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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Shifting Influences On Corporate Governance: Capital Market Completeness And Policy Channeling, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt
Shifting Influences On Corporate Governance: Capital Market Completeness And Policy Channeling, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt
Faculty Scholarship
Corporate governance scholarship is typically portrayed as driven by single factor models, for example, shareholder value maximization, director primacy or team production. These governance models are Copernican; one factor is or should be the center of the corporate governance solar system. In this essay, we argue that, as with binary stars, the shape of the governance system is at any time the result of the interaction of two central influences, which we refer to as capital market completeness and policy channeling. In contrast to single factor models, which reflect a stable normative statement of what should drive corporate governance, in …
Barbarians Inside The Gates: Raiders, Activists, And The Risk Of Mistargeting, Zohar Goshen, Reilly S. Steel
Barbarians Inside The Gates: Raiders, Activists, And The Risk Of Mistargeting, Zohar Goshen, Reilly S. Steel
Faculty Scholarship
This Article argues that the conventional wisdom about corporate raiders and activist hedge funds — raiders break things and activists fix them — is wrong. Because activists have a higher risk of mistargeting — mistakenly shaking things up at firms that only appear to be underperforming — they are much more likely than raiders to destroy value and, ultimately, social wealth.
As corporate outsiders who challenge the incompetence or disloyalty of incumbent management, raiders and activists play similar roles in reducing “agency costs” at target firms. The difference between them comes down to a simple observation about their business models: …
Asset Managers As Regulators, Dorothy S. Lund
Asset Managers As Regulators, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
The conventional view of regulation is that it exists to constrain corporate activity that harms the public. But amid perceptions of government failure, many now call on corporations to tackle social problems themselves. And in this moment of dissatisfaction with government, powerful asset managers have stepped in to serve as regulators of last resort, adopting rules that bind corporate America on issues of great social importance, including climate change and workplace diversity. This Article describes this dynamic — where shareholders have become regulators — which has been made possible by the rise of institutional shareholding (and index investing in particular) …