Securities Law Commons^™

Are Investors’ Gains And Losses From Securities Fraud Equal Over Time?, Alicia J. Davis

Alicia Davis

Leading securities regulation scholars argue that compensating securities fraud victims is inefficient because diversified investors that trade frequently (generally, institutional investors) are as likely to gain from trading in fraud-tainted stocks as they are to suffer harm from doing so. In other words, institutional investors have no expected net losses from fraud over the long term and are effectively hedged against fraud risk. Moreover, individual investors can protect themselves from fraud, as well, by investing through diversified institutional intermediaries. In this Article, I demonstrate, using both probability theory and observational and computer-simulated trading data, that the argument of the compensation …

The Investor Compensation Fund, Alicia J. Davis

Alicia Davis

The prevailing view among securities regulation scholars is that compensating victims of secondary market securities fraud is inefficient. As the theory goes, diversified investors are as likely to be on the gaining side of a transaction tainted by fraud as the losing side. Therefore, such investors should have no expected net losses from fraud because their expected losses will be matched by expected gains. This Article argues that this view is flawed; even diversified investors can suffer substantial losses from fraud, presenting a compelling case for compensation.

The interest in compensation, however, should be advanced by better means than are …