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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Avoiding Wasteful Competition: Why Trading On Inside Information Should Be Illegal, Michael D. Guttentag
Avoiding Wasteful Competition: Why Trading On Inside Information Should Be Illegal, Michael D. Guttentag
Brooklyn Law Review
This article offers a new and compelling reason to make all trading based on inside information illegal. The value realized by trading on inside information is unusual in two respects. First, inside information is produced at little or no incremental cost and is nevertheless quite valuable. Second, profits made from trading on inside information come largely at the expense of others. When the value of something exceeds the cost to produce it, a wasteful race to be the first to capture the resulting surplus is likely to ensue. Similarly, resources expended solely to take something of value from others are …
Karmel’S Dissent: The Sec’S Use And Occasional Misuse Of Section 21(A) Reports Of Investigation, James J. Park
Karmel’S Dissent: The Sec’S Use And Occasional Misuse Of Section 21(A) Reports Of Investigation, James J. Park
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act gives the SEC the option of publishing a report of its findings after conducting an investigation. Typically, the SEC issues such reports about once a year to highlight major compliance and enforcement issues. This Article examines the SEC’s use of Section 21(a) investigative reports with special attention to its 1979 report in Spartek, where Commissioner Roberta Karmel filed a famous dissent. In that opinion, she argued that the report effectively sanctioned conduct over which the SEC did not have jurisdiction and that Spartek did not have sufficient notice of its regulatory obligations. While …
Full Of Questions And Wonder: Roberta Karmel's Legacy, Alan R. Palmiter
Full Of Questions And Wonder: Roberta Karmel's Legacy, Alan R. Palmiter
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Roberta Karmel has been perhaps the keenest observer and commentator on the securities industry and its regulation for the past five decades. Her observations about securities regulation—during the SEC’s precocious adolescence and into its young adulthood—have framed the academic inquiry of all of us who have written on the subject during this period. But more valuable to us than her observations have been her questions, full of wonder and penetrating insight. We securities academics, the enterprise of securities regulation, and especially market capitalism, all owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Professor Karmel.
Qualified Opportunity Funds: Private Equity Exemptions From Public Responsibility, Audrey E. Abate
Qualified Opportunity Funds: Private Equity Exemptions From Public Responsibility, Audrey E. Abate
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
The historic Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), passed and signed into law in 2017, included a pilot program of a new kind of tax advantage: the Qualified Opportunity Zone. The obscure provision has since spawned novel investment vehicles, called Qualified Opportunity Funds, through which qualified individuals and entities participate in what are often significant tax advantages, including deferral of capital gains for up to ten years. Because Qualified Opportunity Funds have come into existence so recently, regulation has been slow to catch up to the ways in which this tax program is rapidly attracting capital from private equity, investment …
Proxy Advisors As Issue Spotters, Douglas Sarro
Proxy Advisors As Issue Spotters, Douglas Sarro
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
When institutional investors hire proxy advisors to prepare reports on matters up for vote at public company shareholder meetings, are they interested primarily in acquiring a bottom-line recommendation on how to vote, on which they can then blindly rely? Or in acquiring information that will help them make their own voting decisions? Supporters of controversial reforms introduced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2019 and 2020 gravitate toward the former position, arguing that reform is needed to discourage undue reliance on proxy advisor recommendations. Opponents gravitate toward the latter position, arguing that additional regulation generally is unnecessary given …
Reducing Conflicts Of Interest: A "Glass-Steagall" Split Of Advisory And Consulting Services Of Proxy Advisory Firms, Austin Manna
Reducing Conflicts Of Interest: A "Glass-Steagall" Split Of Advisory And Consulting Services Of Proxy Advisory Firms, Austin Manna
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
This Note explores a solution to the potential problem with proxy advisory firms that involves an inherent conflict of interest arising from the structure of two services—advisory and consulting services—offered at certain proxy advisory firms in the United States. The solution proposed in this paper applies a Glass-Steagall framework to breakup these two services of the proxy advisory firms. In theory, this would eliminate the inherent conflicts of interest.