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Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Reversing The Fortunes Of Active Funds, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
Reversing The Fortunes Of Active Funds, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
All Faculty Scholarship
In 2019, for the first time in the history of U.S. capital markets, passive funds surpassed active funds in terms of total assets under management. The continuous growth of passive funds at the expense of active funds is a genuine cause for concern. Active funds monitor the management and partake of decision-making in their portfolio companies. Furthermore, they improve price efficiency and managerial performance by engaging in informed trading. The buy/sell decisions of active funds provide other market participants reliable information about the quality of firms. The cost of active investing is significant and it is exclusively borne by active …
A Theory Of Preferred Stock, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
A Theory Of Preferred Stock, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Neoclassicism And The Separation Of Ownership And Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Neoclassicism And The Separation Of Ownership And Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
"Separation of ownership and control" is a phrase whose history will forever be associated with Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means' The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), as well as with Institutionalist economics, Legal Realism, and the New Deal. Within that milieu the large publicly held business corporation became identified with excessive managerial power at the expense of stockholders, social irresponsibility, and internal inefficiency. Neoclassical economists both then and ever since have generally been critical, both of the historical facts that Berle and Means purported to describe and of the conclusions that they drew. In fact, however, within …
Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle And The Modern Corporation, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle And The Modern Corporation, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Private Equity's Three Lessons For Agency Theory, William W. Bratton
Private Equity's Three Lessons For Agency Theory, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, And The Volatile Shareholder Interest, William W. Bratton
Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, And The Volatile Shareholder Interest, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley And Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, William W. Bratton
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley And Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, Jill E. Fisch
Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Dividends, Noncontractibility, And Corporate Law, William W. Bratton
Dividends, Noncontractibility, And Corporate Law, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Class Action Reform: Lessons From Securities Litigation, Jill E. Fisch
Class Action Reform: Lessons From Securities Litigation, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
An Inquiry Into The Efficiency Of The Limited Liability Company: Of Theory Of The Firm And Regulatory Competition, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
An Inquiry Into The Efficiency Of The Limited Liability Company: Of Theory Of The Firm And Regulatory Competition, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, And Corporate Self-Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery Prof
Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, And Corporate Self-Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery Prof
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, And The Structure Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, And The Structure Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton
The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
Professor Bratton examines judicial regulation of issuer-bondholder conflicts of interest within three different, but closely related doctrinal frameworks: neoclassical contract interpretation; contract avoidance; and corporate law fiduciary restraint. After discussing the elements of convertible bond valuation and their interaction with issuer actions giving rise to conflicts of interest, he evaluates the case for judicial intervention to protect bondholder interests. He concludes that ·bondholder protective intervention is fair and tolerably efficient, provided it is kept within the bounds of contract interpretation. But he finds that more aggressive judicial intervention under the frameworks of contract avoidance and fiduciary restraint carries an unnecessary …