Securities Law Commons^™

How Cheap Is Corporate Talk? Comparing Companies' Comments On Regulations With Their Securities Disclosures, James W. Coleman

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

When companies face adverse proposed rules, they may want to convince regulators that the proposed rules are unworkable and should be changed while, at the same time, reassuring investors that the rules will be manageable. These conflicting incentives may lead to inconsistent messages in regulatory comments and securities disclosures, fueling a perception that corporate submissions to regulators are cheap talk. Despite this perception, there has been no empirical study comparing statements to these two audiences. This project performs such a study, taking the example of comments submitted on the Environmental Protection Agency's Renewable Fuel Standard. This standard provides an ideal …

International Securities And Capital Markets, Jennifer Y. Poon, Manfred Ketzer, Walter Stuber, Robert Lando, Audrey Kravets, Sandeep Parekh, Perry Wildes, Ayelet Krispin, Piyansena Perera, Mario Piana

The International Lawyer

No abstract provided.

From The Regulatory Abyss: The Weakened Gatekeeping Incentives Under The Uniform Securities Act, Marc I. Steinberg, James Ames

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

In the last two decades, massive financial scandals have impaired the integrity of the financial markets and cost investors billions of dollars. Even more financial devastation was wrought as the great recession struck. These calamities have brought the importance of proper regulatory control in the securities markets into sharp focus. With this backdrop, this Article tackles the task of examining regulation of one of the most integral components of an effective regulatory system for securities: gatekeepers.

Gatekeepers, such as accountants, attorneys, bankers, and other professionals involved in the securities disclosure process are uniquely positioned to provide much needed oversight with …