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Full-Text Articles in Physical Sciences and Mathematics

Experimental Evidence For Heterogeneous Expectations In A Simple New Keynesian Framework, Atticus David Holm Graven Apr 2014

Experimental Evidence For Heterogeneous Expectations In A Simple New Keynesian Framework, Atticus David Holm Graven

Business and Economics Honors Papers

This paper is a two-dimensional analysis of agent behavior in a standard New Keynesian (NK) Macroeconomic model. On the dimension of pure mathematics, we analyze the parameters of the NK model and of possible prediction rules. On the other dimension we continue a practice of empirical study of heterogeneous expectations with an experiment. The experiment will ask participants to make predictions of future output and inflation. Their responses will create a data-set upon which analysis will be performed to illuminate and corroborate current theories of economic decision making. The literature has shown that most agents' forecasting rules can be modeled …


Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection For Generic Two-Player Games, Srihari Govindan, Robert B. Wilson May 2009

Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection For Generic Two-Player Games, Srihari Govindan, Robert B. Wilson

Robert B Wilson

We impose three conditions on refinements of the Nash equilibria of finite games with perfect recall that select closed connected subsets, called solutions. A. Each equilibrium in a solution uses undominated strategies; B. Each solution contains a quasi-perfect equilibrium; C. The solutions of a game map to the solutions of an embedded game, where a game is embedded if each player's feasible strategies and payoffs are preserved by a multilinear map. We prove for games with two players and generic payoffs that these conditions characterize each solution as an essential component of equilibria in undominated strategies, and thus a stable …