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Full-Text Articles in Programming Languages and Compilers
Demonstration Of Cyberattacks And Mitigation Of Vulnerabilities In A Webserver Interface For A Cybersecure Power Router, Benjamin Allen
Demonstration Of Cyberattacks And Mitigation Of Vulnerabilities In A Webserver Interface For A Cybersecure Power Router, Benjamin Allen
Computer Science and Computer Engineering Undergraduate Honors Theses
Cyberattacks are a threat to critical infrastructure, which must be secured against them to ensure continued operation. A defense-in-depth approach is necessary to secure all layers of a smart-grid system and contain the impact of any exploited vulnerabilities. In this undergraduate thesis a webserver interface for smart-grid devices communicating over Modbus TCP was developed and exposed to SQL Injection attacks and Cross-Site Scripting attacks. Analysis was performed on Supply-Chain attacks and a mitigation developed for attacks stemming from compromised Content Delivery Networks. All attempted attacks were unable to exploit vulnerabilities in the webserver due to its use of input sanitization …
When Good Components Go Bad: Formally Secure Compilation Despite Dynamic Compromise, Guglielmo Fachini, CăTăLin Hriţcu, Marco Stronati, Arthur Azevedo De Amorim, Carmine Abate, Roberto Blanco, Théo Laurent, Benjamin C. Pierce, Andrew Tolmach
When Good Components Go Bad: Formally Secure Compilation Despite Dynamic Compromise, Guglielmo Fachini, CăTăLin Hriţcu, Marco Stronati, Arthur Azevedo De Amorim, Carmine Abate, Roberto Blanco, Théo Laurent, Benjamin C. Pierce, Andrew Tolmach
Computer Science Faculty Publications and Presentations
We propose a new formal criterion for secure compilation, giving strong end-to-end security guarantees for software components written in unsafe, low-level languages with C-style undefined behavior. Our criterion is the first to model dynamic compromise in a system of mutually distrustful components running with least privilege. Each component is protected from all the others—in particular, from components that have encountered undefined behavior and become compromised. Each component receives secure compilation guarantees up to the point when it becomes compromised, after which an attacker can take complete control over the component and use any of its privileges to attack the remaining …