Securities Law Commons^™

Halliburton, Basic And Fraud On The Market: The Need For A New Paradigm, Charles W. Murdock

Charles W. Murdock

Summary: Halliburton, Basic and Fraud on the Market: The Need for a New Paradigm

If defrauded securities plaintiffs cannot bring a class-action lawsuit, there often will be no effective remedy since the amount at stake for individual plaintiffs is not sufficient to warrant the substantial costs of litigation. To surmount the problem of individualized reliance and establish commonality, federal courts for twenty-five years have been employing the Basic fraud-on-the-market theory which posits that, in an efficient market, investors rely on the integrity of the market price.

While class certification at one time was a matter of course, today it is …

Insider Trading And Evolutionary Psychology: Strong Reciprocity, Cheater Detection, And The Expanding Boundaries Of The Law, Steven R. Mcnamara

Steven R. McNamara

Insider trading law has expanded in recent years to cover instances of trading on non-public information that fall outside of the fiduciary duty framework set forth in the landmark cases of Chiarella and Dirks. The trend towards a broader insider trading law moves the law closer towards what evolutionary psychology tells us humans desire when engaging in collective action: that individuals benefit in proportion to the effort or investment they make in a common enterprise. Insider trading law can therefore be understood as a societal response to cheating in group activities, and the recent expansion of the law as …

Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Unfair self-dealing and expropriation of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder are common business practices in developing countries (“bad-law countries”). Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, there are many questions unanswered in relation to behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. For example, a puzzle is that some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries voluntarily extract minority shareholders less than other controlling shareholders. Applying Mancur Olson’s framework of political theory of “banditry” to the context of corporate governance, this Article proposes that there are at least two categories of controlling shareholders. “Roving controllers” are dominant shareholders with …

Gambling On Our Financial Future: How The Federal Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is A Safer Bet To Prevent Another Financial Collapse, Brian M. Mccall

Brian M McCall