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Securities Law Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo Jul 2007

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

Indiana Law Journal

Orthodox corporate law and economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law and economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This Article provides anecdotal evidence of such self interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history-primarily congressional hearings-this Article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy effect of insider trading legislation in …


Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact Of Criminal Sanctions On Corporate Misconduct, Donna M. Nagy Jan 2007

Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact Of Criminal Sanctions On Corporate Misconduct, Donna M. Nagy

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, Hannah Buxbaum Jan 2007

Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, Hannah Buxbaum

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This article examines a form of securities class action that is growing increasingly popular in U.S. courts: the foreign cubed action, brought against a foreign issuer on behalf of a class that includes foreign investors who purchased securities on a foreign exchange. These cases are becoming an important part of the regulatory landscape (as evidenced by recent high-profile lawsuits involving issuers such as Vivendi, Bayer and Royal Ahold), and they create the potential for particularly severe conflict with other countries on the question of how best to regulate global economic activity. Yet they point out quite clearly that the traditional …