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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Misappropriation Theory: How The World’S Two Largest Economies Regulate Insider Trading, Thomas Hare Apr 2021

Misappropriation Theory: How The World’S Two Largest Economies Regulate Insider Trading, Thomas Hare

Journal Articles

Prior to the government adopting policies of economic reform in the late 1970s, the People’s Republic of China (“the PRC” or “China”) did not have a formal securities market or an accompanying regulatory scheme. For the most part, it was not operationally feasible for a market to develop and flourish in China because the PRC had a centrally planned economy with state-owned enterprises as the primary form of business ownership. However, economic reform brokered conditions where stock trades casually began in markets located in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu and several other cities in the early 1980s. This informal trading persisted until …


The Role Of Comparative Law In Shaping Corporate Statutory Reforms, Marco Ventoruzzo Jan 2014

The Role Of Comparative Law In Shaping Corporate Statutory Reforms, Marco Ventoruzzo

Journal Articles

This Essay discusses how comparative law played and plays a role in the statutory development of corporate laws. The influence of laws of other systems on the development of statutory law is common, explicit, and represents a tradition that accompanied legal reforms since the very beginning of the development of legislation.

Focusing on modern corporate law, I argue (but the argument could be extended to many other legal fields) that it is necessary to distinguish two basic ways in which comparative law influences legal reforms in one particular jurisdiction. The first one is through regulatory competition among different systems. In …


Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis And Reform Proposals, Marco Ventoruzzo Jan 2010

Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis And Reform Proposals, Marco Ventoruzzo

Journal Articles

One of the most crucial, but systematically neglected, comparative differences between corporate law systems in Europe and in the United States concerns the regulations governing freeze-out transactions in listed corporations. Freeze-outs can be defined as transactions in which the controlling shareholder exercises a legal right to buy out the shares of the minority, and consequently delists the corporation and brings it private. Beyond this essential definition, the systems diverge profoundly.

This gap exists despite the fact that minority freeze-outs are one of the most debated issues in corporate law, in the public media, in a vast body of scholarly work …


Takeover Regulation As A Wolf In Sheep's Clothing: Taking U.K Rules To Continental Europe, Marco Ventoruzzo Jan 2008

Takeover Regulation As A Wolf In Sheep's Clothing: Taking U.K Rules To Continental Europe, Marco Ventoruzzo

Journal Articles

Aesop was an optimist. In his cautionary fable that inspired the famous admonition about wolves in sheep's clothing, the predator intentionally dons a sheep's fleece in order to sneak up on a lamb. His disguise, it turns out, is so effective that he ends up being mistaken for the real thing and killed by another wolf. According to Aesop, even the most effective fraud can turn against its perpetrator, and justice be done. The results are not always so salutary with other clandestine predators, including legal rules that appear aimed at protecting vulnerable groups, but instead provide valuable tools to …


Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo Jan 2007

Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo

Journal Articles

Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …


Europe's Thirteenth Directive And U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means And Political Economic Ends, Marco Ventoruzzo Jan 2006

Europe's Thirteenth Directive And U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means And Political Economic Ends, Marco Ventoruzzo

Journal Articles

Cross-border acquisitions, especially through hostile takeovers, represent one of the most dramatic consequences of the growing integration, both within Europe, and when considering the economic balance of power between the US and the European industries. This Article focuses on the single most important piece of legislation on European takeover law, the Thirteenth Directive of the European Union on Takeover Regulation, which was approved on April, 21 2004 and must be implemented by Member States before the end of 2006.

Passage of the Thirteenth Directive is no minor event. Earlier versions were embroiled in arresting political controversies that generated significant Member …


Experiments In Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Reform And The Dubious Virtues Of A Market For Rules In The Absence Of Effective Regulatory Competition, Marco Ventoruzzo Jan 2004

Experiments In Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Reform And The Dubious Virtues Of A Market For Rules In The Absence Of Effective Regulatory Competition, Marco Ventoruzzo

Journal Articles

The article addresses a sweeping Reform of corporate law which was enacted by the Italian government in 2003 and came into effect on January 1, 2004. The new statutory regulation significantly increases freedom of contract in corporate law, relying on the idea that the development of an efficient market for rules will allow the "natural selection" of the rules that better suit the need of the different stakeholders. Together - and to some extent to compensate for - this greater freedom of contract, new protections for minority shareholders have also been implemented. The reform also imports into the Italian legal …