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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
The Corporation’S Place In Society, Gabriel Rauterberg
The Corporation’S Place In Society, Gabriel Rauterberg
Michigan Law Review
The vast majority of economic activity is now organized through corporations. The public corporation is usurping the state’s role as the most important institution of wealthy capitalist societies. Across the developed world, there is increasing convergence on the shareholder-owned corporation as the primary vehicle for creating wealth. Yet nothing like this degree of convergence has occurred in answering the fundamental questions of corporate capitalism: What role do corporations serve? What is the goal of corporate law? What should corporate managers do? Discussion of these questions is as old as the institutions involved.
A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar
A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar
Michigan Law Review
Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems, commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder lawsuits under state …
Securities Class Actions And Bankrupt Companies, James J. Park
Securities Class Actions And Bankrupt Companies, James J. Park
Michigan Law Review
Securities class actions are often criticized as wasteful strike suits that target temporary fluctuations in the stock prices of otherwise healthy companies. The securities class actions brought by investors of Enron and WorldCom, companies that fell into bankruptcy in the wake of fraud, resulted in the recovery of billions of dollars in permanent shareholder losses and provide a powerful counterexample to this critique. An issuer's bankruptcy may affect how judges and parties perceive securities class actions and their merits, yet little is known about the subset of cases where the company is bankrupt. This is the first extensive empirical study …
Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals For Reform, Antony Page
Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals For Reform, Antony Page
Michigan Law Review
Part I of this Review discusses the modem "nexus of contracts" approach to corporations and highlights how Greenfield's views differ. Part II examines corporate goals and purposes, suggesting that Greenfield overstates the impact of the shareholder-primacy norm and does not offer a preferable alternative. Part III critiques the means to the ends--Greenfield's proposals for changing the mechanics of corporate governance. Although several of his proposals are intriguing, they seem unlikely to achieve their pro-social aims. This Review remains skeptical, in part because-even given its problems-the U.S. "director-centric governance structure has created the most successful economy the world has ever seen." …
Directorial Fiduciary Duties In A Tracking Stock Equity Structure: The Need For A Duty Of Fairness, Jeffrey J. Hass
Directorial Fiduciary Duties In A Tracking Stock Equity Structure: The Need For A Duty Of Fairness, Jeffrey J. Hass
Michigan Law Review
Part I of this article briefly describes the key distinctions between a tracking stock corporation and a conventional corporation. It then touches on the reasons why corporations have adopted tracking stock equity structures. Part II articulates the unique legal challenges presented by a tracking stock equity structure. Part III discusses the disclosure that tracking stock corporations have made with respect to these challenges. Part IV briefly summarizes the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty and explores why these duties are ill-equipped to address these challenges. Part V presents the duty of fairness and discusses the duty's elements in detail. In …
Cook And The Corporate Shareholder: A Belated Review Of William W. Cook's Publications On Corporations, Alfred F. Conard
Cook And The Corporate Shareholder: A Belated Review Of William W. Cook's Publications On Corporations, Alfred F. Conard
Michigan Law Review
A Review of A Treatise on the Law of Stock and Stockholders, as Applicable to Railroad, Banking, Insurance, Manufacturing, Commercial, Business, Turnpike, Bridge, Canal, and Other Private Corporations by William W. Cook
Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee Jr.
Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee Jr.
Michigan Law Review
The two authors of this article have been on opposite sides of this debate, but both recognize that no single explanation is complete and that other factors, such as the self-interest of fund managers, the conflicts of interest faced by institutions who want to retain corporate business, cultural forces, collective action problems, and what we can call path dependence- the difficulty of changing the structure and behavior of highly evolved and specialized institutions - have causal roles in explaining shareholder passivity. The central question in research on American corporate governance is how these forces interact to produce the characteristic …
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, Bernard S. Black
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, Bernard S. Black
Michigan Law Review
This article argues that shareholder monitoring is possible: It's an idea that hasn't been tried, rather than an idea that has failed. I defer to a second article currently in draft the question of whether more monitoring by institutional shareholders is desirable. Will direct shareholder oversight, or indirect oversight through shareholder-nominated directors, improve corporate performance, prove counterproductive, or, perhaps, not matter much one way or the other? What are the benefits and risks in giving money managers - themselves imperfectly monitored agents - more power over corporate managers? If more shareholder voice is desirable, how much more and …
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, John C. Coffee Jr.
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, John C. Coffee Jr.
Michigan Law Review
Part I will seek to understand why firms trade in the stock market at a substantial discount from their asset value. It will answer that existing theories of the firm have not given adequate attention to a critical area where shareholders and managers have an inherent conflict, one that the existing structure of the firm does not resolve or mitigate. Despite the significant changes in the internal structure of the corporation over the last half century that have been described by business historians, there remains a deep internal strain between shareholders, on the one hand, and managers and employees, on …
Materiality, Law Reform, And Regulation By Prosecution, Michael Rosenzweig
Materiality, Law Reform, And Regulation By Prosecution, Michael Rosenzweig
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Regulation by Prosecution: The Securities & Exchange Commission Versus Corporate America by Roberta S. Karmel
The Effect Of Insider Trading Rules On The Internal Efficiency Of The Large Corporation, Robert J. Haft
The Effect Of Insider Trading Rules On The Internal Efficiency Of The Large Corporation, Robert J. Haft
Michigan Law Review
Academics have hotly debated these justifications for years, and none of the three has achieved universal acclaim. This Article suggests another perspective: Prohibiting insider trading may enhance business decision-making in large corporations. With the exception of proponents of the Business Property view, analysts have focused on how an insider trading rule affects the national securities markets and traders in those markets. The internal governance of the large corporation is a different matter, one deserving separate consideration.
The Sec And Corporate Disclosure: Regulation In Search Of A Purpose, Michigan Law Review
The Sec And Corporate Disclosure: Regulation In Search Of A Purpose, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
A Book Notice about The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Purpose by Homer Kripke
Foreign Bribes And The Securities Acts' Disclosure Requirements, Michigan Law Review
Foreign Bribes And The Securities Acts' Disclosure Requirements, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require most major corporations to disclose to investors all material information concerning company operations. Although they were not intended to regulate the conduct of business, these disclosure obligations can have a deterrent effect upon improper corporate activities. The recent revelation that a significant number of corporations have been making bribes and similar payments abroad has created interest in the feasibility of employing the disclosure requirements to curtail this practice. This Note will show that, despite recent pressures for change, the Securities and Exchange Commission has continued to view …
A Reconsideration Of The Stock Market Exception To The Dissenting Shareholder's Right Of Appraisal, Michigan Law Review
A Reconsideration Of The Stock Market Exception To The Dissenting Shareholder's Right Of Appraisal, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note engages in such a reassessment. It contends, first, that appraisal has not been an unreasonable burden on corporations and that adjustments in the appraisal procedure can eliminate remaining inequities. Next, it asserts that the stock market exception inadequately protects the dissenting shareholder, since a market might, for a variety of reasons, price a shareholder's stock at less than its intrinsic value. Finally, this Note concludes that an appraisal procedure with modifications, and not the stock market exception, reflects the appropriate balance of corporate and shareholder interests.
Limiting The Plaintiff Class: Rule 10b-5 And The Federal Securities Code, Michigan Law Review
Limiting The Plaintiff Class: Rule 10b-5 And The Federal Securities Code, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
The Penn Central litigation, involving a large, publicly held corporation, illustrates the need to examine the reach of the federal antifraud provisions. This Note discusses the problem of defining the plaintiff class when the number of past and present shareholders who are potential plaintiffs is very great. Attention will center on the methods courts have used to limit the class of investors compensable under rule 10b-5. Also, the effect that enactment of present drafts of the American Law lnstitute's proposed Federal Securities Code would have on the composition of the plaintiff class in analogous actions will be discussed. Finally, the …
Tender Offers For Corporate Control, Martin Lipton
Tender Offers For Corporate Control, Martin Lipton
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Tender Offers for Corporate Control by Edward Ross Aranow and Herbert A. Einhorn
Res Judicata In The Derivative Action: Adequacy Of Representation And The Inadequate Plaintiff, Michigan Law Review
Res Judicata In The Derivative Action: Adequacy Of Representation And The Inadequate Plaintiff, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
It is the purpose of this Note to examine the adequacy of representation in a derivative suit and to consider the appropriateness of applying res judicata to foreclose the corporate cause of action. Discussion will focus on the following areas: (1) the problem of the inadequate plaintiff; (2) the efficacy of judicially created devices designed to ensure the adequacy of representation; and, (3) the feasibility of partially exempting the derivative cause of action from the operation of res judicata.
The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections On Campaign Gm, Donald E. Schwartz
The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections On Campaign Gm, Donald E. Schwartz
Michigan Law Review
Proxy contests are generally fought for control of a corporation. The rules governing this form of corporate combat seek to provide shareholders with adequate information about the rival forces for control so that they can intelligently choose between them. The information furnished in proxy materials and discussions at annual meetings have traditionally been devoted almost entirely to subjects such as finance, production, acquisitions, and the like.
Trusts-Restraints On Alienation-Invalidity Of Voting Trust Wherein Voting Trust Certificates Were Made Inalienable, W. P. Sutter S.Ed.
Trusts-Restraints On Alienation-Invalidity Of Voting Trust Wherein Voting Trust Certificates Were Made Inalienable, W. P. Sutter S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Two stockholders, controlling a majority of the class B stock of the X corporation, transferred their stock to themselves jointly as trustees for a ten-year period. The trustees were to vote the stock as a unit, and had full voting powers on all matters affecting the corporation. Trustees agreed not to transfer the stock without the approval of both holders, and the holders agreed not to sell their stock or the voting trust certificates. Moreover, on the death of one holder-trustee, the other had an option to purchase all his interest in the stock. In an action in equity to …
Purchase Of Shares Of Corporation By A Director From A Shareholder, Harold R. Smith
Purchase Of Shares Of Corporation By A Director From A Shareholder, Harold R. Smith
Michigan Law Review
As suggested by the title to this paper, a discussion of the relationship between the directors of a corporation and the corporate entity is not within its scope. Neither is the lrelationship between the directors-and the entire body of the shareholders. These two subjects are generally treated in another branch of the law of corporations and generally are not governed by the same rules of law.' The purchase of shares of stock by a director from a nonofficial shareholder naturally brings into question the relationship between the director and the shareholder in his individual capacity, and not in his capacity …
Watered Stock Commissions Blue Sky Laws Stock Without Par Value, William W. Cook
Watered Stock Commissions Blue Sky Laws Stock Without Par Value, William W. Cook
Michigan Law Review
Stockholders' exemption from liability for corporate debts is a modern invention. It was not until 18x1 that New York extended that exemption to stockholders in manufacturing corporations.' Massachusetts did not grant it until 1830.2 England did not allow it to stockholders in business and manufacturing cornpanies until I855. s As President Eliot of Harvard has pointed out, this privilege of limited liability is "the corporation's most precious characteristic."'
Respective Rights Of Preferred And Common Stockholders In Surplus Profits, George Jarvis Thompson
Respective Rights Of Preferred And Common Stockholders In Surplus Profits, George Jarvis Thompson
Michigan Law Review
The movement in the field of co5perative commercial undertakings has been; school-book-like, a movement from the simple to the complex, from the common-la* sitaation of persons associating together to conduct a busines for profit to the modern statutory association and the corporation possessing an enormous capital ,derived from a host of individuals whose respective interests are represented -by various -classes -of transferable shares.