Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Securities Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 15 of 15

Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Puzzles In Controlling Shareholder Regimes And China: Shareholder Primacy And (Quasi) Monopoly, Sang Yop Kang Aug 2015

Puzzles In Controlling Shareholder Regimes And China: Shareholder Primacy And (Quasi) Monopoly, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Professor Mark Roe explained that the shareholder wealth maximization norm (“the norm”) is not fit for a country with a (quasi) monopoly, because the norm encourages managers to maximize monopoly rents, to the detriment of the national economy. This Article provides new findings and counter-intuitive arguments as to the tension created by the norm and (quasi) monopoly by exploring three key corporate governance concepts that Roe did not examine—(1) “controlling minority structure” (CMS), where dominant shareholders hold a fractional ownership in their controlled-corporations, (2) “tunneling” (i.e., illicit transfer of corporate wealth to controlling shareholders), and (3) Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). …


Democratizing Startups, Seth C. Oranburg Aug 2015

Democratizing Startups, Seth C. Oranburg

Seth C Oranburg

The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 intends to “help entrepreneurs raise the capital they need to put Americans back to work and create an economy that’s built to last.” The goal is to “democratize startups” by making capital available to diverse entrepreneurs in new geographies. Yet the net effect of securities regulations and market conditions is the opposite. Startup companies are encouraged to stay private so capital is consolidating in large, mature firms instead of recycling into new startups. Evidence of consolidation is that once-rare “Unicorns” (billion-dollar startups) now number over 111. More money is going into huge …


The Moral Undercurrent Beneath The Regulatory Regime Of Investor Protection, Huhnkie Lee May 2015

The Moral Undercurrent Beneath The Regulatory Regime Of Investor Protection, Huhnkie Lee

Huhnkie Lee

No abstract provided.


The Law And Ethics Of High-Frequency Trading, Steven R. Mcnamara Mar 2015

The Law And Ethics Of High-Frequency Trading, Steven R. Mcnamara

Steven R. McNamara

Michael Lewis’s recent book Flash Boys has resurrected the controversy concerning “high-frequency trading” (HFT) in the stock markets. While HFT has been important in the stock markets for about a decade, and may have already peaked in terms of its economic significance, it touched a nerve with a public suspicious of financial institutions in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008-2009. In reality, HFT is not one thing, but a wide array of practices conducted by technologically adept electronic traders. Some of these practices are benign, and some even bring benefits such as liquidity and improved price discovery to …


Bridgefunding Is Crowdfunding For Startups Across The Private Equity Gap, Seth C. Oranburg Feb 2015

Bridgefunding Is Crowdfunding For Startups Across The Private Equity Gap, Seth C. Oranburg

Seth C Oranburg

Title III of the JOBS Act of 2012, which attempts to encourage entrepreneurship by allowing startups and small business to sell stock to the general public over the Internet through “crowdfunding,” is completely backwards. Its ceiling should be a floor—the $1 million limit should be inverted. By capping startups at raising $1 million from crowdfunding, the JOBS Act does not address the private equity gap, a fundamental problem in startup markets, and exposes unsophisticated investors to risk and fraud. This Article presents a regulatory framework premised on “bridgefunding,” an approach that this article develops to protect new investors by encouraging …


Insider Trading And Evolutionary Psychology: Strong Reciprocity, Cheater Detection, And The Expanding Boundaries Of The Law, Steven R. Mcnamara Aug 2014

Insider Trading And Evolutionary Psychology: Strong Reciprocity, Cheater Detection, And The Expanding Boundaries Of The Law, Steven R. Mcnamara

Steven R. McNamara

Insider trading law has expanded in recent years to cover instances of trading on non-public information that fall outside of the fiduciary duty framework set forth in the landmark cases of Chiarella and Dirks. The trend towards a broader insider trading law moves the law closer towards what evolutionary psychology tells us humans desire when engaging in collective action: that individuals benefit in proportion to the effort or investment they make in a common enterprise. Insider trading law can therefore be understood as a societal response to cheating in group activities, and the recent expansion of the law as …


Prudential Regulation And The Knowledge Problem: Towards A New Paradigm Of Systemic Risk Regulation, Michael T. Cappucci Jan 2014

Prudential Regulation And The Knowledge Problem: Towards A New Paradigm Of Systemic Risk Regulation, Michael T. Cappucci

Michael T Cappucci

In this article I examine the regulatory structure created by Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act and ask whether the prudential regulatory authority given to the Financial Stability Oversight Council is an effective tool for accomplishing the mission of identifying and containing risk in the financial system. Prudential regulation, the principal tool at the disposal of the FSOC, was developed in the 19th century to counteract moral hazard in the banking system. Over time, prudential supervision has become policymakers’ regulation of choice, to the point where it is now employed in the oversight and regulation of non-bank financial firms. However, …


Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang Jan 2014

Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Unfair self-dealing and expropriation of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder are common business practices in developing countries (“bad-law countries”). Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, there are many questions unanswered in relation to behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. For example, a puzzle is that some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries voluntarily extract minority shareholders less than other controlling shareholders. Applying Mancur Olson’s framework of political theory of “banditry” to the context of corporate governance, this Article proposes that there are at least two categories of controlling shareholders. “Roving controllers” are dominant shareholders with …


Present At The Creation: Reflections On The Early Years Of The National Association Of Corporate Directors, Lawrence J. Trautman Jul 2013

Present At The Creation: Reflections On The Early Years Of The National Association Of Corporate Directors, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

Effective corporate governance is critical to the productive operation of the global economy and preservation of our way of life. Excellent governance execution is also required to achieve economic growth and robust job creation in any country. In the United States, the premier director membership organization is the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). Now over 36 years old, NACD plays a major role in fostering excellence in corporate governance in the United States and beyond. Over the past thirty-six years NACD has grown from a mere realization of the importance of corporate governance to become the only national membership …


Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, With Applications To Financial Regulation, D. Bruce Johnsen Mar 2013

Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, With Applications To Financial Regulation, D. Bruce Johnsen

D. Bruce Johnsen

As Coase convincingly showed, transaction costs inhibit the ability of market participants to achieve first-best outcomes. This paper proposes a novel and relatively simple alternative to traditional cost-benefit analysis when regulated parties face sufficiently low transaction costs that they can bargain directly or rely on competitive markets to set efficient terms of trade. In these settings, the only informational burdens financial market regulators need bear to assess corrective rules is to identify the relevant parties, the “good” they hope to exchange, and the transaction costs that inhibit them from maximizing joint gains from trade. A rule is justified only if …


The Stock Market Reaction To Class Action Filings Post Pslra, Mark S. Klock Feb 2013

The Stock Market Reaction To Class Action Filings Post Pslra, Mark S. Klock

Mark S Klock

Using a substantially larger sample than has been used before, and a sample that includes the Great Financial Crisis and its ensuing recession, I investigate the stock market reaction to securities class action filings following the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act through the first quarter of 2012. I find that on average, even after adjusting for market downturns, there is a statistically significant negative abnormal return at the time of filing. There is also a statistically significant negative abnormal return during the weeks preceding the filing indicating that the market partially, but not fully, anticipates these filings. …


Rise Of The Intercontinentalexchange And Implications Of Its Merger With Nyse Euronext, Latoya C. Brown Jan 2013

Rise Of The Intercontinentalexchange And Implications Of Its Merger With Nyse Euronext, Latoya C. Brown

Latoya C. Brown, Esq.

This paper examines the impending merger between the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) and NYSE Euronext against the backdrop of the current structure of the global financial services industry. The paper concludes that the merger embodies what the financial services industry is becoming and captures the model that will allow exchanges to remain competitive in today’s marketplace: mega-exchanges with broader asset classes and electronic platforms. As technology and globalization threaten their vitality, exchanges will need to continue reinventing and adapting. Increasingly over the last decade they have done so by merging and by moving, at least a part of, their operations on screen. …


The Regulation Of U.S. Money Market Funds: Lessons From Europe, Latoya C. Brown Jan 2013

The Regulation Of U.S. Money Market Funds: Lessons From Europe, Latoya C. Brown

Latoya C. Brown, Esq.

The recent financial crisis challenged long held perceptions of money market funds (“MMFs”) as stable and highly liquid instruments. Regulators in the US and in Europe now seek to impose additional rules on MMFs to avoid another significant failure as happened to the Reserve Fund. In the US, the debate is drawing even more media attention as question of which regulatory body - such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Treasury Department, and the Financial Stability Oversight Council – should lead the way has taken interesting twists and turns. This paper examines primary reform options being proposed in the …


Lessons From Single-Company Event Studies: The Importance Of Controlling For Company-Specific Events, Scott D. Hakala Aug 2010

Lessons From Single-Company Event Studies: The Importance Of Controlling For Company-Specific Events, Scott D. Hakala

Scott D Hakala

Single-company event studies are commonly employed in applied practice, such as in analyzing market efficiency, reliance, and damages in securities litigation. However, the presence of significant company-specific events among the observations used to estimate the market model results in significantly biased, overstated standard errors (a well-known omitted variables problem) and less reliable coefficient estimates in such studies. This is a frequently over-looked or neglected issue that renders the statistical inferences in single-company event studies employing using more traditional event study techniques biased and often unreliable. This paper demonstrates through simulation and actual examples that, even allowing for errors in implementation, …


The Tyranny Of The Multitude Is A Multiplied Tyranny: Is The United States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, Elizabeth F. Brown Jan 2008

The Tyranny Of The Multitude Is A Multiplied Tyranny: Is The United States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, Elizabeth F. Brown

Elizabeth F Brown

This Article examines whether the U.S. regulatory structure undermined U.S. competitiveness with foreign financial markets, particularly the United Kingdom's markets.