Securities Law Commons^™

Hedge Funds In Corporate Governance And Corporate Control, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and corporate control. In this article, we document and examine the nature of hedge fund activism, how and why it differs from activism by traditional institutional investors, and its implications for corporate governance and regulatory reform. We argue that hedge fund activism differs from activism by traditional institutions in several ways: it is directed at significant changes in individual companies (rather than small, systemic changes), it entails higher costs, and it is strategic and ex ante (rather than intermittent and ex post). The reasons for these differences may lie in …

The Integration Conunudrum: Debilitating Failures Of The Securities And Exchange Commission Must Be Addressed As Corporate Malfeasance Is 'Getting Serious, So Serious', André Douglas Pond Cummings

Faculty Scholarship

The Securities Regulation doctrine of Integration has vexed securities lawyers and academics since its inception in the 1930s. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has struggled historically to define, refine and manage the securities Integration problem.

This article undertakes an historical analysis of securities integration recognizing both the evolution of the doctrine and the problems that it has engendered. The conclusion therein suggests that the SEC should abandon, if only momentarily, its practice of leaving securities rules undefined or loosely detailed in order to bring reason to the securities integration arena. A new solution is proposed that suggests that in …

The Investor Compensation Fund, Alicia J. Davis

Articles

The prevailing view among securities regulation scholars is that compensating victims of secondary market securities fraud is inefficient. As the theory goes, diversified investors are as likely to be on the gaining side of a transaction tainted by fraud as the losing side. Therefore, such investors should have no expected net losses from fraud because their expected losses will be matched by expected gains. This Article argues that this view is flawed; even diversified investors can suffer substantial losses from fraud, presenting a compelling case for compensation. The interest in compensation, however, should be advanced by better means than are …