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Securities Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Journal

Brooklyn Law School

2018

Large banks; Bank of America; settlement; JPMorgan; Chase; Wells Fargo; Goldman Sachs; Citigroup; too big to jail; white collar crime; financial crisis; regulations; regulatory model; regulators; Securities & Exchange Commission; SEC; Department of Justice; DOJ; Commodity Futures Trading; CFTC; Federal Reserve Board; the Fed; prosecution; executives; financial services; fines; Wall Street

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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Regulating The “Too Big To Jail” Financial Institutions, Jerry W. Markham Jan 2018

Regulating The “Too Big To Jail” Financial Institutions, Jerry W. Markham

Brooklyn Law Review

This article addresses the “too big to jail” regulatory model in which large banks pay hundreds of billions of dollars to settle multiple and duplicative regulatory charges brought by a horde of state, federal, and even foreign regulators. The banks pay those massive settlements in order to keep their banking charters and to obtain immunity from prosecution for senior executives. In turn, regulators benefit from the headlines these fines generate. Much criticism has been directed at these settlements because the banks are allowed to continue business as usual and no senior executives are jailed. Other critics contend that these settlements …