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Articles 721 - 735 of 735

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Ocs Leasing And Auctions: Incentives And The Performance Of Alternative Bidding Institutions, James W. Cox, R. Mark Isaac, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1983

Ocs Leasing And Auctions: Incentives And The Performance Of Alternative Bidding Institutions, James W. Cox, R. Mark Isaac, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

In Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, the Supreme Court rebutted a challenge to the federal government's mix of "nontraditional" outer continental shelflease-auction mechanisms authorized under the 1978 OCS Amendments. The issues of this case addressed here include: the economic intent of the congressional language; incentive properties of various of the authorized auction processes; methodological shortcomings inherent in the implicit congressional directive for field experimentation; and, the usefulness of laboratory experimental economics in answering relevant auction-policy questions. The discussion of experimental economics includes evidence already gained from laboratory experiments relating to hypotheses about auction-market performance


Banking In Orange County: Early Years, Lynne Doti Jan 1980

Banking In Orange County: Early Years, Lynne Doti

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This article explores the beginnings of banking in Orange County.


Banking In California: Some Evidence On Structure, 1878-1905, Lynne Doti Jan 1978

Banking In California: Some Evidence On Structure, 1878-1905, Lynne Doti

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Doti’s thesis explains the contribution of state banks to nineteenth century financial history in the United States.


The Principle Of Unanimity And Voluntary Consent In Social Choice, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1977

The Principle Of Unanimity And Voluntary Consent In Social Choice, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

A discrete version of the author's incentive-compatible Auction Mechanism for public goods is applied to the problem of social choice (voting) among distinct mutually exclusive alternatives. This Auction Election is a bidding mechanism characterized by (1) unanimity, (2) provision for the voluntary compensation of voters harmed by a winning proposition, and (3) incentives for 'reasonable' bidding by excluding members of a collective from maximal increase in benefit if they fail to agree on the proposition with largest surplus. Four of five experiments with six voters, bidding privacy, monetary rewards, and cyclical majority rule structure choose the best of three propositions.


The Primitive Hunter Culture, Pleistocene Extinction, And The Rise Of Agriculture, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1975

The Primitive Hunter Culture, Pleistocene Extinction, And The Rise Of Agriculture, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

The hypothesis that megafauna extinction some 10,000 years ago was due to "overkill" by Paleolithic hunters is examined using an economic model of a replenishable resource. The large herding animals that became extinct, such as mammoth, bison, camel, and mastodon, presented low hunting cost and high kill value. The absence of appropriation provided incentives for the wastage killing evident in some kill sites, while the slow growth, long lives, and long maturation of large animals increased their vulnerability to extinction. Free-access hunting is compared with socially optimal hunting and used to interpret the development of conservationist ethics, and controls, in …


Review Of "Essays In The Theory Of Risk Bearing", Vernon L. Smith Jan 1974

Review Of "Essays In The Theory Of Risk Bearing", Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Vernon Smith reviews "Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing" by Kenneth J. Arrow.


On Models Of Commercial Fishing: The Traditional Literature Needs No Defenders, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1972

On Models Of Commercial Fishing: The Traditional Literature Needs No Defenders, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Examines the models of commercial fishing. Representation of the variable K as a measure of crowding externality in the cost function; Change of the degree of fishing pressure without changing the variable K; Modification of the output of firms by varying the inputs.


On Models Of Commercial Fishing, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1969

On Models Of Commercial Fishing, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Commercial fishing is characterized by three key economic and technological features that are relevant to the formulation of an economic theory of fish production. 1. A fishery resource, although conceivably exhaustible, is replenishable; that is, it is subject to laws of natural growth which define an environmental biotechnological constraint on the activities of the fishing industry. 2. The resource and the activity of production from it form a stock-flow relationship. The new growth in the population fish mass depends upon the harvest rate relative to natural recruitment to the stock. If the harvest rate exceeds the recruitment rate, the stock …


Taxes And Share Valuation In Competitive Markets, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1969

Taxes And Share Valuation In Competitive Markets, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This paper extends the fundamental theorem of share (or capital) valuation under conditions of certainty and purely competitive markets, to allow for the distinction between capital gains and income in the taxation of personal income. The objective is to develop the theorem for the tax case in a form general enough to allow for corporations both currently and not currently paying a dividend. However, the general derivation is sufficiently tedious to warrant a presentation which begins with less general cases. Accordingly, we will first develop the share valuation equation for a continuous discount version of the taxless case for corporations …


Optimal Insurance Coverage, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1968

Optimal Insurance Coverage, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

There is limited treatment of the optimal protection of assets against casualty or liability loss. The problem of optimal insurance coverage is formally similar to the problem of optimal inventory stockage under uncertainty. If casualty or liability loss (demand) is less than the insurance coverage (inventory level), excessive insurance cost (inventory holding cost) is incurred. If casualty or liability loss (demand) is greater than the insurance coverage (inventory level), one must absorb the cost of the unrecoverable loss (sales loss). These two components of loss must be balanced in determining optimal insurance (inventory) levels.


Experimental Studies Of Discrimination Versus Competition In Sealed Bid Auction Markets, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1967

Experimental Studies Of Discrimination Versus Competition In Sealed Bid Auction Markets, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

In this study, attention focuses on the behavior of a class of auction markets where formal organization requires the individual competing bidders to submit one or more written "sealed bids" specifying the quantity and price at which they are committed to buy (or sell) units of the item being traded.


Bidding Theory And The Treasury Bill Auction: Does Price Discrimination Increase Bill Prices?, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1966

Bidding Theory And The Treasury Bill Auction: Does Price Discrimination Increase Bill Prices?, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This paper is not directed to the question of whether the Treasury should or should not practice in the public sector what the Clayton Act prohibits in the private sector. The paper is concerned exclusively with the theoretical question of whether the Treasury would necessarily receive higher prices by employing price discrimination than it could get by selling the issues at a single price. From a theory of bidding under uncertainty, which seems to apply naturally to the Treasury auction, it will be shown that buyers may be expected to enter lower bids under price discrimination than they would for …


Experimental Auction Markets And The Walrasian Hypothesis, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1965

Experimental Auction Markets And The Walrasian Hypothesis, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This study reports on a block of experimental market sessions designed primarily to provide (1) the severest test yet attempted of the equilibrating forces operating in competitive auction markets and (2) a more rigorously controlled test of the Walrasian hypothesis. Some data are also supplied which show the effect of cash payoffs on the equilibrating behavior of such markets; in particular, the effect of full cash payoffs to all successful trading subjects as against payoffs to a subset of such subjects chosen at random.


An Experimental Study Of Competitive Market Behavior, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1962

An Experimental Study Of Competitive Market Behavior, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in experimental games such as management decision-making games and games designed to simulate oligopolistic market phenomena. This article reports on a series of experimental games designed to study some of the hypotheses of neoclassical competitive market theory.


An Economic Analysis Of Contributions Under The Income Tax Laws, Floyd E. Gillis, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1958

An Economic Analysis Of Contributions Under The Income Tax Laws, Floyd E. Gillis, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

In this note classical tools are used to examine the treatment of "gifts in kind" under the federal income-tax laws as they were but a few years ago, as they are today, and as they should be, given the objective that the law appears to be trying to achieve. It will be demonstrated that, under certain conditions, firms today can maximize profit after taxes by producing some output to be given to acceptable charities.