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Securities Law Commons

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Journal

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Fiduciary duties

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Turning A Short-Term Fling Into A Long-Term Commitment: Board Duties In A New Era, Nadelle Grossman Jul 2010

Turning A Short-Term Fling Into A Long-Term Commitment: Board Duties In A New Era, Nadelle Grossman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Corporate boards face significant pressure to make decisions that maximize profits in the short run. That pressure comes in part from executives who are financially rewarded for short-term profits despite the long-term risks associated with those profit-making activities. The current financial crisis, where executives at AIG and numerous other institutions ignored the long-term risks associated with their mortgage backed securities investments, arose largely because those executives were compensated for the short-term profits generated by those investments despite their longer-term risks. Pressure on boards for short-term profits also comes from activist investors who seek to make quick money off of trading …


Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, Alfred F. Conard Oct 1988

Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, Alfred F. Conard

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Capitalism, in most large public corporations, has been subtly transformed from a system of dominance by the suppliers of capital to a system of dominance by the managers, dubbed "managerialism." In many respects, managerialism is beneficial to investors and other enterprise constituencies, since managers' rewards typically grow with the profitability of the enterprise. But managerialism permits drastic wastes of resources when managers hang on to their jobs after they have become inefficient or spend lavishly to defend themselves against takeover bids. Derivative suits, shareholder proposals, independent directors, and other prescriptions have failed to stifle managerial abuses. This is the message …


Providing An Effective Remedy In Shareholder Suits Against Officers, Directors, And Controlling Persons, Michael H. Woolever Jan 1975

Providing An Effective Remedy In Shareholder Suits Against Officers, Directors, And Controlling Persons, Michael H. Woolever

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Corporate officers, directors, and controlling persons occupy a fiduciary relationship toward the corporation and its shareholders in the exercise of control over corporate affairs. This fiduciary obligation requires that officers, directors, and controlling persons act in good faith and perform their offices in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and not to their own advantage. When this duty is breached, a shareholder may bring an action against these fiduciaries, either in his own name or derivatively for the benefit of the corporation. Under present law, however, it may be impossible for an American court to secure jurisdiction …


Financial Statement Insurance: A New Approach To Ivestor Protection, Stephen Z. Surridge Apr 1969

Financial Statement Insurance: A New Approach To Ivestor Protection, Stephen Z. Surridge

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The accounting profession rapidly is moving toward a crisis in liability. Members of the investing public are suing accountants with mounting frequency and success. This article will analyze briefly the origin and present dimensions of the crisis, and then propose a plan for replacing court-imposed liability with insured liability through the offering of financial statement insurance. The essentials of the plan can be simply stated. Insurance would be offered by accountants to investors on a voluntary basis in conjunction with purchases and sales of corporate stock and securities. Individual investors would be able to purchase from the auditors of a …