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Miranda v. Arizona

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Institution
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Articles 61 - 68 of 68

Full-Text Articles in Supreme Court of the United States

Brewer V. Williams, Massiah And Miranda: What Is 'Interrogation'? When Does It Matter?, Yale Kamisar Jan 1978

Brewer V. Williams, Massiah And Miranda: What Is 'Interrogation'? When Does It Matter?, Yale Kamisar

Articles

On Christmas Eve, 1968, a ten-year-old girl, Pamela Powers, disappeared while with her family in Des Moines, Iowa.2 Defendant Williams, an escapee from a mental institution and a deeply religious person, 3 was suspected of murdering her, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.4 Williams telephoned a Des Moines lawyer, McKnight, and on his advice surrendered himself to the Davenport, Iowa, police.5 Captain Learning and another Des Moines police officer arranged to drive the 160 miles to Davenport, pick up Williams, and return him directly to Des Moines. 6 Both the trial court 7 and the federal district court8 …


Taxpayer Rights In Noncustodial Irs Investigations After Beckwith V. United States, Curtis L. Christensen Jan 1977

Taxpayer Rights In Noncustodial Irs Investigations After Beckwith V. United States, Curtis L. Christensen

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The recent Supreme Court decision in Beckwith v. United States, holding that Miranda does not extend to noncustodial tax investigations, has important implications with respect to the News Release doctrine and the involuntary consent grounds considered in motions to suppress evidence. This article will examine Beckwith and its potential significance with respect to these other doctrines, discussing the factors which the IRS and the courts should consider in order to assure fair treatment of taxpayers during investigations.


Foreword: Brewer V. Williams--A Hard Look At A Discomfiting Record, Yale Kamisar Jan 1977

Foreword: Brewer V. Williams--A Hard Look At A Discomfiting Record, Yale Kamisar

Articles

In recent decades, few matters have split the Supreme Court, troubled the legal profession, and agitated the public as much as the police interrogation-confession cases. The recent case of Brewer v. Williams3 is as provocative as any, because the Supreme Court there revdrsed the defendant's conviction for the "savage murder of a small child" even though no Justice denied his guilt,4 he was warned of his rights no fewer than five times, 5 and any "interrogation" that might have occurred seemed quite mild.6


Kauper's 'Judicial Examination Of The Accused' Forty Years Later—Some Comments On A Remarkable Article, Yale Kamisar Nov 1974

Kauper's 'Judicial Examination Of The Accused' Forty Years Later—Some Comments On A Remarkable Article, Yale Kamisar

Articles

For a long time before Professor Paul Kauper wrote "Judicial Examination of the Accused" in 1932, and for a long time thereafter, the "legal mind" shut out the de facto inquisitorial system that characterized American criminal procedure. Paul Kauper could not look away. He recognized the "naked, ugly facts" (p. 1224) and was determined to do something about them -more than thirty years before Escobedo v. Illinois' or Miranda v. Arizona.2


Prospectivity And Retroactivity Of Supreme Court Constitutional Interpretations Jan 1970

Prospectivity And Retroactivity Of Supreme Court Constitutional Interpretations

University of Richmond Law Review

The freedom of a court, state or federal, to define the limits of ad- herence to precedent has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court in both civil' and criminal cases. Accordingly, any decision can be made to apply to future cases or relate back to all past cases. In no other area of the law is such a decision more important than in the field of criminal procedure where the freedom of a convicted man can rest upon a decision to apply a new "rule" retroactively or prospectively. It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of retroactivity cases involve …


'Custodial Interrogation' Within The Meaning Of Miranda, Yale Kamisar Jan 1968

'Custodial Interrogation' Within The Meaning Of Miranda, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

The primary conceptual hurdle confronting the Miranda Court was the "legal reasoning" that any and all police interrogation is unaffected by the privilege against self-incrimination because such interrogation does not involve any kind of judicial process for the taking of testimony; inasmuch as police officers have no legal authority to compel statements of any kind, there is no legal obligation, ran the argument, to which a privilege can apply. See, e.g., the discussion and authorities collected in Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. …


Police Interrogation And The Supreme Court--The Latest Round, Jerold H. Israel Jan 1967

Police Interrogation And The Supreme Court--The Latest Round, Jerold H. Israel

Book Chapters

My first task is to explain to some degree the nature of the problem embodied in our title. This book has been designated as "Escobedo-The Second Round." What we will be discussing is a series of cases, decided in June, 1966, the most noteworthy of which is Miranda v. Arizona [384 U.S. 436 (1966)]. In these cases, the United States Supreme Court prescribed a new set of standards governing the introduction in evidence of statements obtained from the defendant through police interrogation. Actually, to a degree these standards were not entirely new. They had been suggested, at least in part, …


A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar Jan 1966

A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar

Articles

F the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch conversations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I have participated this past summer3 are any indication, Miranda v. Arizona' has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions do not escape attention.