Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Taxation-Federal Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Taxation-Federal

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Tax compliance

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Taxation-Federal

Does Enforcement Reduce Voluntary Tax Compliance?, Leandra Lederman Jan 2018

Does Enforcement Reduce Voluntary Tax Compliance?, Leandra Lederman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Governments generally use enforcement methods, such as audits and the imposition of penalties, to deter noncompliance with tax laws. Although this approach is consistent with most economic modeling of tax compliance, some scholars caution that enforcement may backfire, “crowding out” taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations to pay taxes to such an extent that they reduce their tax payments. This article analyzes the existing evidence to determine if this occurs. In fact, field studies suggest that enforcement tools, such as audits, are effective deterrents, generally greatly increasing tax collections. A few recent studies have found that audits have a negative effect on the …


Consumer-Based Use Tax Enforcement And Taxpayer Compliance, David Gamage, Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske Jan 2017

Consumer-Based Use Tax Enforcement And Taxpayer Compliance, David Gamage, Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This essay explains how current state government approaches to use-tax enforcement undermine tax morale and taxpayer compliance. This essay further argues that these threats to tax morale and taxpayer compliance will become even more severe as many states are moving toward adopting notice and reporting statutes for their sales and use taxes.


Enforcement As Substance In Tax Compliance, Leandra Lederman, Ted Sichelman Jan 2013

Enforcement As Substance In Tax Compliance, Leandra Lederman, Ted Sichelman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

It is well known that the government's complete failure to enforce a law can nullify that law. But what are the effects of partial enforcement? This Article shows that imperfect enforcement can alter the de facto content of the written law in predictable and beneficial ways. Specifically, in the tax compliance context, even if perfect enforcement were costless, it would not always be socially optimal. When improving the substantive law is infeasible, the enforcement agency can effect beneficial changes in the law by adopting a probabilistic enforcement scheme that varies according to the category of taxpayer and type of transaction. …


Reducing Information Gaps To Reduce The Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, Leandra Lederman Jan 2010

Reducing Information Gaps To Reduce The Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, Leandra Lederman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

A core problem for enforcement of tax laws is asymmetric information. The taxpayer knows the facts regarding the relevant transactions it engages in during the year-or at least has ready access to that information. The government is forced to play catch-up, obtaining that information either from the taxpayer or from third parties. Information reporting is routinely used to address this information gap. The government obtains information about the taxpayer's tax situation from a third party and-equally important-the taxpayer knows that the government has received that information. This fosters taxpayer honesty. Information reporting is not a panacea, however. It imposes costs …


Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play In Tax Compliance, Leandra Lederman Jan 2007

Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play In Tax Compliance, Leandra Lederman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Recent legal and economic scholarship has recognized that the government can use structural systems as an efficient way to reduce prohibited behavior. The federal tax system employs structural mechanisms, such as withholding taxes, to foster compliance. The use of structural systems to reduce tax evasion need not be limited to tax administration, however. The Article argues that substantive federal income tax law can - and in many contexts does - foster compliance by harnessing the structural incentives of third parties. Although this phenomenon has gone largely unnoticed, third parties are routinely used by the tax system to verify the bona …


Addressing Imperfections In The Tax System: Procedural Or Substantive Reform?, Leandra Lederman, Stephen W. Mazza Jan 2005

Addressing Imperfections In The Tax System: Procedural Or Substantive Reform?, Leandra Lederman, Stephen W. Mazza

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In his book "Perfectly Legal: The Covert Campaign to Rig Our Tax System to Benefit the Super Rich - and Cheat Everybody Else", David Cay Johnston, the Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the New York Times, covers a wide array of topics, including some that are quite complex, in a very readable way. The federal income tax system generally and tax compliance in particular are important focuses of the book, but the theme that implicitly connects chapters that otherwise appear unrelated is a variety of aspects of income inequality.

Although "Perfectly Legal" does not make a clear case that politicians and …