Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, David H. Webber
Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, David H. Webber
Faculty Scholarship
In this Article, I imagine a post-class action landscape for shareholder litigation. Assuming, for the sake of this exercise, an environment in which both securities-fraud and transactional class actions are hobbled by procedural or substantive reforms — most likely through the adoption of mandatory-arbitration provisions or fee-shifting provisions — I assess what shareholder litigation would disappear, what would remain, and what a post-class action landscape would look like. I argue that loss of the class action would remove a layer of legal insulation that prevents institutional investors from having to pursue positive value claims against companies. Currently, the class action …
The Plight Of The Individual Investor In Securities Class Actions, David H. Webber
The Plight Of The Individual Investor In Securities Class Actions, David H. Webber
Faculty Scholarship
Individual investors victimized by securities fraud have no voice in directing class actions brought on their behalf once institutional investors obtain lead plaintiff appointments. The same holds for state-level transactional class actions claiming breaches of fiduciary duty by boards of directors in connection with mergers and acquisitions. In theory, the interests of institutional and individual investors align, nullifying the need for a separate voice for individuals; one rationale for the lead plaintiff modifications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was that individuals would benefit from the sophistication of institutional investor lead plaintiffs. But in practice, individual investors’ …
Is 'Pay-To-Play' Driving Public Pension Fund Activism In Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, David H. Webber
Is 'Pay-To-Play' Driving Public Pension Fund Activism In Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, David H. Webber
Faculty Scholarship
The recent emergence of public pension funds as frequent lead plaintiffs in securities class actions has prompted speculation that the funds’ litigation activism is driven by “pay-to-play”. “Pay-to-play” posits that public pension funds are driven by politician board members to obtain lead plaintiff appointments in securities class actions because of campaign contributions made by plaintiffs’ lawyers to those board members. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the securities litigation activity of 111 such funds from the years 2003 through 2006. Three of the paper’s findings cast doubt on the “pay-to-play” theory, including that: (1) politicians and political control negatively …