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Securities Law Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

The Sec And Accounting, In Part Through The Eyes Of Pacioli, Matthew J. Barrett Mar 2005

The Sec And Accounting, In Part Through The Eyes Of Pacioli, Matthew J. Barrett

Journal Articles

As part of a symposium marking the seventieth anniversary of the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, this article pulls together two threads, namely Luca Pacioli's prominence in accounting and the importance of the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) requirements that seek to give investors an opportunity to view a public company through the eyes of management, to evaluate the SEC's record on certain accounting issues. Because writers in legal journals have largely ignored Pacioli's efforts, the article begins by highlighting some of the friar's contributions to accounting precepts. The article next applies some of those precepts in a …


The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2005

The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

As one grows older, birthdays gradually shift from being celebratory events to more reflective occasions. One's 40th birthday is commemorated rather differently from one's 2lst, which is, in turn, celebrated quite differently from one's first. After a certain point, the individual birthdays become less important and it is the milestone years to whch we pay particular attention. Sadly for entities like the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is only the milestone years (the ones ending in five or zero, for some reason), that draw any attention at all. No one held a conference to celebrate the SEC's 67th anniversary. Clearly …


The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2005

The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the pathologies of the SEC and explores the relation between those pathologies and the SEC's status as an independent agency. Part II then outlines an alternative regulatory structure primarily situated within the executive branch. I also argue that such a relocation of authority would enhance regulatory effectiveness while simultaneously reducing the cost of excessive regulation. The Article concludes with some thoughts about the viability of my proposal.