Securities Law Commons^™

Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage Of Citizen Shareholders, Anne M. Tucker

Faculty Publications By Year

In this Essay, I challenge the conventional corporate law wisdom that unhappy mutual fund investors paying high fees don’t need litigation or regulation to protect their interests because they should simply exit a fund and reinvest elsewhere. The exit solution, advanced by Professors John Morley and Quinn Curtis in Taking Exit Rights Seriously provided an elegantly simply solution to the problem of unhappy indirect investors (e.g., mutual fund investors) given that they are often low-dollar, low-incentive, rationally-apathetic investors facing enormous information asymmetries and collective action problems. According to their view, competition produced by exit, or the threat of exit, is …

Institutional Investors In Corporate Governance, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

This chapter of the Oxford Handbook on Corporate Law and Governance examines the role of institutional investors in corporate governance and the role of regulation in encouraging institutional investors to become active stewards. I approach these topics through asking what lessons we can draw from the U.S. experience for the E.U.’s 2014 proposed amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive.

I begin by defining the institutional investor category, and summarizing the growth of institutional investors’ equity holdings over time. I then briefly survey how institutional investors themselves are governed and how they organize share voting. This leads me to two central …

Memo To Prime Minister Cameron On The Revision Of The U.K. National Action Plan On Business And Human Rights, Kaitlin Y. Cordes, Sam Szoke-Burke

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In July 2015, CCSI sent a memo to U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron to provide input on the 2015 revision of the U.K. National Action Plan on business and human rights, originally published in 2013. The memo applauded the U.K. Government’s early adoption of a National Action Plan consistent with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, noting that responsible and rights-respecting outward investment can support sustainable development in host countries, and that the U.K. Government has an important role to play in promoting responsible business operations. The memo urged the government to highlight the importance of land …

Federal Securities Fraud Litigation As A Lawmaking Partnership, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

In its most recent Halliburton II decision, the Supreme Court rejected an effort to overrule its prior decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. The Court reasoned that adherence to Basic was warranted by principles of stare decisis that operate with “special force” in the context of statutory interpretation. This Article offers an alternative justification for adhering to Basic—the collaboration between the Court and Congress that has led to the development of the private class action for federal securities fraud. The Article characterizes this collaboration as a lawmaking partnership and argues that such a partnership offers distinctive lawmaking advantages. …

Form Vs. Function In Rule 10b-5 Class Actions, Amanda M. Rose

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court’s widely anticipated decision last term in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. did little to change the fundamental landscape of securities fraud litigation in the United States. Rule 10b-5 class actions premised on the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption of reliance may still be brought, although it is now clear that defendants may present evidence of lack of price distortion to rebut that presumption at the class certification stage. Halliburton does, however, raise a variety of new questions that will keep plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsel fighting for years to come. Determining the answers to these questions will …

An Essay For Professor Alan Bromberg: Removing The Taint From Past Illegal Offers And Sales - 40 Years Later, Douglas M. Branson

Articles

In 1975, for its inaugural, the Journal of Corporation Law at the University of Iowa solicited a lead article for issue 1, page 1. The editors solicited that piece from Professor Alan Bromberg, one of the great academics of securities law, then or at any other time. Professor Bromberg, of Southern Methodist University, died last year. This article began as a piece with three goals: (1) pay homage to Professor Bromberg, whom I knew personally, and his achievements; (2) update his 1975 article; and (3) add flesh to the treatment by examining closely practical, modern day situations in which rescission …

Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt …

Introduction To Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds And Private Equity, Economics And Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery

All Faculty Scholarship

The increase in institutional ownership of recent decades has been accompanied by an enhanced role played by institutions in monitoring companies’ corporate governance behaviour. Activist hedge funds and private equity firms have achieved a degree of success in actively shaping the business plans of target firms. They may be characterized as pursuing a common goal – in the words used in the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, both seek ‘to increase the market value of their pooled capital through active engagement with individual public companies. This engagement may include demands for changes in management, the composition of the board, …

The Mess At Morgan: Risk, Incentives And Shareholder Empowerment, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

The financial crisis of 2008 focused increasing attention on corporate America and, in particular, the risk-taking behavior of large financial institutions. A growing appreciation of the “public” nature of the corporation resulted in a substantial number of high profile enforcement actions. In addition, demands for greater accountability led policymakers to attempt to harness the corporation’s internal decision-making structure, in the name of improved corporate governance, to further the interest of non-shareholder stakeholders. Dodd-Frank’s advisory vote on executive compensation is an example.

This essay argues that the effort to employ shareholders as agents of public values and, thereby, to inculcate corporate …

"We're Cool" Statements After Omnicare: Securities Fraud Suits For Failures To Comply With The Law, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

As part of a symposium celebrating the multiple contributions of the late Alan Bromberg, this article examines implications flowing from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund. Because Omnicare lands so squarely on the Court’s earlier opaque opinion in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg addressing the treatment of the materiality of opinion statements, Omnicare is the new currency in the realm that will have far-reaching implications. In Virginia Bankshares, the Supreme Court quickly concluded shareholders would attach significance to the board of directors’ statement that the cash-out merger …

The Problem With Consenting To Insider Trading, Leo Katz

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support In Money Market Fund Reform, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

Since the 2008 financial crisis, in which the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck,” money market funds (MMFs) have been the subject of ongoing policy debate. Many commentators view MMFs as a key contributor to the crisis because widespread redemption demands during the days following the Lehman bankruptcy contributed to a freeze in the credit markets. In response, MMFs were deemed a component of the nefarious shadow banking industry and targeted for regulatory reform. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) misguided 2014 reforms responded by potentially exacerbating MMF fragility while potentially crippling large segments of the MMF industry.

Determining the …

Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff

All Faculty Scholarship

Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …