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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage Of Citizen Shareholders, Anne M. Tucker
Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage Of Citizen Shareholders, Anne M. Tucker
Faculty Publications By Year
In this Essay, I challenge the conventional corporate law wisdom that unhappy mutual fund investors paying high fees don’t need litigation or regulation to protect their interests because they should simply exit a fund and reinvest elsewhere. The exit solution, advanced by Professors John Morley and Quinn Curtis in Taking Exit Rights Seriously provided an elegantly simply solution to the problem of unhappy indirect investors (e.g., mutual fund investors) given that they are often low-dollar, low-incentive, rationally-apathetic investors facing enormous information asymmetries and collective action problems. According to their view, competition produced by exit, or the threat of exit, is …
Federal Securities Fraud Litigation As A Lawmaking Partnership, Jill E. Fisch
Federal Securities Fraud Litigation As A Lawmaking Partnership, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
In its most recent Halliburton II decision, the Supreme Court rejected an effort to overrule its prior decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. The Court reasoned that adherence to Basic was warranted by principles of stare decisis that operate with “special force” in the context of statutory interpretation. This Article offers an alternative justification for adhering to Basic—the collaboration between the Court and Congress that has led to the development of the private class action for federal securities fraud. The Article characterizes this collaboration as a lawmaking partnership and argues that such a partnership offers distinctive lawmaking advantages. …
Form Vs. Function In Rule 10b-5 Class Actions, Amanda M. Rose
Form Vs. Function In Rule 10b-5 Class Actions, Amanda M. Rose
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The Supreme Court’s widely anticipated decision last term in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. did little to change the fundamental landscape of securities fraud litigation in the United States. Rule 10b-5 class actions premised on the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption of reliance may still be brought, although it is now clear that defendants may present evidence of lack of price distortion to rebut that presumption at the class certification stage. Halliburton does, however, raise a variety of new questions that will keep plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsel fighting for years to come. Determining the answers to these questions will …
Introduction To Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds And Private Equity, Economics And Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
Introduction To Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds And Private Equity, Economics And Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
All Faculty Scholarship
The increase in institutional ownership of recent decades has been accompanied by an enhanced role played by institutions in monitoring companies’ corporate governance behaviour. Activist hedge funds and private equity firms have achieved a degree of success in actively shaping the business plans of target firms. They may be characterized as pursuing a common goal – in the words used in the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, both seek ‘to increase the market value of their pooled capital through active engagement with individual public companies. This engagement may include demands for changes in management, the composition of the board, …
The Mess At Morgan: Risk, Incentives And Shareholder Empowerment, Jill E. Fisch
The Mess At Morgan: Risk, Incentives And Shareholder Empowerment, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
The financial crisis of 2008 focused increasing attention on corporate America and, in particular, the risk-taking behavior of large financial institutions. A growing appreciation of the “public” nature of the corporation resulted in a substantial number of high profile enforcement actions. In addition, demands for greater accountability led policymakers to attempt to harness the corporation’s internal decision-making structure, in the name of improved corporate governance, to further the interest of non-shareholder stakeholders. Dodd-Frank’s advisory vote on executive compensation is an example.
This essay argues that the effort to employ shareholders as agents of public values and, thereby, to inculcate corporate …
The Problem With Consenting To Insider Trading, Leo Katz
The Problem With Consenting To Insider Trading, Leo Katz
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.