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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Is Say On Pay All About Pay? The Impact Of Firm Performance, Jill E. Fisch, Darius Palia, Steven Davidoff Solomon
Is Say On Pay All About Pay? The Impact Of Firm Performance, Jill E. Fisch, Darius Palia, Steven Davidoff Solomon
Steven M. Davidoff Solomon
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 mandated a number of regulatory reforms including a requirement that large U.S. public companies provide their shareholders with the opportunity to cast a non-binding vote on executive compensation. The “say on pay” vote was designed to rein in excessive levels of executive compensation and to encourage boards to adopt compensation structures that tie executive pay more closely to performance. Although the literature is mixed, many studies question whether the statute has had the desired effect. Shareholders at most companies overwhelmingly approve the compensation packages, and pay levels continue to be high. Although a lack of …
Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage Of Citizen Shareholders, Anne M. Tucker
Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage Of Citizen Shareholders, Anne M. Tucker
Anne Tucker
In this Essay, I challenge the conventional corporate law wisdom that unhappy mutual fund investors paying high fees don’t need litigation or regulation to protect their interests because they should simply exit a fund and reinvest elsewhere. The exit solution, advanced by Professors John Morley and Quinn Curtis in Taking Exit Rights Seriously provided an elegantly simply solution to the problem of unhappy indirect investors (e.g., mutual fund investors) given that they are often low-dollar, low-incentive, rationally-apathetic investors facing enormous information asymmetries and collective action problems. According to their view, competition produced by exit, or the threat of exit, is …
Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Lubomir P. Litov
The accepted wisdom—that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a fool for a client—is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litigation and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and shareholder interests. The results have been an average 9.5% increase in firm value and an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with lawyer-directors. This Article is the first to analyze the rise of lawyer-directors. It makes a variety of other empirical contributions, each of which is statistically significant and large in magnitude. First, …
Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
The accepted wisdom—that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a fool for a client—is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litigation and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and shareholder interests. The results have been an average 9.5% increase in firm value and an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with lawyer-directors. This Article is the first to analyze the rise of lawyer-directors. It makes a variety of other empirical contributions, each of which is statistically significant and large in magnitude. First, …
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff
Steven Davidoff Solomon
Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …
Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones
Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones
Renee Jones
This book chapter on Corporate Governance and Accountability is a contribution to the book CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE (Wiley, forthcoming 2010), edited by Ronald Anderson and H. Kent Baker. This chapter describes the sources of corporate governance standards for American corporations and analyzes the accountability mechanisms designed to ensure that corporate officials act faithfully in their management of corporate affairs. The chapter focuses on the financial reporting system under the U.S. securities laws which forms the foundation of the accountability system, and discusses structures and rules designed to ensure the integrity of financial reporting. The …
Negotiability, Property, And Identity, James S. Rogers
Negotiability, Property, And Identity, James S. Rogers
James S. Rogers
In this Article, Professor Rogers challenges the assumption that securities transfer law has always been based on negotiable certificates and suggests that the reign of negotiability is a relatively recent, and brief, phase in the long history of investment securities trading. Professor Rogers posits that the difficulties currently facing the law of securities transfers are in large part due to the transition from paper to electronic representations of investments. To place these challenges into perspective, Professor Rogers first surveys the history of securities trading and then examines the theoretical underpinnings of the law of securities transfers.
Falling Short: Has The Sec’S Quest To Control Market Manipulation And Abusive Short-Selling Come To An End Or Has It Really Just Begun?, Richard Ramirez
Falling Short: Has The Sec’S Quest To Control Market Manipulation And Abusive Short-Selling Come To An End Or Has It Really Just Begun?, Richard Ramirez
Richard E. Ramirez, J.D. | CFCS
No abstract provided.
Third Party Access And Refusal To Deal In European Energy Networks: How Sector Regulation And Competition Law Meet Each Other, Michael Diathesopoulos
Third Party Access And Refusal To Deal In European Energy Networks: How Sector Regulation And Competition Law Meet Each Other, Michael Diathesopoulos
Michael Diathesopoulos
In this paper, we will analyse the issue of concurrence between competition and sector rules and the relation between parallel concepts within the two different legal frameworks. We will firstly examine Third Party Access in relation to essential facilities doctrine and refusal of access and we will identify the common points and objectives of these concepts and the extent to which they provide a context to each other’s implementation. Second, we will focus on how Commission uses sector regulation and objectives as a context within the process of implementation of competition law in the energy sector and third, we will …
The Trouble With Stockjobbers: The South Sea Bubble, The Press And The Legislative Regulation Of The Markets, Benedict Sheehy
The Trouble With Stockjobbers: The South Sea Bubble, The Press And The Legislative Regulation Of The Markets, Benedict Sheehy
Benedict Sheehy
Abstract: The South Sea Bubble Act of 1721 is often taken as the first securities legislation. Further it is understood to be a response to a stock market scandal. In fact, the Act was enacted prior to the scandal and indeed the likely cause of the collapse of the stock bubble itself. This article reviews the historical context, including the finance of government of the era, the development of the South Sea Company and its bubble, the legislation, burst and subsequent effects. It places securities legislation in its historical context as part of a broader movement in corporate law, shifting …
Shareholders, Unicorns And Stilts: An Analysis Of Shareholder Property Rights, Benedict Sheehy
Shareholders, Unicorns And Stilts: An Analysis Of Shareholder Property Rights, Benedict Sheehy
Benedict Sheehy
Abstract: Shareholders rights advocates argue that shareholders have the right to control the corporation. This article examines the basis for the claims. It begins with an analysis of rights, then moves to an analysis of legal rights, which is followed by an analysis of property rights as a species of legal rights. The article then examines the historical context, rationale and development of shareholder rights which leads to the analysis of current shareholders’ rights. The article concludes with some comments and suggestions concerning future development of corporate governance thinking.