Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Banking and Finance Law (14)
- Business Organizations Law (7)
- Law and Economics (5)
- Contracts (3)
- Administrative Law (2)
-
- Business (2)
- Consumer Protection Law (2)
- Corporate Finance (2)
- Bankruptcy Law (1)
- Civil Procedure (1)
- Evidence (1)
- First Amendment (1)
- International Law (1)
- Labor and Employment Law (1)
- Law and Politics (1)
- Legislation (1)
- Litigation (1)
- Military, War, and Peace (1)
- Organizations Law (1)
- Science and Technology Law (1)
- Tax Law (1)
- Torts (1)
- Institution
- Keyword
-
- Debt relief (5)
- Public debts (5)
- Corporation law (3)
- Securities (3)
- Class action (2)
-
- Corporate governance (2)
- Fee shifting (2)
- Financial crisis (2)
- IPO (2)
- Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) (2)
- Rule 10b-5 (2)
- Securities fraud (2)
- ATP Tour (1)
- Accountability (1)
- Ace Securities Corp. v DB Structured Products Inc. (1)
- Administrative law (1)
- Agency costs (1)
- Asset-backed financing--Law and legislation (1)
- Bailouts (Government policy) (1)
- Banking law (1)
- Business Lawyer (1)
- CEF (1)
- Charter provision (1)
- Class actions (1)
- Class disaggregation (1)
- Closed-end fund (1)
- Constituency directors; codetermination; venture capital; fiduciary duties; corporate theory; theory of the firm; board of directors; behavioral theory (1)
- Consumer law (1)
- Contracts (1)
- Cooperation (1)
Articles 1 - 29 of 29
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Political Uncertainty And The Market For Ipos, Jay B. Kesten, Murat C. Mungan
Political Uncertainty And The Market For Ipos, Jay B. Kesten, Murat C. Mungan
Faculty Scholarship
This Article presents a simple theory and model of the effects of political uncertainty on the market for IPOs. Our model generates four central predictions: (i) increased political uncertainty reduces the frequency of IPOs; (ii) firms that choose to conduct an IPO during periods of political uncertainty are, on average, of higher quality and generate greater return on investment in the secondary market; (iii) political uncertainty increases the cost of capital for IPO firms; but (iv) underpricing is less pronounced during periods of heightened political uncertainty. We demonstrate that each of these predictions is consistent with available empirical evidence.
Our …
The Vanishing Supervisor, James A. Fanto
Let Sleeping Regs Lie: A Diatribe On Regulation A'S Futility Before And After The J.O.B.S. Act, Neal F. Newman
Let Sleeping Regs Lie: A Diatribe On Regulation A'S Futility Before And After The J.O.B.S. Act, Neal F. Newman
Faculty Scholarship
Did Congress do the right thing when it attempted to revise Regulation A through Title IV of the J.O.B.S. Act or was their legislative effort an exercise in futility?
On April 4 2012, President Obama signed into law the J.O.B.S. (Jumpstart Our Business Startups) Act. The Act’s intent is to ease the regulatory burden on smaller companies when issuing securities in both private and public offerings. This paper’s specific focus is on the Act’s Title IV. Title IV makes revisions to Regulation A, a private securities offering exemption promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933.
A big problem with Regulation …
Law's Acceleration Of Finance: Redefining The Problem Of High-Frequency Trading, Frank Pasquale
Law's Acceleration Of Finance: Redefining The Problem Of High-Frequency Trading, Frank Pasquale
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Law On Insider Trading Lacks Needed Definition, Roberta Karmel
The Law On Insider Trading Lacks Needed Definition, Roberta Karmel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Brief Of Prof. Steven L. Schwarcz As Amicus Curiae, Steven L. Schwarcz
Brief Of Prof. Steven L. Schwarcz As Amicus Curiae, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Reprofiling Sovereign Debt, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, Ignacio Tirado
Reprofiling Sovereign Debt, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, Ignacio Tirado
Faculty Scholarship
• The IMF staff’s 2013 proposal to reprofile (i.e., stretch out for a short period without haircutting principal or interest) the maturing debt of a country that has lost market access is a sensible policy in cases where the IMF is uncertain whether the country’s debt stock is sustainable.
• The motivation for the policy is to avoid situations, such as occurred during the Eurozone debt crisis, in which Fund resources are used to bail-out commercial creditors in full.
• But a debt reprofiling is a species of debt restructuring and as such is susceptible to holdout creditor behaviour.
• …
Closed-End Fund Ipo Considerations, Benjamin P. Edwards
Closed-End Fund Ipo Considerations, Benjamin P. Edwards
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Disaggregated Classes, Benjamin P. Edwards
Correcting Corporate Benefit: How To Fix Shareholder Litigation By Shifting The Doctrine On Fees, Sean J. Griffith
Correcting Corporate Benefit: How To Fix Shareholder Litigation By Shifting The Doctrine On Fees, Sean J. Griffith
Faculty Scholarship
The current controversy in corporate law concerns whether firms can discourage litigation by shifting its cost to shareholders. But corporate law courts have long engaged in fee-shifting—from shareholder plaintiffs to the corporation—under the “corporate benefit” doctrine. This Article examines fee-shifting in share-holder litigation, arguing that current practices are unsound from the perspective of both doctrine and public policy. Unfortunately, the fee-shifting bylaws recently enacted in response to the problem of excessive shareholder litigation fare no better. The Article therefore offers a different approach to fee-shifting, articulating three specific reforms of the corporate benefit doctrine to quell the current crisis in …
Lift Not The Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, Martin Gelter, Geneviève Helleringer
Lift Not The Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, Martin Gelter, Geneviève Helleringer
Faculty Scholarship
In this article, we identify a fundamental contradiction in the law of fiduciary duty of corporate directors across jurisdictions, namely the tension between the uniformity of directors’ duties and the heterogeneity of directors themselves. American scholars tend to think of the board as a group of individuals elected by shareholders, even though it is widely acknowledged (and criticized) that the board is often a largely self-perpetuating body whose inside members dominate the selection of their future colleagues and eventual successors. However, this characterization is far from universally true internationally, and it tends to be increasingly less true even in the …
Human Equity? Regulating The New Income Share Agreements, Shu-Yi Oei, Diane Ring
Human Equity? Regulating The New Income Share Agreements, Shu-Yi Oei, Diane Ring
Faculty Scholarship
A controversial new financing phenomenon has recently emerged. New "income share agreements" (''ISAs'') enable an individual to raise funds by pledging a percentage of her future earnings to investors for a certain number of years. These contracts, which have been offered by entities such as Fantex, Upstart, Pave, and Lumni, raise important questions for the legal system: Are they a form of modern-day indentured servitude or an innovative breakthrough in human financing? How should they be treated under the law?
This Article comprehensively addresses the public policy and legal issues raised by ISAs and articulates an analytical approach to evaluating …
Corporate Law And The Limits Of Private Ordering, James D. Cox
Corporate Law And The Limits Of Private Ordering, James D. Cox
Faculty Scholarship
Solomon-like, the Delaware legislature in 2015 split the baby by amending the Delaware General Corporation Law to authorize forum-selection bylaws and to prohibit charter or bylaw provisions that would shift to the plaintiff defense costs incurred in connection with shareholder suits that were not successfully concluded. The legislature acted after the Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund. v. Chevron Corp ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, broadly empowered the board vis-à-vis the shareholders through the board’s power to amend the bylaws. Repeatedly the analysis used by each court referenced the contractual relationship the shareholders had through the articles of …
Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott
Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt …
Evaluating The 2013 Euro Cac Experiment, Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati
Evaluating The 2013 Euro Cac Experiment, Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
On January 1, 2013, it became mandatory that every new sovereign bond issued by a member of the European Monetary Union include a new contract clause called a Collective Action Clause or CAC. This, we believe, constituted the biggest one-time change to the terms of sovereign debt contracts in history, impacting a market of many trillions of euros. And it was not just that the change was big in terms of the size of the market it impacted; it was big in terms of its impact on the documentation of each individual Euro area sovereign bond contract. To illustrate, prior …
The Relevance Of Law To Sovereign Debt, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati
The Relevance Of Law To Sovereign Debt, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
The literature on sovereign debt treats law as of marginal significance, largely because the doctrine of sovereign immunity leaves creditors few potent legal remedies against sovereign borrowers. Although sovereign debts can indeed by hard to enforce, the goal of this Essay is to demonstrate that law plays a central, and constantly evolving, role in structuring sovereign debt markets. To list just a few examples, legal rules and institutions (i) decide when a borrower is sovereign, (ii) define the consequences of sovereignty by drawing (or refusing to draw) artificial boundaries between the sovereign and other legal entities, (iii) play some role …
Banking And Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz
Banking And Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter provides a basic overview of banking and financial regulation for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (Francesco Paris, ed.). Among other things, the chapter compares traditional and shadow banking and their regulation, differentiating “micro prudential” regulation (which focuses on protecting individual components of the financial system, such as banks) and “macro prudential” regulation (which focuses on protecting against systemic risk). The chapter also examines how regulation can help to correct market failures that undermine financial efficiency. In that context, it discusses, among other things, capital requirements, ring-fencing, and stress testing. Finally, the chapter examines how regulation …
A Model-Law Approach To Restructuring Unsustainable Sovereign Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz
A Model-Law Approach To Restructuring Unsustainable Sovereign Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Unresolved sovereign debt problems are hurting debtor nations, their citizens and their creditors, and also can pose serious systemic threats to the international financial system. The existing contractual restructuring approach is insufficient to make sovereign debt sustainable. Although a more systematic legal resolution framework is needed, a formal multilateral approach, such as a treaty, is not currently politically viable. An informal model-law approach should be legally, politically and economically feasible. This informal approach would not require multilateral acceptance. Because most sovereign debt contracts are governed by either New York or English law, it would be sufficient if one or both …
When Governments Write Contracts: Policy And Expertise In Sovereign Debt Markets, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati, Anna Gelpern
When Governments Write Contracts: Policy And Expertise In Sovereign Debt Markets, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati, Anna Gelpern
Faculty Scholarship
At least three times in the past two decades, national governments and institutions at the regional and international levels have tried to reform sovereign bond contracts to facilitate debt restructuring. Increasingly, these efforts have focused on promoting majority modifications clauses, a species of collective action clause (CAC) that facilitates a binding debt restructuring. Rather than legislate or regulate, governments have convened expert commissions, produced model CACs, and aggressively marketed these clauses to debtors and creditors. When events prove the existing CAC template inadequate or irrelevant, the process begins anew. This paper considers this mode of government intervention, which has a …
Addressing Agency Costs Through Private Litigation In The U.S: Tensions, Disappointments, And Substitutes, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Addressing Agency Costs Through Private Litigation In The U.S: Tensions, Disappointments, And Substitutes, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Faculty Scholarship
Many scholars argue that over the past seventy years, shareholder representative litigation has acted as an important policing mechanism of managerial abuses at U.S. public companies. Different types of representative litigation have had their moment in the sun – derivative suits early on, followed by federal securities class actions, and most recently merger litigation – often producing benefits for shareholders, but posing difficult challenges as well. In particular, the benefits are qualified by another concern, the litigation agency costs that surround shareholder suits. This form of agency costs arises since the suits are invariably representative with no requirement that the …
"We're Cool" Statements After Omnicare: Securities Fraud Suits For Failures To Comply With The Law, James D. Cox
"We're Cool" Statements After Omnicare: Securities Fraud Suits For Failures To Comply With The Law, James D. Cox
Faculty Scholarship
As part of a symposium celebrating the multiple contributions of the late Alan Bromberg, this article examines implications flowing from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund. Because Omnicare lands so squarely on the Court’s earlier opaque opinion in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg addressing the treatment of the materiality of opinion statements, Omnicare is the new currency in the realm that will have far-reaching implications. In Virginia Bankshares, the Supreme Court quickly concluded shareholders would attach significance to the board of directors’ statement that the cash-out merger …
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven D. Solomon
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven D. Solomon
Faculty Scholarship
Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …
Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, David H. Webber
Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, David H. Webber
Faculty Scholarship
In this Article, I imagine a post-class action landscape for shareholder litigation. Assuming, for the sake of this exercise, an environment in which both securities-fraud and transactional class actions are hobbled by procedural or substantive reforms — most likely through the adoption of mandatory-arbitration provisions or fee-shifting provisions — I assess what shareholder litigation would disappear, what would remain, and what a post-class action landscape would look like. I argue that loss of the class action would remove a layer of legal insulation that prevents institutional investors from having to pursue positive value claims against companies. Currently, the class action …
Through The Looking Glass To A Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law And Financial Regulation, Gillian E. Metzger
Through The Looking Glass To A Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law And Financial Regulation, Gillian E. Metzger
Faculty Scholarship
Administrative law and financial regulation have an uneasy relationship today. It was not always so. Indeed, the two were closely intertwined at the nation's birth. The Treasury Department was a major hub of early federal administration, with Alexander Hamilton crafting the first iterations of federal administrative law in his oversight of revenue generation and customs collection. One hundred and fifty years later, administrative law and financial regulation were conjoined in the New Deal's creation of the modern administrative state. This time it was James Landis, Chair of the newly formed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and author of the leading …
The New Stock Market: Sense And Nonsense, Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, Gabriel Rauterberg
The New Stock Market: Sense And Nonsense, Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, Gabriel Rauterberg
Faculty Scholarship
How stocks are traded in the United States has been totally transformed. Gone are the dealers on NASDAQ and the specialists at the NYSE. Instead, a company’s stock can now be traded on up to sixty competing venues where a computer matches incoming orders. High-frequency traders (HFTs) post the majority of quotes and are the preponderant source of liquidity in the new market.
Many practices associated with the new stock market are highly controversial, as illustrated by the public furor following the publication of Michael Lewis’s book Flash Boys. Critics say that HFTs use their speed in discovering changes in …
Loser Pays: The Latest Installment In The Battle-Scarred, Cliff-Hanging Survival Of The Rule 10b-5 Class Action, John C. Coffee Jr.
Loser Pays: The Latest Installment In The Battle-Scarred, Cliff-Hanging Survival Of The Rule 10b-5 Class Action, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
When I was an upper-year student at Yale Law School in the late 1960s, I was sometimes as undermotivated as contemporary upper-year law students regularly appear to be. But there was then an appropriate role model for us: a graduate student, brimming with efficiency and self-discipline, who occupied a carrel in the law library, seemingly working day and night on a special research project. He had piled law review articles and cases a foot or more about his carrel, and anyone walking by could see that he seemed obsessed with something called Rule 10b-5. I had dimly heard of this …
Halliburton Ii: It All Depends On What Defendants Need To Show To Establish No Impact On Price, Merritt B. Fox
Halliburton Ii: It All Depends On What Defendants Need To Show To Establish No Impact On Price, Merritt B. Fox
Faculty Scholarship
Rule 1Ob-5 private damages actions cannot proceed on a class basis unless the plaintiffs are entitled to the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court provides defendants with an opportunity, before class certification, to rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption through evidece that the misstatement had no effect on the issuer's share price. It left unspecified, however, the standard by which the sufficiency of this evidence should be judged.
This Article explores the two most plausible approaches to setting this standard. One approach would be to impose the same statistical burden on defendants seeking to show there was …
Mandatory Disclosure And Individual Investors: Evidence From The Jobs Act, Colleen Honisberg, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Yu-Ting Forester Wong
Mandatory Disclosure And Individual Investors: Evidence From The Jobs Act, Colleen Honisberg, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Yu-Ting Forester Wong
Faculty Scholarship
One prominent justification for the mandatory disclosure rules that define modem securities law is that these rules encourage individual investors to participate in stock markets. Mandatory disclosure, the theory goes, gives individual investors access to information that puts them on a more equal playing field with sophisticated institutional shareholders. Although this reasoning has long been cited by regulators and commentators as a basis for mandating disclosure, recent work has questioned its validity. In particular, recent studies contend that individual investors are overwhelmed by the amount of information required to be disclosed under current law, and thus they cannot and do …
"Loser Pays" And Federal Preemption, John C. Coffee Jr.
"Loser Pays" And Federal Preemption, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Delaware and the federal courts have been on a collision course since 2014 when the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the facial validity of a corporate bylaw that shifted the corporation’s (and all defendants’) legal expenses to a losing plaintiff. That 2014 decision, ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A. 3d 554 (Del. 2014), quickly led a number of public corporations to adopt similar “loser pays” bylaws and charter provisions, all of which are one-sided provisions (that is, only the plaintiff may be held liable) and most shift the fees against the plaintiff even if it wins (unless …