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Articles 1 - 17 of 17
Full-Text Articles in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology
Time To Stop Pretending We Don’T Know Other Animals Are Sentient Beings, Marc Bekoff
Time To Stop Pretending We Don’T Know Other Animals Are Sentient Beings, Marc Bekoff
Animal Sentience
Rowan et al.’s target article is an outstanding review of some of the history of the science of sentience, but one would have liked to see a much stronger “call to action.” We don’t need any more data to know that many other animals are sentient beings whose lives must be protected from harm in a wide variety of contexts. It is not anti-science to want more action on behalf of other animals right now.
Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates, Scarlett R. Howard, Matthew R.E. Symonds
Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates, Scarlett R. Howard, Matthew R.E. Symonds
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) have built on the discussion about which species deserve inclusion in animal ethics and welfare considerations. Here, we raise questions concerning the assessment criteria. We ask how to assess different species for their ability to fulfill the criteria, which criteria are most important, how we quantify them (absolute or on a continuum), and how non-animals such as fungi and plants fit into this paradigm.
Problems With Basing Insect Ethics On Individuals’ Welfare, Susana Monsó, Antonio J. Osuna-Mascaró
Problems With Basing Insect Ethics On Individuals’ Welfare, Susana Monsó, Antonio J. Osuna-Mascaró
Animal Sentience
In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to arthropods. In this commentary, we show that there are some unforeseen obstacles to applying the sort of individualistic welfare-based ethics that M&P have in mind to certain arthropods, namely, insects. These obstacles have to do with the fact that there are often many more individuals involved in our dealings with insects than our ethical theories anticipate, and also with the fact that, in some sense, some insects count as more than an individual and, in another sense, they sometimes count as less than an …
Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff
Sentience Is The Foundation Of Animal Rights, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman argue that the cognitive differences between humans and nonhuman animals do not make humans superior to animals. I suggest that humans have domain-general cognitive abilities that make them superior in causing uniquely complex changes in the world not caused by any other species. The ability to conceive of and articulate a claim of rights is an example. However, possession of superior cognitive ability does not entitle humans to superior moral status. It is sentience, not cognitive complexity, that is the basis for the assignment of rights and the protections under the law that accompany them.
Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus
Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus
Animal Sentience
I qualify two criticisms made by commentators on Chapman & Huffman’s target article. Responding to the view that differences between humans and other animals are irrelevant to deciding how we should treat other species, I point out that differences between any species in their capacity to suffer are morally relevant. And in response to the claim that suffering is the sole criterion for the moral treatment of animals, I argue that cognitive complexity and a capacity for empathy also have moral relevance to the extent that they influence suffering.
Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration, S. Brian Hood, Sophia Giddens
Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration, S. Brian Hood, Sophia Giddens
Animal Sentience
Identifying specific traits to justify according differential moral status to humans and non-human animals may be more challenging than Chapman & Huffman suggest. The reasons for this also go against their recommendation that we ought to attend to how humans and non-humans are similar. The problem lies in identifying the moral relevance of biological characteristics. There are, however, other reasons for treating non-human animals as worthy of moral consideration, such as the Precautionary Principle.
On Crabs And Statistics, Jonathan Birch
On Crabs And Statistics, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
I respond to commentaries by Elwood and Seth & Dienes and to a recent critique by Diggles, discussing the link between avoidance learning and sentience, the relevance of the clash between frequentist and Bayesian statistics, the risks to decapod welfare in aquaculture, and the broader concerns one may have about a “precautionary” approach to protecting invertebrates.
Why Animal Welfarism Continues To Fail, Lori Marino
Why Animal Welfarism Continues To Fail, Lori Marino
Lori Marino, PhD
Welfarism prioritizes human interests over the needs of nonhuman animals. Despite decades of welfare efforts other animals are mostly worse off than ever before, being subjected to increasingly invasive and harmful treatments, especially in the factory farming and biomedical research areas. A legal rights-based approach is essential in order for other animals to be protected from the varying ethical whims of our species.
Wild Justice Redux: What We Know About Social Justice In Animals And Why It Matters, Jessica Pierce, Marc Bekoff
Wild Justice Redux: What We Know About Social Justice In Animals And Why It Matters, Jessica Pierce, Marc Bekoff
Marc Bekoff, PhD
Social justice in animals is beginning to attract interest in a broad range of academic disciplines. Justice is an important area of study because it may help explain social dynamics among individuals living in tightly- knit groups, as well as social interactions among individuals who only occasionally meet. In this paper, we provide an overview of what is currently known about social justice in animals and offer an agenda for further research. We provide working definitions of key terms, outline some central research questions, and explore some of the challenges of studying social justice in animals, as well as the …
What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano
What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano
Animal Sentience
Starting with its title, Key’s (2016) target article advocates the view that fish do not feel pain. The author describes the neuroanatomical, physiological and behavioural conditions involved in the experience of pain in humans and rodents and confidently applies analogical arguments as though they were established facts in support of the negative conclusion about the inability of fish to feel pain. The logical reasoning, unfortunately, becomes somewhat incoherent, with the arbitrary application of the designated human criteria for an analogical argument to one animal species (e.g., rodents) but not another (fish). Research findings are reported selectively, and questionable interpretations are …
What’S The Common Sense Of Just Some Improvement Of Some Welfare For Some Animals?, Liv Baker
What’S The Common Sense Of Just Some Improvement Of Some Welfare For Some Animals?, Liv Baker
Animal Sentience
The goal of Animal Welfare Science to reduce animal suffering is commendable but too modest: Suffering animals need and deserve far more.
Why Animal Welfarism Continues To Fail, Lori Marino
Why Animal Welfarism Continues To Fail, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Welfarism prioritizes human interests over the needs of nonhuman animals. Despite decades of welfare efforts other animals are mostly worse off than ever before, being subjected to increasingly invasive and harmful treatments, especially in the factory farming and biomedical research areas. A legal rights-based approach is essential in order for other animals to be protected from the varying ethical whims of our species.
Animal Cognition, Kristin Andrews, Ljiljana Radenovic
Animal Cognition, Kristin Andrews, Ljiljana Radenovic
Kristin Andrews, PhD
Debates in applied ethics about the proper treatment of animals often refer to empirical data about animal cognition, emotion, and behavior. In addition, there is increasing interest in the question of whether any nonhuman animal could be something like a moral agent.
Wild Justice Redux: What We Know About Social Justice In Animals And Why It Matters, Jessica Pierce, Marc Bekoff
Wild Justice Redux: What We Know About Social Justice In Animals And Why It Matters, Jessica Pierce, Marc Bekoff
Ethology Collection
Social justice in animals is beginning to attract interest in a broad range of academic disciplines. Justice is an important area of study because it may help explain social dynamics among individuals living in tightly- knit groups, as well as social interactions among individuals who only occasionally meet. In this paper, we provide an overview of what is currently known about social justice in animals and offer an agenda for further research. We provide working definitions of key terms, outline some central research questions, and explore some of the challenges of studying social justice in animals, as well as the …
Ethics In A Time Of Crises, David A. Bainbridge
Ethics In A Time Of Crises, David A. Bainbridge
David A Bainbridge
Global crises reveal the weakness of our current ethical construct. A more inclusive ethical framework is needed to encourage and support sustainable development and management of resources and restoration of damaged ecosystems.
Science, Values And Animal Welfare: Exploring The ‘Inextricable Connection’, D. Fraser
Science, Values And Animal Welfare: Exploring The ‘Inextricable Connection’, D. Fraser
Animal Welfare Collection
In conceptualizing animal welfare, it is useful to distinguish among three types of concepts. 'Type l' are single, measurable attributes. 'Type 2' are single attributes that cannot be measured directly but can be estimated by correctly combining various contributing attributes. 'Type 3' are concepts involving multiple attributes which are grouped together because they serve some common function, and whose relative importance cannot be established in an entirely objective way. Individuals who treat animal welfare as a type 1 concept may propose single, objective measures of welfare, such as longevity or levels of stress-related hormones; however, this approach rests on judgements, …
Aldo Leopold's "Land Ethic": An Ecological Extension Of Albert Schweitzer's "Reverence For Life", John Lee Weaver
Aldo Leopold's "Land Ethic": An Ecological Extension Of Albert Schweitzer's "Reverence For Life", John Lee Weaver
Undergraduate Honors Capstone Projects
As a member of the world community, and in the process of becoming a professional ecologist, I have begun a search for a personal ecological ethic to guide my actions. Two of the paths I have taken in my search are Albert Schweitzer's Reverence for Life ethic and Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic. They are relevant because each has extended the scope of ethics beyond Homo Sapiens. Their thoughts, with similarities and dissimilarities, form herein my travels.