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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee
Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article is written as two discrete, independently accessible topical sections. The first topical section, presented in Part I of this Article, is a case study of Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch and the impact of a flawed merger execution on the board’s subsequent decisions. The second topical section, presented Parts II-IV of this Article, advances a theoretical basis for fiduciary exemption during a public crisis. The financial crisis of 2008 was the worst economic disaster since the Great Depression. It nearly resulted in a collapse of the global capital markets. A key event in the history of …
Evolving Regulation Of Corporate Governance And The Implications For D&O Liability: The United States And Australia, Joan T.A. Gabel, Nancy R. Mansfield, Paul Von Nessen, Austin W. Hall, Andrew Jones
Evolving Regulation Of Corporate Governance And The Implications For D&O Liability: The United States And Australia, Joan T.A. Gabel, Nancy R. Mansfield, Paul Von Nessen, Austin W. Hall, Andrew Jones
San Diego International Law Journal
This Article compares the modern corporate regulatory environments in the United States and Australia, including an analysis of the climate for Directors & Officers (D & O) liability coverage. Comparing these regulations across two large markets with similar historical bases for assessing director and officer liability allows us to explore which reforms may be more effective as new scandals emerge.
Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee
Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee
Robert Rhee
This Article is written as two discrete, independently accessible topical sections. The first topical section, presented in Part I of this Article, is a case study of Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch and the impact of a flawed merger execution on the board’s subsequent decisions. The second topical section, presented Parts II-IV of this Article, advances a theoretical basis for fiduciary exemption during a public crisis. The financial crisis of 2008 was the worst economic disaster since the Great Depression. It nearly resulted in a collapse of the global capital markets. A key event in the history of …
Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee
Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee
Faculty Scholarship
This Article is written as two discrete, independently accessible topical sections. The first topical section, presented in Part I of this Article, is a case study of Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch and the impact of a flawed merger execution on the board’s subsequent decisions. The second topical section, presented Parts II-IV of this Article, advances a theoretical basis for fiduciary exemption during a public crisis. The financial crisis of 2008 was the worst economic disaster since the Great Depression. It nearly resulted in a collapse of the global capital markets. A key event in the history of …
Foreword: In Berle’S Footsteps, Charles R.T. O'Kelley
Foreword: In Berle’S Footsteps, Charles R.T. O'Kelley
Seattle University Law Review
On the weekend of November 6–8, 2009, scholars from around the world gathered in Seattle for a symposium—In Berle’s Footsteps—celebrating the launch of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. As founding director of the Berle Center, I described our undertaking: “It is with a profound sense of obligation to the legacy that has been entrusted to my care, that I announce the launching of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. It is a privilege to follow in Berle’s footsteps.”
Opening Remarks, Chancellor William B. Chandler Iii
Opening Remarks, Chancellor William B. Chandler Iii
Seattle University Law Review
Law is, in many ways, a backwards-looking field. We litigate over facts that have already occurred, challenge deals that have already been signed, and apply rules of decision based on previously-established precedent or statutes already enacted. To the extent that this Center and the symposium reflect on Berle’s work, they too are an exercise in looking back. Indeed, some might say the establishment of a Center named in Berle’s honor is a monument to the past.
The Birth Of Corporate Governance, Harwell Wells
The Birth Of Corporate Governance, Harwell Wells
Seattle University Law Review
Part I of this Article briefly examines the concept of “corporate governance” and argues for dating the concept’s origins to the debates of the 1920s. Part II then moves on to examine early scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of ownership and control. After surveying the historical developments that produced the recognizably modern corporate economy around the turn of the century, it examines early scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of ownership and control, focusing on three major thinkers, Louis D. Brandeis, Walter Lippmann, and Thorstein Veblen. It argues that, while each of these authors examined the separation …
Corporate Power In The Public Eye: Reassessing The Implications Of Berle’S Public Consensus Theory, Marc T. Moore, Antoine Rebérioux
Corporate Power In The Public Eye: Reassessing The Implications Of Berle’S Public Consensus Theory, Marc T. Moore, Antoine Rebérioux
Seattle University Law Review
We analyze Berle’s overall corporate governance project in accordance with what we see as its four core sub-themes: (A) the limitations of external market forces as a constraint on managerial decision-making power; (B) the desirability of internal (corporate) over external (market) actors in allocating corporate capital; (C) civil society and the public consensus as a continuous informal check on managerial decision-making power; and (D) shareholder democracy (as opposed to shareholder primacy or shareholder wealth maximization) as a socially instrumental institution. We seek to debunk the popular misconception that Berle’s early work was a defense of the orthodox shareholder primacy paradigm …