Securities Law Commons^™

Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Securities law’s dirty little secret is that rich investors have access to special kinds of investments—hedge funds, private equity, private companies—that everyone else does not. This disparity stems from the fact that, from its inception, federal securities law has jealously guarded the manner in which firms can sell shares to the general public. Perhaps paternalistically, the law assumes that the average investor needs the protection of the full panoply of securities regulation and thus should be limited to buying public securities. In contrast, accredited—i.e., wealthy— investors, who it is presumed can fend for themselves, have the luxury of choosing between …

From Loyalty To Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty At The Officer Level, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Conflicts of interest are the quintessential agency cost-the constant, lurking danger that agents may seek their own personal gain, rather than the good of the corporation. Yet many corporate employees lack knowledge as to exactly what constitutes a conflict of interest. This ignorance facilitated the kind of fraud seen in Enron, WorldCom, and the options backdating scandals, and may help explain the out-sized payouts that many high-level corporate officers received even as the financial institutions they headed verged on self-destruction. Each case required not only affirmative fraudulent behavior on the part of a few, but also the tacit acceptance of …

The Fetishization Of Independence, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

According to conventional wisdom, a supermajority independent board of directors is the ideal corporate governance structure. Debate nevertheless continues: empirical evidence suggests that independent boards do not improve firm performance. Independence proponents respond that past studies reflect a flawed definition of independence.

Remarkably, neither side in the independence debate has looked to Delaware, the preeminent state source for corporate law. Comparing Delaware's notions of independence with those of Sarbanes-Oxley and its attendant reforms reveals two fundamentally different conceptions of independence. Sarbanes-Oxley equates independence with outsider status. An independent director is one who lacks financial ties to the corporation and is …

Corporate Social-Reform, The Business Judgment Rule And Other Considerations, Robert N. Leavell

Scholarly Works

In recent years there has been a well-publicized movement to induce corporations to use their economic wealth and power to achieve "social-reform," rather than carry on as usual by professing to be guided only by profit-making. Social change is sought by allowing shareholders to make, or influence directly, those management decisions which significantly affect the quality of life in this country. This approach has found support on college campuses and among the commentators in this field. The Securities Exchange Commission and the courts also have endorsed this approach by legitimating such a role for shareholders despite the fact that it …

The Texas Gulf Sulphur Opinion In The Appellate Court: An Open Door To Federal Control Of Corporations, Robert N. Leavell

Scholarly Works

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has written an opinion in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case which seems to me unfortunate and in large part unnecessary. This comment is a brief statement of why I feel this to be the case.