Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics Commons^™

Coalitions And Cliques In The School Choice Problem, Sinan Aksoy, Alexander Adam Azzam, Chaya Coppersmith, Julie Glass, Gizem Karaali, Xueying Zhao, Xinjing Zhu

Pomona Faculty Publications and Research

The school choice mechanism design problem focuses on assignment mechanisms matching students to public schools in a given school district. The well-known Gale Shapley Student Optimal Stable Matching Mechanism (SOSM) is the most efficient stable mechanism proposed so far as a solution to this problem. However its inefficiency is well-documented, and recently the Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (EADAM) was proposed as a remedy for this weakness. In this note we describe two related adjustments to SOSM with the intention to address the same inefficiency issue. In one we create possibly artificial coalitions among students where some students modify their …