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Securities Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Brooklyn Law School

Activist; Company; Target Controlled Company; Activism; Controlled Companies; Shareholder-Empowering; Shareholder-Empoyerment; Shareholder; Election; Minority Directors; Directors; Principal-Principal; Agency; De jure; De facto; Corporate Governance; Appointment; Board Representation; Institutional Investor; Board Representation; Controller; Non-activist; Shareholder Engagement

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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Activist Shareholders At De Facto Controlled Companies, Gaia Balp May 2019

Activist Shareholders At De Facto Controlled Companies, Gaia Balp

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Activist campaigns are likely to increasingly target controlled companies. Studies concerning activism at controlled companies focus on shareholder-empowering tools, such as the right to nominate and elect minority directors on the board, as a pathway for limiting the principal-principal agency problem. However, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between de jure and de facto controlled companies. Building on a recent case concerning a leading Italian corporation, this Article analyzes the possible unexpected corporate governance consequences of successful activist intervention at de facto controlled companies, showing that, where minority shareholders are granted the right to appoint directors on …