Securities Law Commons^™

Jury Certification Of Federal Securities Fraud Class Actions, Thomas Kayes

Northwestern University Law Review

The rough equivalence of certification and ultimate outcome is class action dogma. If certification is granted, then the plaintiff “wins” by settlement because the risk of incurring class-wide liability by going to trial is too great. If certification is denied, the defendant “wins” because the case may not be worth litigating without the possibility of a class-wide recovery. This Note is about where the dogma is wrong. There are now cases where a denial of certification, just like a grant, presents to the defendant the risk of incurring class-wide liability at trial. This is because those cases are capable of …

Beyond The Target Market: Product Advertising And Rule 10b-5'S In Connection With Requirement , Thomas J. Maloney

Cleveland State Law Review

An investor purchases Apple common stock in reliance on representations in advertisements that the new iPad is capable of connecting to “ultrafast” 4G wireless networks. It turns out that the iPad is not compatible with the fastest wireless network in Australia or the 4G networks in Sweden and Germany. If the investor suffered a loss as a result, can the investor recover from Apple for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934? A number of possible impediments to recovery exist. One is Rule 10b-5’s limited scope. The Rule applies only to a fraud that is …

Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws, Douglas M. Branson

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

An Inquiry Into The Perception Of Materiality As An Element Of Scienter Under Sec Rule 10b-5, Allan Horwich

Faculty Working Papers

In any private action or enforcement proceeding based on SEC Rule 10b-5 the plaintiff, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, must prove that the defendant engaged in deception or manipulation with scienter, that is, an intent to deceive (which lower courts have held encompasses reckless conduct). Where the gravamen of the claim is deception, the deception must have been material. A fact, including forward-looking information, is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider the fact important in making his investment decision. This Article demonstrates that in an appropriate case an assessment of whether the …

Extraterritoriality As Standing: A Standing Theory Of The Extraterritorial Application Of The Securities Laws, Erez Reuveni

Erez Reuveni

This Article contends that the current treatment of the extraterritorial scope of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act as a question of subject matter jurisdiction is wrong. Although the Act is silent as to its extraterritorial application, for over forty years courts have analyzed the Act’s extraterritorial scope as a question of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the so-called “conduct” and “effects” tests. Because courts apply these tests in an ad hoc, case-by-case manner, they are inherently unpredictable and unnecessarily complicated. This state of affairs has become particularly troublesome in recent years, as so-called “foreign-cubed” securities fraud lawsuits - lawsuits filed …

Cleaning The Murky Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements: An Inquiry Into Whether Actual Knowledge Of Falsity Precludes The Meaningful Cautionary Statement Defense, Allan Horwich

Faculty Working Papers

Congress included a safe harbor for forward-looking statements in the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. This affords certain issuers and other specified persons limited protection from civil liability for damages under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when the projections or objectives in a forward-looking statement are not realized, i.e., turn out to be false. The safe harbor contains two principal elements, in addition to protection for "immaterial" statements: one prong where projections are accompanied by "meaningful cautionary statements," the second prong where the plaintiff fails to prove that the speaker made the …

Introduction: Insider Trading (Oxford University Press 3d Ed.), William K.S. Wang, Marc I. Steinberg

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This paper is the introductory chapter to Insider Trading (Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2010). This treatise analyzes the application of various laws to stock market insider trading and tipping. Among the federal laws are Exchange Act section 10(b), SEC Rule 10b-5, mail/wire fraud, SEC Rule 14e-3, Exchange Act section 16, and Securities Act section 17(a). The state law discussed is both state common law and a state law claim by the issuer.

Another chapter addresses government enforcement of the insider trading/tipping prohibitions. A chapter on compliance programs deals with how firms can try to prevent illegal insider trading and …

A Perspective On Federal Corporation Law, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.

Introduction: Insider Trading (Pli 2d Ed. 2006), Marc I. Steinberg, William K.S. Wang

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This paper is the Introductory chapter to Insider Trading (PLI 2d ed. 2006). Insider Trading is a two-volume treatise that analyzes the application of various laws to stock market insider trading and tipping. Among the federal laws are Exchange Act section 10(b), SEC rule 10b-5, mail/wire fraud, SEC rule 14e-3, Exchange Act section 16, and Securities Act section 17(a). The state laws discussed are the common law, the Uniform Securities Act, and the California and New York securities statutes.

Another chapter addresses government enforcement of the insider trading/tipping prohibitions. A chapter on compliance programs deals with how firms can try …

Freedom Of Contract: The Trojan Horse Of Rule 10b-5, Margaret V. Sachs

Scholarly Works

Before the late 1980s, traditional contract law played virtually no role in private litigation under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5. The reason was perceived incompatibility. The 1934 Act is regulation intended to supersede “the philosophy of caveat emptor,” whereas traditional contract law promotes bargaining free of regulation. In the late 1980s, however, the tide turned. Since that time, private rule 10b-5 litigation has become riddled with the vocabulary of traditional contract jurisprudence – the statute of frauds, merger clauses, attorneys' fees clauses, choice of law clauses, releases, and the formation of an agreement. …

Closing A Loophole: Insider Trading In Standardized Options, Steve Thel

Fordham Urban Law Journal

This article is a Commentary on a previous Note published in the Fordham Urban Law Journal (Note, Insiders, Options and the Fiduciary Principle: A Rule 10b-5 Loophole, 16 Fordham Urb. L.J. 295 (1988)). The Note argued that the Supreme Court has expressly endorsed only one theory of insider trading liability, in Chiarella v. United States. By the simple expedient of trading options on common stock rather than the common stock itself, an insider can escape Rule 10b-5 liability under Chiarella.

Tax Shelter As A Security: The Use Of Tax Returns In A 10b-5 Action, Risa A. Levine

Fordham Urban Law Journal

This student note examines the consequences to investors who initially invest through tax shelters, and whose investments later fail, resulting in liability. The author questions policy for treating those investments in a similar manner to other securities fraud, by looking at the history and procedure of a 10b-5 private cause of action. Tax returns can be used to evaluate the liability and penalties for SEC actions and the ensuing private actions. The author concludes that because 10b-5 actions are judicially created, they must be carefully cabined and screened for reliable indications of harm to the investor. Tax returns should be …

Voluntary Recapitalization, Fairness, And Rule 10b-5: Life Along The Trail Of Santa Fe, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In corporate recapitalizations, the board of directors will sometimes propose a recapitalization plan which substantially alters the “bundle of rights” represented by preferred shares. Although these plans cannot usually be completed without the approval of a majority of the preferred shareholders, the preferred shareholders are at a disadvantage to protect their interests for several reasons. Thus preferred shareholders who are dissatisfied with the change in their rights will sometimes call upon state courts to enjoin the recapitalization on the grounds that it is unfair or fraudulent; state courts, however, have provided only slight protection for preferred shareholders. In this article, …