Securities Law | Open Access Articles | Digital Commons Network™

Dictation And Delegation In Securities Regulation, Usha Rodrigues Jan 2017

Dictation And Delegation In Securities Regulation, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

When Congress undertakes major financial reform, either it dictates the precise contours of the law itself or it delegates the bulk of the rulemaking to an administrative agency. This choice has critical consequences. Making the law self-executing in federal legislation is swift, not subject to administrative tinkering, and less vulnerable than rulemaking to judicial second-guessing. Agency action is, in contrast, deliberate, subject to ongoing bureaucratic fiddling and more vulnerable than statutes to judicial challenge.

This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the extent of congressional delegation in securities law from 1970 to the present day, examining nine pieces of …

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The Great And Powerful Faa: Why Schwab’S Class Action Waiver Should Have Been Enforced Over Finra’S Rules, Clint Hale Feb 2015

The Great And Powerful Faa: Why Schwab’S Class Action Waiver Should Have Been Enforced Over Finra’S Rules, Clint Hale

Pepperdine Law Review

This Comment argues that recent Supreme Court precedent, circuit court decisions in contexts similar to FINRA’s oversight of the securities industry, and investors’ true interests all instruct that Schwab’s class action waiver should have been enforced over FINRA’s contrary command. Part II discusses FINRA’s role in the securities industry, the FAA and recent Supreme Court precedent interpreting the FAA, and the FINRA Rules that Schwab’s class action and joinder waiver violated. Part III analyzes why the conflict between the FAA and FINRA’s rules should have been resolved in favor of the FAA and supports this argument with discussion of federal …

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Reconsidering The Prohibition Against General Solicitation During Section 3(C)(7) Offerings, Daniel P. Taub May 2004

Reconsidering The Prohibition Against General Solicitation During Section 3(C)(7) Offerings, Daniel P. Taub

ExpressO

This paper examines the seventy year history of the general solicitation prohibition during private offerings and then analyzes its continuing relevance as applied to Section 3(c)(7) offerings. The S.E.C. Staff recently issued a report questioning the continuing value of prohibiting general solicitation during private offerings made pursuant to Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. If the S.E.C. were to follow the recommendation in the S.E.C. Staff Report, this would have tremendous implications for a growing number of hedge funds, and other investment companies utilizing the Section 3(c)(7) exemption. By allowing general solicitation, the S.E.C. would be reversing a policy …

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Section 14(E) Of The Williams Act And The Rule 10b-5 Comparisons, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 1983

Section 14(E) Of The Williams Act And The Rule 10b-5 Comparisons, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

The passage of the Williams Act in 1968 added a set of provisions to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to govern tender offers. In this article, Professor Loewenstein examines the antifraud provision of the Williams Act, codified as section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the development of decisional law under it. After discussing the propriety of inferring a private cause of action from section 14(e), Professor Loewenstein argues that the judiciary's reliance on rule 10b-5 precedents to set the bounds of the 14(e) cause of action is unwarranted. He concludes: 1) that scienter should not …

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Soft Information: The Sec's Former Exogenous Zone, Ted J. Fiflis Jan 1978