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Regulating In Foresight Versus Judging Liability In Hindsight: The Case Of Tobacco, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski Dec 2014

Regulating In Foresight Versus Judging Liability In Hindsight: The Case Of Tobacco, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Potentially dangerous products, such as cigarettes, can be regulated through ex post liability or ex ante regulation. Both systems should reach the same result. In practice, however, cognitive biases that influence the liability system can produce incentives to take an excess of precautions. In particular, because people tend to see past events as more predictable than they really were, judges and juries will tend to find defendants who took reasonable care negligent or even reckless. As a consequence of these biases, a liability system can be more expensive than a regulatory system, both to potential defendants and to society. Cognitive …


Regulating In Foresight Versus Judging Liability In Hindsight: The Case Of Tobacco, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski Apr 1999

Regulating In Foresight Versus Judging Liability In Hindsight: The Case Of Tobacco, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Potentially dangerous products, such as cigarettes, can be regulated through ex post liability or ex ante regulation. Both systems should reach the same result. In practice, however, cognitive biases that influence the liability system can produce incentives to take an excess of precautions. In particular, because people tend to see past events as more predictable than they really were, judges and juries will tend to find defendants who took reasonable care negligent or even reckless. As a consequence of these biases, a liability system can be more expensive than a regulatory system, both to potential defendants and to society. Cognitive …


The Case For A "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, Richard C. Ausness Jan 1996

The Case For A "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, Richard C. Ausness

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Federal administrative agencies have established safety standards or licensing procedures for airplanes, motor vehicles, pesticides, drugs, medical devices, and a variety of other products. At the same time, product sellers are subject to tort liability even though their products comply with applicable federal safety standards. Product sellers maintain that compliance with federal safety standards ought to protect them from liability under state tort law and have relied upon several legal principles to support this claim. The first, and most successful, theory is federal preemption. Under this concept, Congress may expressly or impliedly assert the primacy of federal law under the …