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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Who Sits On Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are & What They Do, Lawrence J. Trautman
Who Sits On Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are & What They Do, Lawrence J. Trautman
Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.
Corporate directors play an important role in governing American business, in the capital formation process, and are fundamental to the stewardship of economic growth. Texas businesses play a disproportionately important role among the states in aggregate U.S. job creation, responsible for 37% of all net new American jobs since the post 2008-2009 recovery began. It is the job of the board of directors to govern the corporation. The duties and responsibilities of a corporate director include: the duty of care; duty of loyalty; and duty of good faith. This paper results from the author’s previously assembled biographical data for most …
Corporate Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking About This?, Lawrence J. Trautman
Corporate Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking About This?, Lawrence J. Trautman
Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.
What exactly is board diversity and why does it matter? How does diversity fit in an attempt to build the best board for any organization? What attributes and skills are required by law and what mix of experiences and talents provide the best corporate governance? Even though most companies say they are looking for diversity, why has there been such little progress? Are required director attributes, which are a must for all boards, consistent with future diversity gains and aligned with achieving high performance and optimal board composition? My goal is to provide answers to these questions, and to discuss …
Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang
Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Unfair self-dealing and expropriation of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder are common business practices in developing countries (“bad-law countries”). Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, there are many questions unanswered in relation to behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. For example, a puzzle is that some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries voluntarily extract minority shareholders less than other controlling shareholders. Applying Mancur Olson’s framework of political theory of “banditry” to the context of corporate governance, this Article proposes that there are at least two categories of controlling shareholders. “Roving controllers” are dominant shareholders with …