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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, Steven L. Schwarcz
The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
In an earlier article, I argued that shadow banking — the provision of financial services and products outside of the traditional banking system, and thus without the need for bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds — is so radically transforming finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink their basic assumptions. This article attempts to rethink the corporate governance assumption that owners of firms should always have their liability limited to the capital they have invested. In the relatively small and decentralized firms that dominate shadow banking, equity investors tend to be active managers. Limited liability gives …
Does Board Independence Reduce The Cost Of Debt?, Michael Bradley, Dong Chen
Does Board Independence Reduce The Cost Of Debt?, Michael Bradley, Dong Chen
Faculty Scholarship
Using the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated change in listing standards as a natural experiment, we find that while board independence decreases the cost of debt when credit conditions are strong or leverage low, it increases the cost of debt when credit conditions are poor or leverage high. We also document that independent directors set corporate policies that increase firm risk. These results suggest that, acting in the interest of shareholders, independent directors are increasingly costly to bondholders with the intensification of the agency conflict between these two stakeholders.