Securities Law Commons^™

Delaware's Global Competitiveness, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

For about a hundred years, Delaware has been the leading jurisdiction for corporate law in the United States. The state, which deliberately embarked on a mission to build a haven for corporate law in the early twentieth century, now supplies corporate charters to over two thirds of Fortune 500 companies and a growing share of closely held companies. But Delaware’s domestic dominance masks the important and yet underexamined issue of whether Delaware maintains its competitive edge globally.

This Article examines Delaware’s global competitiveness, documenting Delaware’s surprising weakness competing in the emerging international market for corporate charters. It does so principally …

Investments And Security: Balancing International Commerce And National Security With Expanded Authority For The Committee On Foreign Investment In The United States, Christopher Jusuf

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

What happens when the interests of international trade conflict with those of national security? This article analyzes this question within the context of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an obscure but increasingly powerful executive panel that exercises the president's broad authority to unilaterally interfere with and stop international mergers and acquisitions. With the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), CFIUS is more powerful now than it has ever been, and should be a key consideration for any company seeking to do business with foreign investors. This is especially true as America …

Crowding Out Theory: Protecting Shareholders By Balancing Executives’ Incentives In France, The United States, & China, Palden Flynn

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

This paper explores the differences between executive compensation regimes in France, the United States, and China. It asks whether there is a link between state regulation of real options as a form of executive compensation and state regulation of shareholder protections. This paper argues that if a country regulates the use of real options as compensation, then that country is also more likely to have strong shareholder protection laws. This argument seems to be true based on a descriptive review of executive compensation law and shareholder protections in France, the United States, and China.

If it is true that countries …

Open Sesame: The Myth Of Alibaba's Extreme Corporate Governance And Control, Yu-Hsin Lin, Thomas Mehaffy

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

In September 2014, Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Alibaba) successfully launched a $25 billion initial public offering (IPO), the largest IPO ever, on New York Stock Exchange. Alibaba’s IPO success witnessed a wave among Chinese Internet companies to raise capital in U.S capital markets. A significant number of these companies have employed a novel, but poorly understood corporate ownership and control mechanism—the variable interest entity (VIE) structure and/or the disproportional control structure. The VIE structure was created in response to the Chinese restriction on foreign investments; however, it carries the risk of being declared illegal under Chinese law. The disproportional control …

股权分置改革中的行政授予与补偿协商:公法与私法的融合, Wen-Yeu Wang, Jianlin Chen

Jianlin Chen

中国的股权分置改革一方面要使非流通股股东取得流通权,另一方面也要让流通股股东获得合理补偿以求改革能够稳定推进. 传统观点下的契约理论和行政征收理论并不能适切解释中国的股权分置改革方案. 在公,私法融合背景下,美国学者新近提出的行政授予 (regulatory givings)学说，可与大陆法上的行政行为附款理论相互协力，为改革方案提供正当性基础。改革中采用财产法则而非补偿法则保障流通股股东的权益，实属符合经济效率之举. 然而，本方案仍有诸多值得改进之处.