, Piero Gottardi, Atsushi Kajii, Tomoyuki Nakajima

Research Collection School Of Economics

When individuals' labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how? In a two-period general equilibrium model with production, we derive a decomposition formula of the welfare effects of these taxes into insurance and distribution effects. This allows us to determine how the sign of the optimal taxes on capital and labor depend on the nature of the shocks and the degree of heterogeneity among consumers' income, as well as on the way in which the tax revenue is used to provide lump-sum transfers to consumers. When shocks affect …

Optimal Taxation And Debt With Uninsurable Risks To Human Capital Accumulation, Piero Gottardi, Atsushi Kajii, Tomoyuki Nakajima

Research Collection School Of Economics

We consider an economy where individuals face uninsurable risks to their human capital accumulation and analyze the optimal level of linear taxes on capital and labor income together with the optimal path of government debt. We show that in the presence of such risks, it is beneficial to tax both labor and capital and to issue public debt. We also assess the quantitative importance of these findings, and show that the benefits of government debt and capital taxes both increase with the magnitude of idiosyncratic risks and the degree of relative risk aversion.

Insurance In Extended Family Networks, Orazio P. Attanasio, Costas Meghir, Corina Mommaerts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We investigate partial insurance and group risk sharing in extended family networks. Our approach is based on decomposing income shocks into group aggregate and idiosyncratic components, allowing us to measure the extent to which each component is insured. We apply our framework to extended family networks in the United States by exploiting the unique intergenerational structure of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find that over 60% of shocks to household income are potentially insurable within extended family networks. However, we find little evidence that the extended family provides insurance for such idiosyncratic shocks.

Insurance In Extended Family Networks, Orazio P. Attanasio, Costas Meghir, Corina Mommaerts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We investigate partial insurance and group risk sharing in extended family networks. Our approach is based on decomposing income shocks into group aggregate and idiosyncratic components, allowing us to measure the extent to which each is insured, having accounted for public insurance programs. We apply our framework to extended family networks in the United States by exploiting the unique intergenerational structure of the PSID. We find that over 60% of shocks to household income are potentially insurable within family networks. However, we find little evidence that the extended family provides insurance for such idiosyncratic shocks.

Income Inequality And Economic Incentives: Is There An Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff?, Lonnie K. Stevans

Lonnie K. Stevans

What is the basis and direction of relationship between income inequality and economic growth? The equity versus efficiency dictum which predicts a positive relationship between inequality, capital formation, and real GDP growth—emphasizes the importance of economic incentives. Subsequently, this was challenged by the incomplete markets and political outcomes theories, because of increasing empirical evidence of an inverse relationship between income inequality and economic growth. In this paper, a further explanation of the basis and nature of the inequality–capital–growth relationship is presented, which emphasizes the divergence between savings and investment. For the United States, over the period 1970–2006, we have found …

International Capital Flows With Limited Commitment And Incomplete Markets, Jürgen Von Hagen, Haiping Zhang

Research Collection School Of Economics

Recent literature has proposed two alternative types of financial frictions, i.e., limited commitment and incomplete markets, to explain the patterns of international capital flows between developed and developing countries observed in the past two decades. This paper integrates both types of frictions into a two-country overlapping-generations framework to facilitate a direct comparison of their effects. In our model, limited commitment distorts the investment made by agents with different productivity, which creates a wedge between the interest rates on equity capital vs. credit capital; while incomplete markets distort the investment among projects with different riskiness, which creates a wedge between the …

Radical Financial Innovation, Robert J. Shiller

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Radical financial innovation is the development of new institutions and methods that permit risk management to be extended far beyond its former realm, covering important new classes of risks. This paper compares past such innovation with potential future innovation, looking at the process that produced past success and the possibilities for future financial innovation.

Monetary Equilibrium With Missing Markets, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We consider a two-period model with missing assets and missing market links, in which money plays a central role and is linked to every instrument in the economy. If there are enough missing market links relative to the ratio of outside to inside money, then monetary equilibrium (ME) exists and money has positive value. The nonexistence of GEI (of the underlying economy) shows up as a liquidity trap in terms of the ME. In sharp contrast to GEI, the ME are generally determinate not only in terms of real, but also financial, variables.

If You're So Smart, Why Aren't You Rich?Belief Selection In Complete And Incomplete Markets, Larry Blume, David Easley

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper provides an analysis of the asymptotic properties of consumption allocations in a stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous consumers. In particular we investigate the market selection hypothesis, that markets favor traders with more accurate beliefs. We show that in any Pareto optimal allocation whether each consumer vanishes or survives is determined entirely by discount factors and beliefs. Since equilibrium allocations in economies with complete markets are Pareto optimal, our results characterize the limit behavior of these economies. We show that, all else equal, the market selects for consumers who use Bayesian learning with the truth in the support …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of moral hazard, adverse selection, and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. We impose a condition on the expected delivery rates for untraded assets that is similar to the trembling hand refinements used in game theory. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to …

Signalling And Default: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

In our previous paper we built a general equilibrium model of default and punishment in which equilibrium always exists and endogenously determines asset promises, penalties, and sales constraints. In this paper we interpret the endogenous sales constraints as equilibrium signals. By specializing the default penalties and imposing an exclusivity constraint on asset sales, we obtain a perfectly competitive version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance. In our model their separating equilibrium always exists even when they say it doesn’t.

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection, and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) and some moral hazard problems in a general equilibrium framework. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, we show that equilibrium always exists. We show that more lenient punishment which encourages default may be Pareto improving because it …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, we show that equilibrium always exists. We show that more lenient punishment which encourages default may be Pareto improving because it increases the dimension of …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena (including the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. In contrast to game-theoretic models of adverse selection, our perfectly competitive framework eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. The …

Default In A General Equilibrium Model With Incomplete Markets, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI) to allow for default. The equilibrating variables include aggregate default levels, as well as prices of assets and commodities. Default can be either strategic, or due to ill-fortune. It can be caused by events directly affecting the borrower, or indirectly as part of a chain reaction in which a borrower cannot repay because he himself has not been repaid. Each asset is defined by its promises A , the penalties lambda for default, and the limitations Q on its sale. The model is thus named GE ( A …

An Introduction To General Equilibrium With Incomplete Asset Markets, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

I survey the major results in the theory of general equilibrium with incomplete asset markets. I also introduce the papers in this volume and offer a few suggestions for further work.

The Capital Asset Pricing Model As A General Equilibrium With Incomplete Markets, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We recast the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in the broader context of general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI). In this setting we give proofs of three properties of CAPM equilibria: they are efficient, asset prices lie on a “security market line,” and all agents hold the same two mutual funds. The first property requires a riskless asset, the latter two do not. We show that across all GEI only one of these three properties of equilibrium is generally valid: asset prices depend on covariances, not variances. We extend CAPM to many consumption goods in such a way that all …

Liquidity And Bankruptcy With Incomplete Markets: Pure Exchange, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We enlarge the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete market (GEI), to incorporate liquidity constraints as well as the possibility of bankruptcy and default. A new equilibrium results, which we abbreviate GELBI (general equilibrium with liquidity, bankruptcy and incomplete markets). When the supply of bank money and bankruptcy/default penalties are taken sufficiently high (the high regime), GEI occur as GELBI. But outside the high regime many new phenomena appear: money is (almost) never neutral, it has positive value and its optimum quantity is often finite; bankruptcy and default not only occur in equilibrium but can have welfare improving consequences …