Securities Law Commons^™

Are Investors’ Gains And Losses From Securities Fraud Equal Over Time?, Alicia J. Davis

Alicia Davis

Leading securities regulation scholars argue that compensating securities fraud victims is inefficient because diversified investors that trade frequently (generally, institutional investors) are as likely to gain from trading in fraud-tainted stocks as they are to suffer harm from doing so. In other words, institutional investors have no expected net losses from fraud over the long term and are effectively hedged against fraud risk. Moreover, individual investors can protect themselves from fraud, as well, by investing through diversified institutional intermediaries. In this Article, I demonstrate, using both probability theory and observational and computer-simulated trading data, that the argument of the compensation …

The Responsibilities Of Lawyers For Their Clients’ Misstatements And Omissions To The Securities Market In Singapore, Wai Yee Wan

Wai Yee WAN

This article examines the extent to which lawyers advising on the disclosure documents of their clients issued to the securities markets should be responsible for their clients’ disclosure failures. It identifies the following problems with the current framework. First, there is a lack of objective due diligence standards which lawyers are expected to meet when they are advising on public disclosure documents. Second, except for takeovers, lawyers are not subject to public enforcement actions even if they have not acted with due care and diligence in ensuring that their clients comply with their disclosure obligations. Third, private enforcement actions against …

Who "Caused" The Enron Debacle?, David K. Millon

David K. Millon

No abstract provided.

The Cost Of Securities Fraud, Urska Velikonja

Urska Velikonja

Under the dominant account, securities fraud by public firms harms the firms’ shareholders and, more generally, capital markets. Recent financial legislation—the JOBS Act and the Dodd-Frank Act—as well as the influential 2011 D.C. Circuit decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC reinforce that same worldview. This Article contends that the account is wrong. Misreporting distorts economic decision-making by all firms, both those committing fraud and not. False information, coupled with efforts to hide fraud and avoid detection, impairs risk assessment by providers of human and financial capital, suppliers and customers, and thus misdirects capital and labor to lower-value projects. If fraud …

Extraterritoriality As Standing: A Standing Theory Of The Extraterritorial Application Of The Securities Laws, Erez Reuveni

Erez Reuveni

This Article contends that the current treatment of the extraterritorial scope of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act as a question of subject matter jurisdiction is wrong. Although the Act is silent as to its extraterritorial application, for over forty years courts have analyzed the Act’s extraterritorial scope as a question of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the so-called “conduct” and “effects” tests. Because courts apply these tests in an ad hoc, case-by-case manner, they are inherently unpredictable and unnecessarily complicated. This state of affairs has become particularly troublesome in recent years, as so-called “foreign-cubed” securities fraud lawsuits - lawsuits filed …

• The Credit Crisis And Subprime Litigation: How Fraud Without Motive ‘Makes Little Economic Sense’, Peter Hamner

Peter Hamner

The recent collapse of the financial markets spurred numerous lawsuits seeking a faulty party. Many plaintiffs argue that market participants committed securities fraud. They claim that deficient subprime loans caused the financial crisis. These risky loans were allegedly originated by banks to be sold off to third parties. The subprime loans were securitized and spread throughout the financial markets. The risk these loans presented was allegedly not disclosed to the buyers of the loans and securities on the loans. As these deficient loans and securities began to default the financial markets came to a halt. This article argues that securities …

The Investor Compensation Fund, Alicia J. Davis

Alicia Davis

The prevailing view among securities regulation scholars is that compensating victims of secondary market securities fraud is inefficient. As the theory goes, diversified investors are as likely to be on the gaining side of a transaction tainted by fraud as the losing side. Therefore, such investors should have no expected net losses from fraud because their expected losses will be matched by expected gains. This Article argues that this view is flawed; even diversified investors can suffer substantial losses from fraud, presenting a compelling case for compensation.

The interest in compensation, however, should be advanced by better means than are …

The Dangers And Drawbacks Of The Disclosure Antidote: Toward A More Substantive Approach To Securities Regulation, Susanna K. Ripken

Susanna K. Ripken

This article analyzes and critiques the federal securities laws' reliance on disclosure as the primary method of protecting investors and regulating the securities markets. Since the inception of the federal securities law seventy years ago, the policy has always been that, as long as corporations disclose all material information about their operations and their stock, public investors can make their own informed investment decisions. The unprecedented number of corporate frauds, scandals, and bankruptcies in recent years has revealed weaknesses in the traditional disclosure strategy of regulation. Disclosure rules did not protect American investors from the damages they suffered when large …