Securities Law Commons^™

A Historical Analysis Of The Investment Company Act Of 1940, Michael B. Weiner

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

More than 100 million Americans invest $25 trillion in mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (collectively, “funds”) regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Act”), making funds the predominant investment vehicle in the United States. Everyday investors rely on funds to save for retirement, pay for college, and seek financial security. In this way, funds demonstrate how “Wall Street” can connect with “Main Street” to improve people’s lives.

By way of background, funds are created by investment advisers (“advisers”) that provide investment advisory (e.g., stock selection) and other services to their funds in exchange for a fee. …

Break From Tradition: Questioning The Primacy Of Self-Regulation In American Securities Law, John I. Sanders

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This Comment outlines the circular path of American securities law—one that begins and ends with the primacy of self-regulation. Part I of this paper describes American securities law between 1792 and 1911 (the “Buttonwood Era”). In this era, a group of New York stock brokers utilized private contract law to create securities regulation for their private club, thereby establishing a tradition of self-regulation. Part II describes a short period of history in which individual states attempted to regulate the se-curities market through state statutes, the so-called “Blue Sky Laws.” Part III details the creation of the federal securities law regime …

Power Without Property, Still: Unger, Berle, And The Derivatives Revolution, Cristie Ford, Carol Liao

Seattle University Law Review

We are in a time when the notion of property is in flux. The derivatives revolution has shattered the “atom of property” well beyond what was originally imagined in 1932 by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. This disaggregation has had fascinating, and often adverse, effects on corporate law and securities regulation. Moreover, the phenomenon has had the unexpected effect of permitting some parties that already possess considerable social, economic, and political power to accumulate even more.

Neo-Brandeisianism And The New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., William O. Douglas, And The Problem Of Corporate Finance In The 1930s, Jessica Wang

Seattle University Law Review

This essay revisits Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and The Modern Corporation and Private Property by focusing on the triangle of Berle, Louis D. Brandeis, and William O. Douglas in order to examine some of the underlying assumptions about law, economics, and the nature of modern society behind securities regulation and corporate finance in the 1930s. I explore Douglas and Berle’s academic and political relationship, the conceptual underpinnings of Brandeis, Berle, and Douglas’s critiques of modern finance, and the ways in which the two younger men—Berle and Douglas—ultimately departed from their role model, Brandeis.

The Limited Public Offer In German And U.S. Securities Law: A Comparative Analysis Of Prospectus Act Section 2(2) And Rule 505 Of Regulation D, David B. Guenther

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Note examines the "limited circle of persons" exception in section 2(2) of the Prospectus Act in comparison to similar provisions of U.S. federal securities law, particularly Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") and Rule 505 of Regulation D ("Rule 505"). Comparison of the Prospectus Act to U.S. securities law seems both warranted and useful. Certain aspects of German securities law are broadly modeled on U.S. precedents. U.S. securities laws reflect more than sixty-five years of experience defining (and re-defining) public and limited public offers and private placements. U.S. securities regulators have also displayed in …

Baruch: Wall Street: Security Risk, Lewis D. Lowenfels

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Wall Street: Security Risk by Hurd Baruch