Securities Law Commons^™

Securitizing Notes Of Small Businesses And Needy Workers, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Businesses, whether large ones or small ones, such as restaurants and small shops, are presently closed and some of their employees have been laid off.¹ Currently, the government is lending money to these small businesses² and the now unemployed workers for their sustenance. It then collects the payments from some of the borrowers and the source of the rest of the money is taxes.³ Since not all, or perhaps only a few, small businesses own real estate, they might sign notes promising to repay the loans but can offer no asset backing. Presumably, the nation’s financial deficit …

Hidden Agendas In Shareholder Voting, Scott Hirst, Adriana Z. Robertson

Faculty Scholarship

Nothing in either corporate or securities law requires companies to notify investors what they will be voting on before the record date for a shareholder meeting. We show that, overwhelmingly, they do not. The result is “hidden agendas”: for 88% of shareholder votes, investors cannot find out what they will be voting on before the record date. This poses an especially serious problem for investors who engage in securities lending: they must decide whether the expected benefit of voting exceeds the expected benefit of continuing to lend their shares (or making them available for lending) without knowing what they will …

Index Funds And The Future Of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, And Policy, Scott Hirst, Lucian Bebchuk

Faculty Scholarship

Index funds own an increasingly large proportion of American public companies. The stewardship decisions of index fund managers—how they monitor, vote, and engage with their portfolio companies—can be expected to have a profound impact on the governance and performance of public companies and the economy. Understanding index fund stewardship, and how policymaking can improve it, is thus critical for corporate law scholarship. In this Article we contribute to such understanding by providing a comprehensive theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of index fund stewardship.

We begin by putting forward an agency-costs theory of index fund incentives. Stewardship decisions by index funds …

Corporate Governance By Index Exclusion, Scott Hirst, Kobi Kastiel

Faculty Scholarship

Investors have long been unhappy with certain governance arrangements adopted by companies undertaking initial public offerings, such as dual-class voting structures. Traditional sources of corporate governance rules—the Securities and Exchange Commission, state law, and exchange listing rules—do not constrain these arrangements. As a result, investors have turned to a new source of governance rules: index providers.

This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of index exclusion rules and their likely effects on insiders’ decision-making. We show that efforts to portray index providers as the new sheriffs of the U.S. capital markets are overstated. Index providers face complex and conflicting interests, which …

The Specter Of The Giant Three, Scott Hirst, Lucian Bebchuk

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines the large, steady, and continuing growth of the Big Three index fund managers — BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors. We show that there is a real prospect that index funds will continue to grow, and that voting in most significant public companies will come to be dominated by the future “Giant Three.”

We begin by analyzing the drivers of the rise of the Big Three, including the structural factors that are leading to the heavy concentration of the index funds sector. We then provide empirical evidence about the past growth and current status of the …

The Case For Investor Ordering, Scott Hirst

Faculty Scholarship

Whether corporate arrangements should be mandated by public law or “privately ordered” by corporations themselves has been a foundational question in corporate law scholarship. State corporation laws are generally privately ordered. But a significant and growing number of arrangements are governed by “corporate regulations” created by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). SEC corporate regulations are invariably mandatory. Whether they should be is the focus of this Article.

This Article contributes to the ongoing debate by showing that whether mandatory or privately-ordered rules are optimal depends on the nature of investors, and their incentives in choosing corporate arrangements. The …

Universal Proxies, Scott Hirst

Faculty Scholarship

Contested director elections are a central feature of the corporate landscape, and underlie shareholder activism. Shareholders vote by unilateral proxies, which prevent them from “mixing and matching” among nominees from either side. The solution is universal proxies. The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed a universal proxy rule, which has been the subject of heated debate and conflicting claims. This paper provides the first empirical analysis of universal proxies, allowing evaluation of these claims.

The paper’s analysis shows that unilateral proxies can lead to distorted proxy contest outcomes, which disenfranchise shareholders. By removing these distortions, universal proxies would improve corporate …

Zappers, Phantomware And Other Sales Suppression Software In The State Of Washington, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Robert Chicoine

Faculty Scholarship

Electronic sales suppression (ESS) is a fraud that has been a (prominent) feature of the North American retail business since at least 1996. The first EES case in the US dates from 1981. ESS is a global problem. Depending on the jurisdiction, and the research study consulted, ESS is estimated to be present in 34% (of Canadian), 50% (of German – two studies), and 70% (of Swedish and Slovenian) businesses. It may be the case today, that “you cannot leave home without” encountering (or participating in) ESS.

The most common types of sales suppression technology are Zappers and Phantomware programming. …

Frozen Charters, Scott Hirst

Faculty Scholarship

In 2012, the New York Stock Exchange changed its policies to prevent brokers voting shares on corporate governance proposals where they had not received instructions from beneficial owners. Although the change was intended to protect investors and improve corporate governance, it has had the opposite effect: a significant number of U.S. public companies are no longer able to amend important parts of their corporate charters, despite the support of their boards of directors and overwhelming majorities of shareholders. Their charters are frozen.

This paper provides the first empirical and policy analysis of the broker voting change and its significant unintended …

Lead Plaintiffs And Lead Counsel In Deal Litigation, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

The shareholder lawsuit is the primary vehicle for enforcing corporate law. While closely related fields like securities regulation rely on private shareholder lawsuits to supplement the enforcement work of public regulators like the Securities Exchange Commission, corporate law enforcement depends largely on private rights of action brought by aggrieved investors and their lawyers. The purpose of these lawsuits is straightforward: to induce corporate fiduciaries like boards and managers to abide by the duties of loyalty and care in overseeing the corporation. There are many situations that implicate these fiduciary duties, but none that are as fraught with conflict and temptation …

Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, I imagine a post-class action landscape for shareholder litigation. Assuming, for the sake of this exercise, an environment in which both securities-fraud and transactional class actions are hobbled by procedural or substantive reforms — most likely through the adoption of mandatory-arbitration provisions or fee-shifting provisions — I assess what shareholder litigation would disappear, what would remain, and what a post-class action landscape would look like. I argue that loss of the class action would remove a layer of legal insulation that prevents institutional investors from having to pursue positive value claims against companies. Currently, the class action …

The Ftc And Privacy And Security Duties For The Cloud, Daniel J. Solove

Faculty Scholarship

Third-party data service providers, especially providers of cloud computing services, present unique and difficult privacy and data security challenges. While many companies that directly collect data from consumers are bound by the promises they make to individuals in their privacy policies, cloud service providers are usually not a part of this arrangement. It is not entirely clear what, if any, obligations cloud service providers have to protect the data of individuals with whom they have no contractual relationship. This problem is especially acute because many institutions sharing personal data with cloud service providers fail to include significant privacy and security …

Central Falls Retirees V. Bondholders: Assessing Fear Of Contagion In Chapter 9 Proceedings, Maria O'Brien

Faculty Scholarship

Modern Chapter 9 litigation has been characterized by extraordinary protections for municipal bondholders, and Central Falls is no exception. Although not well understood by politicians, fear of contagion has encouraged the adoption of legal arrangements that have limited the bankruptcy courts’ ability to include bondholders in the cost of restructuring municipal debt. This preference for bondholders (and, by extension, their insurers) has meant increased misery for taxpayers and retirees. Given that all of these actors appear to have been complicit to some degree in the creation and maintenance of the fiscally imprudent conditions that triggered bankruptcy and that evidence of …

The Plight Of The Individual Investor In Securities Class Actions, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Individual investors victimized by securities fraud have no voice in directing class actions brought on their behalf once institutional investors obtain lead plaintiff appointments. The same holds for state-level transactional class actions claiming breaches of fiduciary duty by boards of directors in connection with mergers and acquisitions. In theory, the interests of institutional and individual investors align, nullifying the need for a separate voice for individuals; one rationale for the lead plaintiff modifications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was that individuals would benefit from the sophistication of institutional investor lead plaintiffs. But in practice, individual investors’ …

The Failure Of Investor Protection By Disclosure, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article deals with the issue of investor protection by disclosure. It discusses the evolution of disclosure in the financial area during the past thirty years, the role of disclosure in the regulation of intermediaries, and the current strong disagreements concerning the Dodd-Frank Act's mandate applicable to market brokers. The Article notes the role of disclosure in the restructured financial intermediation system, its failure to protect investors, and concludes with suggestions to partially correct the failure and restore the rationale for effective disclosure. Disclosure should apply to the risks posed by the intermediaries rather than to the dangers and risks …

Upper-Level Courses: Three Examplars, Mark Fagan, Tamar Frankel, Eric J. Gouvin, Kathy Z. Heller

Faculty Scholarship

I'm Mark Fagan, and I co-teach a course on securitization with Tamar Frankel at Boston University School of Law. We have come together to teach several interdisciplinary courses that combine law, business and public policy. Our course on securitization is a wonderful exemplar because it touches so many aspects of law as well as business and public policy.

We spent quite a bit of time wrestling with how to teach it. Do you teach it in a process fashion? Do you teach it by legal topic? Do you take examples and examine them? After much debate and discussion, we actually …

Private Ordering And The Proxy Access Debate, Scott Hirst, Lucian A. Bebchuk

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines two “meta” issues raised by opponents of the SEC’s proposal to provide shareholders with rights to place director candidates on the company’s proxy materials. First, opponents argue that, even assuming proxy access is desirable in many circumstances, the existing no-access default should be retained and the adoption of proxy access arrangements should be left to opting out of this default on a company-by-company basis. This Article, however, identifies strong reasons against retaining no-access as the default. There is substantial empirical evidence indicating that director insulation from removal is associated with lower firm value and worse performance. Furthermore, …

Is 'Pay-To-Play' Driving Public Pension Fund Activism In Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

The recent emergence of public pension funds as frequent lead plaintiffs in securities class actions has prompted speculation that the funds’ litigation activism is driven by “pay-to-play”. “Pay-to-play” posits that public pension funds are driven by politician board members to obtain lead plaintiff appointments in securities class actions because of campaign contributions made by plaintiffs’ lawyers to those board members. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the securities litigation activity of 111 such funds from the years 2003 through 2006. Three of the paper’s findings cast doubt on the “pay-to-play” theory, including that: (1) politicians and political control negatively …

Let The Securities And Exchange Commission Outsource Enforcement By Litigation: A Proposal, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

The stories of Stanford's suspected Ponzi scheme, and Madoff s proven scheme, as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission's lenient settlements with very large suspected violators, and its focus on the numerous, small accused, have raised questions about the Commission's enforcement resources. This Article suggests that the Commission outsource civil cases against very large defendants when the examination of the defendant finds signs of wrongdoing under the securities acts. The Commission already outsources two types of legal services and the United States government practices extensive outsourcing. This article suggests that with appropriate limitations and controls outsourcing of enforcement litigation …

Leverage In The Board Room: The Unsung Influence Of Private Lenders In Corporate Governance, Frederick Tung

Faculty Scholarship

The influence of banks and other private lenders pervades public companies. From the first day of a lending arrangement, loan covenants and built-in contingency provisions affect managerial decision making. Conventional corporate governance analysis has been slow to notice or account for this lender influence. Corporate governance discourse has traditionally focused only on corporate law arrangements. The few existing accounts of creditors' influence over firm managers emphasize the drastic actions creditors take in extreme cases - when a firm is in serious trouble - but in fact, private lender influence is a routine feature of corporate governance even absent financial distress. …

Financial Accounting And Corporate Behavior, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

The power of financial accounting to shape corporate behavior is underappreciated. Positive accounting theory teaches that even cosmetic changes in reported earnings can affect share value, not because market participants are unable to see through such changes to the underlying fundamentals, but because of implicit or explicit contracts that are based on reported earnings and transaction costs. However, agency theory suggests that accounting choices and corporate responses to accounting standard changes will not necessarily be those that maximize share value. For a number of reasons, including the fact that executive compensation often is tied to reported earnings, managerial preferences for …

Lost In Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition To Issuer Choice In International Securities Regulation, Frederick Tung

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate charter competition among U.S. states has been held out as a model of welfare-enhancing regulatory competition. Proponents of this story also rely on it as a basis for promoting regulatory competition in international securities regulation. Issuer choice proponents argue that an issuer of securities should be permitted to choose the securities regulation of any nation to govern its securities offerings and trading worldwide. This Article challenges the notion that the claimed success of corporate charter competition among U.S. states argues in favor of issuer choice for international securities regulation.

Even granting the assumptions of race-to-the-top advocates and accepting the …

From Monopolists To Markets?: A Political Economy Of Issuer Choice In International Securities Regulation, Frederick Tung

Faculty Scholarship

It is ironic that during a time of corporate scandal and regulatory soul searching, one of the most spirited debates among corporate and securities law scholars has focused on reform proposals for international securities regulation that essentially call for corporate self-regulation. Scholars have called for international regulatory competition in securities law, arguing that each issuer of securities should be able to pick its own securities regulatory regime. While these "issuer choice" proponents argue for a diversity of and competition among securities laws of the various nations, their proposals also ironically depend on uniformity - or at least international consensus - …

The Internet, Securities Regulation, And Theory Of Law, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Rarely has a change in the environment affected society as dramatically as the Internet. It has transformed the way we retain, transfer, and exchange information. At minimal cost, the Internet offers us far more information at a faster pace than ever before. It enables us to interact around the globe with more people than at any time in the past. When such dramatic environmental changes occur, drastic changes in the law often follow. 1 The Internet affects the environment in which securities markets operate, and the laws that govern them. 2 The use of the Internet has already begun to …

Cross-Border Securitization: Without Law, But Not Lawless, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

The Article discusses two puzzles posed by cross-border securitization.

First, why do the innovators in this area "give away" their creations through publications and other means rather than attempt to extract licensing fees by registering copyrights, patents, and trade names? The Article shows that innovators benefit from "giving away" their innovations through fees of the first clients or future clients to a greater extent than through licensing fees. Second, how can securitization markets develop under fragmented and unpredictable laws? The Article argues that cross-border securitization is flourishing under a "law merchant," which is later incorporated into domestic laws. In fact, …

The Ethics Of Insider Trading, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The quickest way to become famous is often to become infamous, as arbitrageur Ivan Boesky has recently discovered. Prior to November 1986, Mr. Boesky was well-known within the financial community, but largely unknown outside it. That changed dramatically following revelations that he and Dennis Levine, a merger specialist with the investment banking firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., had made tens of millions of dollars in the stock market by using Mr. Levine's advance knowledge of impending takeovers by Drexel clients. Today, after disgorging $50 million in profits, paying $50 million in penalties, and receiving a jail sentence, Mr. Boesky …

Taxation Without Premeditation: An Economic Analysis Of The Structure, Regulation And Strangulation Of The Private Activity Bond Market, Kevin Outterson

Faculty Scholarship

Private Activity Bonds (PABs) are private debt issued under the auspices of state governments. The states issued $119.4 billion dollars of long-term PABs in 1985. Utilizing the state government conduit transforms the bond interest into federally tax exempt income. As a result, PABs bear lower interest rates than comparable taxable bonds. PAB financing significantly reduces private capital costs at the expense of the Federal Treasury. The structure of the PAB subsidy is fundamentally flawed. State governments subsidize local businesses and investments with PABs, often in competition with sister states. The states receive significant local benefits, but bear no direct costs …

Symposium: The Internationalization Of The Securities Markets--Introduction, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium on international trading in securities was the brain child of William Schwartz, Dean of the Boston University School of Law, and John J. Phelan, President of the New York Stock Exchange. The idea was implemented by Donald L. Calvin, Executive Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange, and myself, with the staff and students of Boston University School of Law. The event was held in New York City on October 18, 1985.

The symposium had three purposes: first, to present a picture of the current status of international trading in securities, which has been developing rapidly; second, …