Securities Law Commons^™

Commodity Swap Position Limit Rule May Help Return Price-Risk Management, Michael Greenberger

Michael Greenberger

No abstract provided.

Examining Timely Disclosure Of Material Information To Shareholders And The Privacy Concerns Of Executive Officers, Ufuoma Barbara Akpotaire

Ufuoma Barbara Akpotaire

On January 20, 1993, Michael Walsh, the former Chairman and CEO of Tenneco revealed to the public that he had brain cancer. This type of disclosure of health issues are arguable serious enough to affect Wall Street. Other company officials have previously made similar disclosures such as Hugh Martin, CEO of Pacific Biosciences who in October 2010 disclosed to his employees that he had cancer of the Blood (multiple myeloma), and Harry J. Pearce, the Vice President of General Motors, who disclosed in 2001 that he had leukemia.

The above public disclosures are however more the exceptions than the rule. …

Will The Cftc Defy Congress's Mandate To Stop Excessive Speculation In Commodity Markets And Aid And Abet Hyperinflation In World Food And Energy Prices: Analysis Of The Cftc's Proposed Rules On Speculative Position Limits, Michael Greenberger

Michael Greenberger

On January 26, 2011, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Position Limits for Derivatives pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The proposed rules are designed to implement the historic Congressional mandate of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended by Section 737 of the Dodd-Frank Act, to ban excessive speculation from the derivatives market, i.e., the speculation which exceeds the need for liquidity by commercial handlers hedging price risk in these markets. Section 737 is the result of multi-year consideration by Congress, during which a strong consensus was reached there …

Mismatch: The Misuse Of Market Efficiency In Market Manipulation Class Actions, Charles R. Korsmo

Faculty Publications

Plaintiffs commonly bring two distinct types of claims under Section 1(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 1) claims of material misrepresentations or omissions; and 2) claims of trade-based market manipulation. Despite the distinctive features of the two types of claims, courts have tended to treat them identically when applying the “fraud on the market” doctrine. In particular, courts have required both types of plaintiffs to make identical showings that the relevant security traded in an “efficient market” in order to gain a presumption of reliance. The reasons for requiring such a showing by plaintiffs in a misrepresentation case …