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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Brief Of Prof. Steven L. Schwarcz As Amicus Curiae, Steven L. Schwarcz
Brief Of Prof. Steven L. Schwarcz As Amicus Curiae, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, And The Real Estate Sector, Steven L. Schwarcz
Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, And The Real Estate Sector, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This is a relatively brief “firestarter” talk prepared by the author for the World Economic Forum’s Industry Partnership Strategists Meeting 2012 (held on October 3, 2012) on transformation of the real estate sector in light of ongoing shifts in the financial markets and broader global trends.
Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, And The Real Estate Sector, Steven L. Schwarcz
Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, And The Real Estate Sector, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This is a relatively brief “firestarter” talk prepared by the author for the World Economic Forum’s Industry Partnership Strategists Meeting 2012 (held on October 3, 2012) on transformation of the real estate sector in light of ongoing shifts in the financial markets and broader global trends.
In-House Counsel’S Role In The Structuring Of Mortgage-Backed Securities, Steven L. Schwarcz, Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully
In-House Counsel’S Role In The Structuring Of Mortgage-Backed Securities, Steven L. Schwarcz, Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully
Faculty Scholarship
The authors introduce the financial crisis and the role played by mortgage-backed securities. Then describe the controversy at issue: whether, in order to own and enforce the mortgage loans backing those securities, a special-purpose vehicle “purchasing” mortgage loans must take physical delivery of the notes and security instruments in the precise manner specified by the sale agreement. Focusing on this controversy, the authors analyze (i) the extent, if any, that the controversy has merit; (ii) whether in-house counsel should have anticipated the controversy; and (iii) what, if anything, in-house counsel could have done to avert or, after it arose, to …
The Roberta Mitchell Lecture: Structuring Responsibility In Securitization Transactions, Steven L. Schwarcz
The Roberta Mitchell Lecture: Structuring Responsibility In Securitization Transactions, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
In this Lecture, Professor Schwarcz examines how complex securitization transactions may have created a “protection gap,” the conundrum that transaction parties may be unable to purchase or might not want to pay the price for full protection. As a result, they sometimes choose or are forced to assume the good faith of the other parties to the transaction and the consistency and completeness of protections provided in the transaction documents.
Chapman Dialogue And Law Review Symposium Keynote Address: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches To Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz
Chapman Dialogue And Law Review Symposium Keynote Address: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches To Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Ideal financial regulation would work ex ante, to prevent financial failures. Once a failure occurs, there may already be economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from spreading and becoming systemic. The reality, though, is that preventing financial failures should be only one role for regulators. Even an optimal prophylactic regulatory regime cannot anticipate and prevent every failure. This paper, which formed my Chapman Dialogue Address at Chapman University School of Law and the keynote speech at Chapman Law Review’s 2011 Symposium on the Future of Financial Regulation, attempts to contrast fundamental differences between ex ante …
Keynote Address: A Regulatory Framework For Managing Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Keynote Address: A Regulatory Framework For Managing Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This accessible analysis of systemic risk regulation was delivered as the keynote speech at an October 20, 2011 European Central Bank conference on regulation of financial services. Many regulatory responses, like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, consist largely of politically motivated reactions to the financial crisis, looking for villains (whether or not they exist). To be most effective, however, the regulation must be situated within a more analytical framework. In this speech, I attempt to build that framework, showing that preventive regulation is insufficient and that regulation also must be designed to limit the transmission of systemic risk …
Keynote Address: The Case For A Market Liquidity Provider Of Last Resort, Steven L. Schwarcz
Keynote Address: The Case For A Market Liquidity Provider Of Last Resort, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This short paper, prepared as a keynote address, explains why the credit crunch is fundamentally a story about financial markets, not banks. Its cause was a collapse of securitization and other debt markets, which have become major sources of financing for consumers and companies. Deprived of this financing, consumers have had difficulty purchasing homes and automobiles, and companies have had difficulty purchasing inventory and making capital investments, causing the real economy to shrink. This paper examines how these financial markets should be protected. Although already subject to many prescriptive regulatory protections, these markets evolve faster than regulation can adapt. The …
The ‘Principles’ Paradox, Steven L. Schwarcz
The ‘Principles’ Paradox, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This essay, prepared for a University of Cambridge conference on ‘Principles Versus Rules in Financial Regulation’, posits a new issue in that debate. Although principles-based regulation is thought to more closely achieve normative goals than rules, the extent to which that occurs can depend on the enforcement regime. A person who is subject to unpredictable liability is likely to hew to the most conservative interpretation of the principle, especially where that person would be a potential deep pocket in litigation. This creates a paradox: unless protected by a regime enabling one in good faith to exercise judgment without fear of …