Securities Law Commons^™

A Historical Analysis Of The Investment Company Act Of 1940, Michael B. Weiner

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

More than 100 million Americans invest $25 trillion in mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (collectively, “funds”) regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Act”), making funds the predominant investment vehicle in the United States. Everyday investors rely on funds to save for retirement, pay for college, and seek financial security. In this way, funds demonstrate how “Wall Street” can connect with “Main Street” to improve people’s lives.

By way of background, funds are created by investment advisers (“advisers”) that provide investment advisory (e.g., stock selection) and other services to their funds in exchange for a fee. …

Securities Law In The Sixties: The Supreme Court, The Second Circuit, And The Triumph Of Purpose Over Text, Adam C. Pritchard, Robert B. Thompson

Articles

This Article analyzes the Supreme Court’s leading securities cases from 1962 to 1972—SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.; J.I. Case Co. v. Borak; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.; and Affiliated Ute of Utah v. United States—relying not just on the published opinions, but also the Justices’ internal letters, memos, and conference notes. The Sixties Court did not simply apply the text as enacted by Congress, but instead invoked the securities laws’ purposes as a guide to interpretation. The Court became a partner of Congress in shaping the securities laws, rather …

Constructive Ambiguity And Judicial Development Of Insider Trading, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

The Texas Gulf Sulphur decision began what has become a fifty-year project of developing U.S. insider trading regulation through judicial lawmaking. During the course of that project, the courts developed a complex, fraud-based approach to determining the scope of liability. The approach has led, in many cases, to doctrinal uncertainty, a result that is reflected in the recent decisions in Newman, Salman, and Martoma.

n the face of this uncertainty, many commentators have called for a legislative solution. This article argues, however, that the true challenge of insider trading regulation is a lack of consensus about the …

Break From Tradition: Questioning The Primacy Of Self-Regulation In American Securities Law, John I. Sanders

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This Comment outlines the circular path of American securities law—one that begins and ends with the primacy of self-regulation. Part I of this paper describes American securities law between 1792 and 1911 (the “Buttonwood Era”). In this era, a group of New York stock brokers utilized private contract law to create securities regulation for their private club, thereby establishing a tradition of self-regulation. Part II describes a short period of history in which individual states attempted to regulate the se-curities market through state statutes, the so-called “Blue Sky Laws.” Part III details the creation of the federal securities law regime …

A Return To Old-Time Religion? The Glass-Steagall Act, The Volcker Rule, Limits On Proprietary Trading, And Sustainability, Douglas M. Branson

Articles

Pursuant to directions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), five federal agencies collaborated to produce a 983 page rule limiting proprietary trading by financial institutions (the Volcker Rule, which becomes effective in summer, 2015). The Volcker Rule limits proprietary trading to no more than 3 percent of “Tier One” assets. The hoped for effects are that financial institutions will be strictly limited in trading for their own accounts. Some say, propelled by unbridled greed, U.S. financial institutions borrowed excessive amounts of money, inflating leverage ratios as high as 36 or 40 to 1, using the borrowed funds to engage in …

New Governance In The Teeth Of Human Frailty: Lessons From Financial Regulation, Cristie L. Ford

Cristie L. Ford

New Governance scholarship has made important theoretical and practical contributions to a broad range of regulatory arenas, including securities and financial markets regulation. In the wake of the global financial crisis, question about the scope of possibilities for this scholarship are more pressing than ever. Is new governance a full-blown alternative to existing legal structures, or is it a useful complement? Are there essential preconditions to making it work, or can a new governance strategy improve any decision making structure? If there are essential preconditions, what are they? Is new governance “modular” – that is, does it still confer benefits …

Principles-Based Securities Regulation In The Wake Of The Global Financial Crisis, Cristie L. Ford

Cristie L. Ford

This paper seeks to re-examine, and ultimately to restate the case for, principles-based securities regulation in light of the global financial crisis and related developments. Prior to the onset of the crisis, the concept of more principles-based financial regulation was gaining traction in regulatory practice and policy circles, particularly in the United Kingdom and Canada. The crisis of course cast financial regulatory systems internationally, including more principles-based approaches, into severe doubt. This paper argues that principles-based securities regulation as properly understood remains a viable and even necessary policy option, which offers solutions to the real-life and theoretical challenge that the …

Power Without Property, Still: Unger, Berle, And The Derivatives Revolution, Cristie Ford, Carol Liao

Seattle University Law Review

We are in a time when the notion of property is in flux. The derivatives revolution has shattered the “atom of property” well beyond what was originally imagined in 1932 by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. This disaggregation has had fascinating, and often adverse, effects on corporate law and securities regulation. Moreover, the phenomenon has had the unexpected effect of permitting some parties that already possess considerable social, economic, and political power to accumulate even more.

Neo-Brandeisianism And The New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., William O. Douglas, And The Problem Of Corporate Finance In The 1930s, Jessica Wang

Seattle University Law Review

This essay revisits Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and The Modern Corporation and Private Property by focusing on the triangle of Berle, Louis D. Brandeis, and William O. Douglas in order to examine some of the underlying assumptions about law, economics, and the nature of modern society behind securities regulation and corporate finance in the 1930s. I explore Douglas and Berle’s academic and political relationship, the conceptual underpinnings of Brandeis, Berle, and Douglas’s critiques of modern finance, and the ways in which the two younger men—Berle and Douglas—ultimately departed from their role model, Brandeis.

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

ExpressO

Legislation and Legitimation:

Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s

Abstract

Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …

The Limited Public Offer In German And U.S. Securities Law: A Comparative Analysis Of Prospectus Act Section 2(2) And Rule 505 Of Regulation D, David B. Guenther

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Note examines the "limited circle of persons" exception in section 2(2) of the Prospectus Act in comparison to similar provisions of U.S. federal securities law, particularly Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") and Rule 505 of Regulation D ("Rule 505"). Comparison of the Prospectus Act to U.S. securities law seems both warranted and useful. Certain aspects of German securities law are broadly modeled on U.S. precedents. U.S. securities laws reflect more than sixty-five years of experience defining (and re-defining) public and limited public offers and private placements. U.S. securities regulators have also displayed in …

Baruch: Wall Street: Security Risk, Lewis D. Lowenfels

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Wall Street: Security Risk by Hurd Baruch