Securities Law Commons^™

Derivative Suit Under The Saudi Companies Law: Theory And Best Practice, Ahmed Saeed Khabti

Maurer Theses and Dissertations

Saudi Arabia has been focused on diversification of its economy and attracting foreign investors. Countries that provide strong shareholder protection are more likely to attract foreign investors. However, there is a need for greater protection of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. This is because Saudi’s companies law fails to equip minority shareholders with adequate protective rights. A current issue with the new Saudi companies law can be linked to derivative suit, which is very important for both foreign investors and local investors. Derivative suit in Saudi Arabia is very limited and difficult to pursue because under article 79 of Saudi …

A Comparative Analysis Of Shareholder Derivative Litigations In Taiwan: Rethinking Of Law, Implementation, And Suggestion, Ting-Hsien Cheng

Maurer Theses and Dissertations

Since the 1990s, Taiwan’s capital market has been tarnished by several corporate scandals, many involving managerial embezzlements and false/misleading financial reports. One of the main reasons why these scandals frequently occurred is the lack of an effective system of checks-and-balances or good corporate governance mechanisms within Taiwan’s companies. To deal with this deficiency for corporate governance, there have been many discussions in Taiwan’s academia of corporate laws about how to reform the provisions of Taiwan Company Act, especially for a better internal monitoring mechanism.

In fact, in last two decades, Taiwan has taken a series of legal reforms as an …

Shareholder Voting As Veto, Michael S. Kang

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility Through The Shareholder-Primacy Norm, Marshall M. Magaro

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Renegotiation Of Cash Flow Rights In The Sale Of Vc-Backed Firms, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Incomplete contracting theory suggests that VC cash flow rights - including liquidation preferences - may be subject to renegotiation. Using a hand-collected dataset of sales of Silicon Valley firms, we find common shareholders do sometimes receive payment before VCs' liquidation preferences are satisfied. However, such deviations tend to be small. We also find that renegotiation is more likely when governance arrangements, including the firm's choice of corporate law, give common shareholders power to impede the sale. Our study provides support for incomplete contracting theory, improves understanding of VC exits, and suggests that choice of corporate law matters in private firms.

The Future Of Shareholder Democracy, Lisa M. Fairfax

Indiana Law Journal

In 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) considered, and ultimately rejected, a rule that would have required corporations to include shareholder-nominated candidates on the ballot. This Article seeks to ascertain the impact of this rejection. On the one hand, the SEC's rejection appears to be a stunning blow to the shareholders' rights campaign. This is because many shareholders' rights advocates have long considered access to the corporate ballot as the "holy grail" of their campaign for increased shareholder power. Such advocates believe that access to the corporate ballot is critical to ensuring that shareholders can participate legitimately in the …