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Full-Text Articles in Life Sciences
Multiple Ways To Implement And Infer Sentience, Nicolas Rouleau, Michael Levin
Multiple Ways To Implement And Infer Sentience, Nicolas Rouleau, Michael Levin
Animal Sentience
Segundo-Ortin & Calvo’s (S&C’s) thorough review of “plant neurobiology” presents evidence supporting the possibility of plant sentience. They make a compelling case that plants anticipate, assess risk, cooperate, mimic, and pursue goals, as do their animal counterparts. S&C point out that there is a double standard: behavioural patterns associated with subjective experiences in humans are considered valid for inferring cognition in non-human animals but not in diverse other systems including plants. We argue that cognitive functions, including sentience, can potentially be achieved by very different systems and their disparate substrates. We offer some context from the basal cognition literature and …
Do Plants Have The Cognitive Complexity For Sentience?, Ricard V. Solé
Do Plants Have The Cognitive Complexity For Sentience?, Ricard V. Solé
Animal Sentience
Are plants sentient? Like other aspects of the cognitive potential of plants, this is a controversial issue, often driven by analogies and seldom supported on solid theoretical grounds. Sentience is understood in cognitive sciences as the capacity to feel. I suggest that because of plants’ evolved adaptations to morphological plasticity, sessile nature and ecological constraints, they are unlikely to have the requisite cognitive complexity for sentience.
What If Plants Compute?, Jordi Vallverdú
What If Plants Compute?, Jordi Vallverdú
Animal Sentience
The unexpended cognitive capacities of plants suggest the possibility of combining them with advances in computation. It is important to explore such a new field of research despite the incompleteness of the empirical support for it.
Insulting Words: "They Are Animals!", Carolyn A. Ristau
Insulting Words: "They Are Animals!", Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
As Chapman & Huffman state, creating divisive human categories has rationalized atrocities committed against the “other.” Labeling neighboring warring villagers as “animals” is considered a despicable insult. Yet contemporary scientific views of many animals grant them thinking and conscious faculties, and the capacity for impressive achievements, many unattainable by humans. Robots, too, can accomplish many similar feats. But the essential reason we must protect animals is not because of their admirable abilities, but their capacity for consciousness, for suffering. Robots are not conscious. Participants in the human-animal debate should not complain about changing criteria for determining human uniqueness. New and …