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Securities Law Commons

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Faculty Scholarship

Mandatory disclosure

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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Law, Share Price Accuracy And Economic Performance: The New Evidence, Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, Artyom Durnev Jan 2003

Law, Share Price Accuracy And Economic Performance: The New Evidence, Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, Artyom Durnev

Faculty Scholarship

Mandatory disclosure has been at the core of U.S. securities regulation since its adoption in the early 1930s. For many decades, this fixture of our financial system was accepted with little examination. Over the last twenty years, however, mandatory disclosure has been subject to intensifying intellectual crosscurrents. Some commentators hold out the U.S. system as the standard for the world. They argue that adoption by other countries of a U.S.-styled system, with its greater corporate transparency, would enhance their economic performance. Other commentators, in contrast, insist that the U.S. mandatory disclosure regime represents a mistake, not a model. These crosscurrents …


The Securities Globalization Disclosure Debate, Merritt B. Fox Jan 2001

The Securities Globalization Disclosure Debate, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

A global market is developing for the shares of an increasing portion of the world’s 41,000 publicly-traded issuers. This trend has given rise to an active debate concerning what United States policy should be toward regulation of their disclosure practices. This Article is a comment on this debate through the eyes of an active participant


Required Disclosure And Corporate Governance, Merritt B. Fox Jan 1999

Required Disclosure And Corporate Governance, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most distinctive features of U.S. business law is the stringent requirements of ongoing disclosure imposed on issuers of publicly traded securities. This scheme usually has been justified as necessary to protect investors from making poor trading decisions as a result of being uninformed. Little scholarly attention, however, has been paid to the corporate governance effects of such required disclosure. In analyzing these effects, this article concludes that required disclosure can improve corporate governance in important ways. Indeed, improving corporate governance, not investor protection, provides the most persuasive justification for imposing on issuers the obligation to provide ongoing …


Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, Merritt B. Fox Jan 1999

Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

This Article advances the reopened debate over mandatory disclosure in two ways. First, it demonstrates that the proponents of issuer choice have not effectively countered the arguments that have formed the basis of the prevailing consensus for retaining mandatory disclosure. While this consensus was formed when the alternative to mandatory disclosure was total abandonment of regulation, the proponents of issuer choice have not shown how the arguments that form the basis of this consensus have any less force when applied to the new alternative of issuer choice. Nor have the proponents offered persuasive, more general rebuttals to these arguments. Second, …


Market Failure And The Economic Case For A Mandatory Disclosure System, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 1984

Market Failure And The Economic Case For A Mandatory Disclosure System, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Recent academic commentary on the securities laws has much in common with the battles fought in historiography over the origins of the First World War. The same progression of phases is evident. First, there is an orthodox school, which tends to see historical events largely as a moral drama of good against evil. Next come the revisionists, debunking all and explaining that the good guys were actually the bad. Eventually, a new wave of more professional, craftsmanlike scholars arrives on the scene to correct the gross overstatements of the revisionists and produce a more balanced, if problematic, assessment.