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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Shareholder Voting And The Symbolic Politics Of Corporation As Contract, Matthew T. Bodie, Grant M. Hayden Jan 2018

Shareholder Voting And The Symbolic Politics Of Corporation As Contract, Matthew T. Bodie, Grant M. Hayden

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American corporations are structured in such a way that shareholders, and shareholders alone, have the right to vote in all significant corporate decisions. Over the years, this exclusive shareholder franchise has been supported by an ongoing procession of justifications. But as those arguments have fallen by the wayside, shareholder primacists have circled back and latched upon a final argument for the special voting status of shareholders, arguing that this fundamental feature of corporate governance is the product of the set of freely-bargained-for agreements among all corporate constituents. Because this set of agreements reflects the preferences of all parties to the …


Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton Jan 2002

Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton

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No abstract provided.


Waiting For The Omelet To Set: Match-Specific Assets And Minority Oppression In The Close Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter Jan 1999

Waiting For The Omelet To Set: Match-Specific Assets And Minority Oppression In The Close Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter

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No abstract provided.


Comparative Corporate Governance And The Theory Of The Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery Jan 1999

Comparative Corporate Governance And The Theory Of The Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery

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Professors Bratton and McCahery take up the main questions addressed by the literature on comparative corporate governance: whether national governance systems can be expected to converge in the near future, and whether the focal point of that convergence will be a new, hybrid governance system comprised of the best practices drawn from different systems. This Article advances the view that neither global convergence that eliminates systemic differences nor the emergence of a hybrid best practice safely can be projected because each national governance system is a system to a significant extent. Each system, rather than consisting of a loose collection …


The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton Jan 1984

The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton

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Professor Bratton examines judicial regulation of issuer-bondholder conflicts of interest within three different, but closely related doctrinal frameworks: neoclassical contract interpretation; contract avoidance; and corporate law fiduciary restraint. After discussing the elements of convertible bond valuation and their interaction with issuer actions giving rise to conflicts of interest, he evaluates the case for judicial intervention to protect bondholder interests. He concludes that ·bondholder protective intervention is fair and tolerably efficient, provided it is kept within the bounds of contract interpretation. But he finds that more aggressive judicial intervention under the frameworks of contract avoidance and fiduciary restraint carries an unnecessary …