Securities Law Commons^™

Tracing, Peter B. Oh

ExpressO

Tracing is a method that appears within multiple fields of law. Distinct conceptions of tracing, however, have arisen independently within securities and remedial law. In the securities context plaintiffs must “trace” their securities to a specific offering to pursue certain relief under the Securities Act of 1933. In the remedial context victims who “trace” their misappropriated value into a wrongdoer’s hands can claim any derivative value, even if it has appreciated.

This article is the first to compare and then cross-apply tracing within these two contexts. Specifically, this article argues that securities law should adopt a version of the “rules-based …

Casenote: Killing Life Partners: Why Viatical Settlements Constitute Securities – In Light Of The Sec V. Mutual Benefits Corporation And Other Recent Cases Explicitly Rejecting Life Partners, Brian Levin

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Is The Dutch Auction Ipo A Good Idea?, Anita I. Anand

ExpressO

The Google IPO raised the question of whether Dutch auctions are preferable to the traditional bookbuilding method of financing. Some argue that Dutch auctions make public offerings more efficient in terms of price discovery by leaving less money on the table. They further argue that Dutch auctions are more fair, since underwriters do not allocate securities to preferred clients, thereby allowing for a more equitable allocation among institutional and retail investors. I suggest that the Dutch auction is not necessarily more fair and may in fact lead to less efficient capital markets. I argue that reform of the current system …

From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.

Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …

What Makes Asset Securitization "Inefficient"?, Kenji Yamazaki

ExpressO

Despite the damage caused by the recent Enron scandal , the asset securitization market has been vibrant and has become a popular financing alternative . A number of academics emphasize its merits and suggest that it is a more favorable way of financing, and Congress’s proposal to make sales of asset in securitization immune from characterization as secured transactions under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 (the “Reform Act”) almost materialized when the Enron scandal hit the scene. Conversely, there have been accusations that securitization is not a legitimate way of financing because, for example, it fosters fraudulent transactions.

Why …

Voluntary Vs Mandatory Corporate Governance: Towards An Optimal Regulatory Framework, Anita I. Anand

ExpressO

This article fills a gap in the legal literature by comparing mandatory corporate governance regimes to voluntary corporate governance regimes. It encourages market participants, including regulators, to acknowledge that firms have incentives to adopt enhanced governance practices voluntarily and to make disclosure about the same. The article argues that an optimal governance regime is a hybrid one in which adoption of best practice guidelines is voluntary but disclosure of corporate governance practices is mandatory. Such a regime is optimal because it balances the benefits and costs to all stakeholders, particularly issuers and investors. The cost analysis should be completed by …

Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith

All Faculty Scholarship

This Essay explores the connection between corporate governance and D&O insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, D&O insurance premiums provide the insurer’s assessment of a firm’s governance quality. Most basically, firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher D&O premiums. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent. Corporations lack the incentive to produce this disclosure themselves, and U.S. securities regulators do …

Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets And The Dog That Did Not Bark, Henry G. Manne

ExpressO

This Essay briefly reexamines the great debates on the role of insider trading in the corporate system from the perspectives of efficiency of capital markets, harm to individual investors, and executive compensation. The focus is on the mystery of why trading by all kinds of insiders as well as knowledgeable outsiders was studiously ignored by the business and investment communities before the advent of insider trading regulation. It is hardly conceivable that officers, directors, and controlling shareholders would have remained totally silent in the face of widespread insider trading if they had seen the practice as being harmful to the …

Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, And The Dog That Did Not Bark, Henry G. Manne

ExpressO

This Essay briefly reexamines the great debates on the role of insider trading in the corporate system from the perspectives of efficiency of capital markets, harm to individual investors, and executive compensation. The focus is on the mystery of why trading by all kinds of insiders as well as knowledgeable outsiders was studiously ignored by the business and investment communities before the advent of insider trading regulation. It is hardly conceivable that officers, directors, and controlling shareholders would have remained totally silent in the face of widespread insider trading if they had seen the practice as being harmful to the …

Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), Jonathan C. Lipson

ExpressO

This article presents the first in-depth exploration of third-party closing opinions, a common but curious – and potentially troubling -- feature of U.S. business law practice. Third-party closing opinions are letters delivered at the closing of most large transactions by the attorney for one party (e.g., the borrower) to the other party (e.g., the lender) offering limited assurance that the transaction will have legal force and effect.

Hundreds, if not thousands, of legal opinions are delivered every week. Yet, lawyers often complain that they create needless risk and cost, and produce little benefit. Closing opinions thus pose a basic question: …

The Legal Status Of “Dump & Sue”: Should Plaintiffs And Their Attorneys Be Prohibited From Trading The Stock Of Companies They Sue? – A Law And Economics Approach, Moin A. Yahya

ExpressO

There is some evidence that plaintiffs and their attorneys are profitably short-selling the stock of the companies they intend to sue. The status of such short sales is undecided in the law. Lawsuits against companies can cause large drops in market value, and hence such an action by the plaintiff should cause concern. Plaintiffs, however, are not traditional insiders, and they do not owe the shareholders any fiduciary duties. They can therefore consent to their attorneys also short-selling the stock of the defendant corporation. The attorneys need to receive such permission to avoid misappropriating the information concerning their client’s decision …

Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, And Poison Pills, Brett H. Mcdonnell

ExpressO

Shareholder bylaws limiting or directing board action raise a tough and fascinating question of statutory interpretation under state law as well as an important policy question. In particular, over the last decade shareholders have sought to use bylaws to limit poison pills and to grant shareholders access to the corporate proxy materials to nominate directors. This paper argues that an expansive, although not unlimited, shareholder power to enact bylaws is both a plausible interpretation of Delaware’s statutory scheme and desirable as a policy matter. Shareholder bylaws that set general rules of corporate governance and procedure should be valid unless more …

The "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, David A. Hoffman

ExpressO

How and when do courts determine that corporate disclosures are actionable under the federal securities laws? The applicable standard is materiality: would a (mythical) "reasonable investor" have considered the disclosures important. As I establish through empirical and statistical testing of 500 cases analyzing the materiality standard, judicial findings of immateriality are remarkably common, and have been stable over time. Materiality's scope results in the dismissal of a large number of claims, and creates a set of cases in which courts attempt to explain and defend their vision of who is, and is not, a "reasonable investor." Thus, materiality provides an …

The Corporation As God, Douglas Litowitz

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Regulation Nms: Has The Sec Exceeded Its Congressional Mandate To Facilitate A “National Market System” In Securities Trading?, Dale A. Oesterle

The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Working Paper Series

The SEC is currently holding hearings on sweeping changes to the micro-structure of the country's securities trading markets - modifying the trade through rule, for example. Professor Oesterle argues that the SEC should not be in the business of so structuring the country's securities markets in the first place. In the piece he chronicles the SEC's expansive interpretation of its power under Congress's 1975 National Market System Amendments to the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act and questions whether Congress intended to grant the SEC such a mandate.

The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Predictions, Projections, And Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings In Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, Susanna Ripken

Susanna K. Ripken

This article discusses the problems that are created when corporate insiders make public predictions about the future prospects of their business. Investors crave these types of forward-looking corporate disclosures because investors use them to make judgments about the future profitability of companies. Corporations, however, are often reluctant to make predictions and projections because sometimes the predictions fail to come true, and investors may then sue corporations for misleading the market. Congress enacted a controversial statutory safe harbor designed to encourage corporations to make forward-looking statements. The safe harbor immunizes corporations from liability so long as they include meaningful cautionary warnings …

El Fiduciario Como Accionista: A Propósito De La Resolución 820/2005 De La Inspección General De Justicia, Martin Paolantonio

Martin Paolantonio

Análisis crítico de la posición de la Inspección General de Justicia respecto del accionista fiduciario

Shock Therapy' For Aktiengesellschaften: Can The Sarbanes-Oxley Certification Requirements Transform German Corporate Culture, Practice And Prospects?, Hudson T. Hollister

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Act) of 20021 was the U.S. Congress's hasty response to the wave of corporate scandals that had begun to devastate U.S. investor confidence during the previous year. Its sixty-six pages contain a wide range of measures designed to enhance the quality and independence of corporate audits and disclosure under the U.S. securities-regulation regime. The Act applies to public corporations-corporations that are required to file regular financial reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). Objections from German corporations and observers were particularly vigorous. At least one German foreign private issuer registered with the SEC has …

Erisa Stock Drop Cases: An Evolving Standard, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 889 (2005), Craig C. Martin, Elizabeth L. Fine

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Rules Of Or Substantive Law: Who Controls An Individual's Right To Choose A Lawyer In Today's Corporate Environment, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1265 (2005), Joan Colson

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Rule 10b-5 And The "Unfitness" Question, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Corporation As Insider Trader, Mark J. Loewenstein, William K.S. Wang

Publications

With regard to issuer purchases, some of the traditional policy rationales against insider trading do not apply or apply with less force. Nevertheless, courts, commentators, and the SEC have all stated or assumed that a public corporation violates rule 10b-5 by buying its own shares in the market based on material, nonpublic information. In rule 10b-5 cases involving face-to-face transactions, several circuit courts have ruled that the company may not purchase its own stock based on material information not known to the seller. No good reason exists not to apply these precedents to stock market trades by issuers, especially because …

The Supreme Court, Rule 10b-5, And The Federalization Of Corporate Law, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

This Article examines Supreme Court jurisprudence since 1997 under the federal securities laws in light of the Court's earlier securities law decisions and in light of its recent decisions construing the Constitution and federal statutes as they relate to the regulation of business. These post-1977 cases strongly suggest that the much-heralded new federalism philosophy of the Supreme Court is not a factor in securities law cases or in business cases generally. Indeed, the opposite seems to be the case. In this context, new federalism cases appear to be an anomaly, with the reality being that the Court is still as …

Toward A Reform-Minded Model For Securities Law Enforcement, Cristie Ford

All Faculty Publications

This paper examines a significant shift in enforcement practice at the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, originating under the Chairmanship of William Donaldson but likely to continue beyond it. This shift is a response to a crisis of corporate governance, exemplified by recent scandals among various public corporations and financial services institutions, and to the demonstrated inadequacy of SEC enforcement tools to respond to that crisis. While the SEC's new approach, which I call the Reform Undertaking, is incomplete, I argue that if properly implemented it may have the potential to spur institutional reform not only in corporate governance, …

Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Comment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores the connection between corporate governance and directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, in a well-working insurance market, D&O insurance premiums would convey the insurer's assessment of a firm's governance quality. Simply stated, firms with better corporate governance would pay relatively low D&O premiums, while firms with worse corporate governance would pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the …

Did The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

In 1995 Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA or the Act) to address abuses in securities fraud class actions. In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and other high profile securities frauds, critics suggest that the law made it too easy to escape liability for securities fraud and thus created a climate in which frauds are more likely to occur. Others claim that the Act has largely failed because it did little to deter plaintiffs' lawyers from filing nonmeritorious cases. This article employs a database of the 1449 class actions filed from 1996 through 2001 to …

Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard

All Faculty Scholarship

When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 (“PSLRA”), the Act’s “lead plaintiff” provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel’s compensation.

Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional investors—pension funds, mutual …