State and Local Government Law Commons^™

Solving Slapp Slop, Nicole J. Ligon

University of Richmond Law Review

In a substantial minority of states, wealthy and powerful individuals can, without much consequence, bring defamation lawsuits against the press and concerned citizens to silence and intimidate them. These lawsuits, known as “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (“SLAPP”s), are brought not to compensate a wrongfully injured person, but rather to discourage the defendants from exercising their First Amendment rights. In other words, when well resourced individuals feel disrespected by public criticism, they sometimes sue the media or concerned citizens, forcing these speakers to defend themselves in exorbitantly expensive defamation actions. In states without anti-SLAPP statutes—statutes aimed at protecting speakers from …

What Is The Standard For Obtaining A Preliminary Injunction In Virginia?, Stuart A. Raphael

University of Richmond Law Review

A perception exists that the Supreme Court of Virginia has not articulated the legal standard for adjudicating preliminary-injunction motions in Virginia circuit courts. For decades, lawyers and legal scholars have advocated that Virginia trial judges borrow the federal preliminary-injunction standard applied in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Virginia trial courts have generally followed that advice. Virginia courts at first applied the Fourth Circuit’s Blackwelder test, which called upon judges to balance the four traditional factors and allowed a stronger balanceof-hardship showing to offset a weaker showing of likely success on the merits. After the 2008 …

Replacing Tinker, Noah C. Chauvin

University of Richmond Law Review

In this Article, I wish to question whether reaffirming the animating spirit of Tinker is the best way to protect student speech rights. In allowing schools to punish student speech that school officials reasonably believe could be substantially disruptive, Tinker founds students’ free expression rights on unstable ground. This is true for two reasons. First, the Tinker standard allows school officials to regulate student speech based on their own perceptions of what its impacts will be. While these perceptions must be reasonable, courts have shown extraordinary deference to educators’ claims that student speech could be substantially disruptive. Second, the substantial …

Redefining The Badges Of Slavery, Nicholas Serafin

University of Richmond Law Review

Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to eliminate the “badges and incidents” of slavery. What constitutes an incident of slavery is clear: the incidents of slavery are the legal restrictions, such as submission to a master and a ban on the ownership of productive property, that were inherent in the institution of slavery itself. What constitutes a badge of slavery is far less certain, and relatively few legal scholars have examined the historical meaning of the metaphor. Nevertheless, there has emerged a renewed interest in Section 2, such that the literature now abounds with proposals for …

Frenemy Federalism, Scott Bloomberg

University of Richmond Law Review

Federalism scholars have long been fascinated by the unique relationship between the federal government and states that have legalized marijuana. And with good reason. For the past fifty years, Congress has classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), deeming the drug to have a high potential for abuse and no accepted medical use. Congress’s aim in establishing Schedule I of the CSA was to “eliminate the market in Schedule I substances.” Thus, possessing, distributing, and manufacturing marijuana are federally illegal. Congress’s objective notwithstanding, over two-thirds of the states (and territories) have legalized marijuana …

Out Of Sight And Out Of Mind: Criminal Laws Disguised Moral Culpability Requirement, Andrew Ingram

University of Richmond Law Review

Last spring, the Supreme Court of the United States made a little-remarked constitutional ruling in Kahler v. Kansas. Upon casual inspection, Kahler looks like a doctrinal dead-end. The petitioner asked the Supreme Court to recognize a due process right for mentally ill defendants to raise the M’Naghten right-and-wrong test of insanity, and the Court said, “No.” The petitioner’s failure notwithstanding, Kahler is not a barren vine. On the contrary, it is heavy-laden with new doctrinal insights for criminal law scholars.

The case deserves a thorough look—not for what it can teach us about constitutional contentions that the Court has …

Rules And Standards In Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment, Robert M. Bloom, Eliza S. Walker

University of Richmond Law Review

When looking at Justice Scalia’s approach to the Fourth Amendment, most would say he was an originalist and a textualist. Justice Scalia himself would like to explain, “I’m an originalist and a textualist, not a nut.” Although originalism and textualism were often prevalent in his Fourth Amendment decisions, even more important to his decision-making was his disdain for judicial activism. To limit judicial discretion, Justice Scalia frequently opted to impose bright-line rules rather than vague standards. This is apparent not only within his jurisprudence as a whole, but also specifically in his Fourth Amendment decisions.

This Article examines Justice Scalia’s …

Religious Exemptions As Rational Social Policy, Justin W. Aimonetti, M. Christian Talley

University of Richmond Law Review

In its 1963 decision Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to permit religious exemptions from general laws that incidentally burdened religious practice. Sherbert, in theory, provided stringent protections for religious freedom. But those protections came at a price. Religious adherents could secure exemptions even if they had no evidence the laws they challenged unfairly targeted their religious conduct. And they could thereby undermine the policy objectives those laws sought to achieve. Because of such policy concerns, the Court progressively restricted the availability of religious exemptions. In its 1990 decision Employment Division v. Smith …

Proving The Constitution: Burdens Of Proof And The Confrontation Clause, Enrique Schaerer

University of Richmond Law Review

In law, we never prove anything to 100% certainty. For factual propositions, the proponent has the burden of proving them to the satisfaction of a standard: a preponderance of the evidence at the low end; clear and convincing evidence in the middle; proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the high end. The standards are often explicit. Yet, for legal propositions, standards are often implicit or lacking altogether. This Article argues that, to decide legal issues, courts may look to similar burdens of proof that they use to decide factual issues. They should do so informally, using burdens of proof just …

The Bivens "Special Factors" And Qualified Immunity: Duplicative Barriers To The Vindication Of Constitutional Rights, Amelia G. Collins

University of Richmond Law Review

Part I of this note traces the history of the Bivens cause of action and analyzes the original “special factors” that concerned the Supreme Court. Part I also outlines the purpose behind implying a Bivens cause of action for plaintiffs bringing constitutional claims. Part II includes the same analysis of the qualified immunity defense, both to its history and purpose. Part III demonstrates how the Supreme Court has incorporated the concerns addressed by qualified immunity into the “special factors” analysis, rather than acknowledging the mitigating nature of immunity defenses when examining if any “special factors” exist. Finally, Part IV argues …

Pills, Public Nuisance, And Parens Patriae: Questioning The Propriety Of The Posture Of The Opioid Litigation, Michelle L. Richards

University of Richmond Law Review

The opioid crisis has been in litigation for almost twenty years on various fronts, including criminal prosecutions of pharmaceutical executives, civil lawsuits by individuals against drug manufacturers and physicians, class actions by those affected by opioid abuse, and criminal actions filed by the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). In the early 2000s, opioid litigation began with individual plaintiffs filing suit against manufacturers and others for damages allegedly related to opioid use. The litigation has since expanded significantly in terms of the type of plaintiffs and defendants, the nature of the claims being asserted, and the damages attributable to the crisis.

The …

The Historical Case For Constitutional "Concepts", Glenn E. Chappell

University of Richmond Law Review

The concepts/conceptions dichotomy is prominent in both the philosophy of language and the field of constitutional interpretation. It is most prominently illustrated through the provisions in the Constitution that contain broad, open-ended moral language. Those who hold the “conceptions” view believe that the legal content of those provisions includes both abstract moral concepts and its communicators’ subjective beliefs about, or conceptions of, how those concepts should apply. Under this view, the judge’s role is mostly empirical: he is tasked with examining historical evidence to ascertain those conceptions, which in turn supply applicational criteria by which he can decide specific cases. …

The People's Lawyer: The Role Of Attorney General In The Twenty-First Century, Mark J. Herring

University of Richmond Law Review

For the last five years, it has been my privilege to serve the people as their attorney general. The origin of the position of attorney general can be traced back centuries, but in a world that has become more interconnected, complex, and fast-paced, what does the role of a state attorney general entail in the twenty-first century and beyond? Is the proper role as a diligent but reactive defender of statutes and state agencies, or is there a deeper responsibility that calls for a more proactive and engaged use of its tools and authority? I have found that the job …

Enforcing Statutory Maximums: How Federal Supervised Release Violates The Sixth Amendment Rights Defined In Apprendi V. New Jersey, Danny Zemel

University of Richmond Law Review

The Sixth Amendment commands that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” Trial by a jury of one’s peers is a fundamental American legal right, existing in the earliest colonies before being codified in both Article III of the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment. The jury trial right derives from “the mass of the people,” ensuring that “no man can be condemned of life, or limb, or property, or reputation, without the concurrence of the …

Race, Speech, And Sports, Matthew J. Parlow

University of Richmond Law Review

Race, sports, and free speech rights intersected in a very controversial and public way during the 2016 and 2017 National Football League (“NFL”) seasons. On August 26, 2016, Colin Kaepernick spurred a national debate when he refused to stand during the playing of the national anthem before the NFL preseason game between the Green Bay Packers and the San Francisco 49ers, Kaepernick’s team at the time.

Non-Contact Excessive Force By Police: Is That Really A Thing?, Michael J. Jacobsma

University of Richmond Law Review

When people hear the words “police” and “excessive force,” they usually associate those words with an unjustified assault and battery, or lethal force made against suspects by law enforcement officers during an arrest or investigation. When such acts occur, the victim of the excessive force has the right to pursue a civil action against the police officer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if committed by state or local police, or a Bivens action if committed by federal agents. But can a police officer be sued for excessive force without making any physical contact with the plaintiff? The answer to …

States Suing The Federal Government: Protecting Liberty Or Playing Politics?, Elbert Lin

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The President, Prosecutorial Discretion, Obstruction Of Justice, And Congress, Henry L. Chambers Jr.

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Non-Originalist Separation Of Powers, Eric J. Segall

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Commonwealth And Constitution, Robert S. Claiborne Jr.

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Article I Section 13 Of The Virginia Constitution: Of Militias And An Individual Right To Bear Arms, Hon. Stephen R. Mccullough

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Rhetoric Hits The Road: State Challenges To The Affordable Care Act Implementation, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Vanishing Virginia Constitution?, Hon. Stephen R. Mccullough

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Independence In Virginia, W. Hamilton Bryson

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Criminal Law And Procedure, Julie E. Mcconnell, Gregory Franklin, Craig Winston Stallard

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Role Of State Constitutions In An Era Of Big Government, Stanley Mosk

University of Richmond Law Review

This is a speech delivered by The Honorable Stanley Mosk, Justice of the Supreme Court of California,at the T.C. Williams School of Law's eighth annual Emroch Lecture. Among his many achievements, Justice Mosk has authored some of California's most constructive legislative proposals in the crime and law enforcement fields, including the measure creating the Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training.

Virginia And The Ratification Of The Bill Of Rights, 1789-1791, J. Gordon Hylton

University of Richmond Law Review

Historians and constitutional scholars have paid scant attention to the process by which the states ratified the Bill of Rights. The states' ratifying conventions of 1787 and 1788 have been examined in great detail, as have the debates of the first Congress which led to the presentation of the Bill of Rights to the states. Scholars, however, have treated the ratification of the first ten amendments as little more than an historical formality. Why more than two full years passed between the Congressional adoption of the proposed amendments and the approval by the requisite number of states has never been …

Double Jeopardy And The Virginia Supreme Court: Three Approaches To Multiple Punishment, Jane S. Glenn

University of Richmond Law Review

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution affords three primary protections. First, the clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. Secondly, it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. Thirdly, the clause prohibits the imposition of multiple punishment for a single offense. Although the double jeopardy principle has roots in antiquity, it may be one of our least understood constitutional protections. This comment will focus on the third protection of double jeopardy as it has been developed by the United States Supreme Court and recently …

Subdivision Exactions: Virginia Constitutional Restrictions, Benjamin J. Trichelo

University of Richmond Law Review

New directions in zoning law have recently been established by the Supreme Court of Virginia. The court has declared unconstitutional an ordinance imposing a temporary building moratorium, another establishing minimum building lot sizes, and one compelling individual developers to first dedicate property in fee to the local government, and to then construct and maintain designated public facilities upon the dedicated land.

Constitutional Revision: Virginia And The Nation, A.E. Dick Howard

University of Richmond Law Review

For about a quarter of a century-from the 1920's into the 1940's-no American state adopted a new constitution. By midcentury, however, interest in revising these fundamental laws had burgeoned. So widespread was the movement for constitutional revision that by 1970 a leading student of the subject commented that there was at that time "more official effort directed toward revising and rewriting state constitutions than at any time in the nation's history with the possible exception of the Civil War and Reconstruction era."