Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Keyword
-
- Corporations (3)
- Securities Law (3)
- Corporate Governance (2)
- Corporate governance (2)
- Federalism (2)
-
- Insurance (2)
- Law (2)
- Liability (2)
- Regulated Industries (2)
- Rule 10b-5 (2)
- AOL (1)
- Board power (1)
- CEO turnover (1)
- Charter competition (1)
- Class actions (1)
- Compensation terms (1)
- Corporate (1)
- Corporate Finance (1)
- Corporate law (1)
- Corporate law and governance (1)
- Corporation (1)
- D&O (1)
- Delaware (1)
- Director (1)
- Directors (1)
- Disclosure (1)
- Economics (1)
- Federal securities laws (1)
- Federalization (1)
- Financial law (1)
Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.
Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …
Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
All Faculty Scholarship
This Essay explores the connection between corporate governance and D&O insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, D&O insurance premiums provide the insurer’s assessment of a firm’s governance quality. Most basically, firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher D&O premiums. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent. Corporations lack the incentive to produce this disclosure themselves, and U.S. securities regulators do …
Regulation Nms: Has The Sec Exceeded Its Congressional Mandate To Facilitate A “National Market System” In Securities Trading?, Dale A. Oesterle
Regulation Nms: Has The Sec Exceeded Its Congressional Mandate To Facilitate A “National Market System” In Securities Trading?, Dale A. Oesterle
The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Working Paper Series
The SEC is currently holding hearings on sweeping changes to the micro-structure of the country's securities trading markets - modifying the trade through rule, for example. Professor Oesterle argues that the SEC should not be in the business of so structuring the country's securities markets in the first place. In the piece he chronicles the SEC's expansive interpretation of its power under Congress's 1975 National Market System Amendments to the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act and questions whether Congress intended to grant the SEC such a mandate.
Toward A Reform-Minded Model For Securities Law Enforcement, Cristie Ford
Toward A Reform-Minded Model For Securities Law Enforcement, Cristie Ford
All Faculty Publications
This paper examines a significant shift in enforcement practice at the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, originating under the Chairmanship of William Donaldson but likely to continue beyond it. This shift is a response to a crisis of corporate governance, exemplified by recent scandals among various public corporations and financial services institutions, and to the demonstrated inadequacy of SEC enforcement tools to respond to that crisis. While the SEC's new approach, which I call the Reform Undertaking, is incomplete, I argue that if properly implemented it may have the potential to spur institutional reform not only in corporate governance, …
Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the connection between corporate governance and directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, in a well-working insurance market, D&O insurance premiums would convey the insurer's assessment of a firm's governance quality. Simply stated, firms with better corporate governance would pay relatively low D&O premiums, while firms with worse corporate governance would pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the …
Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Comment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch
Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Comment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Aol Time Warner And The False God Of Shareholder Primacy, Matthew T. Bodie
Aol Time Warner And The False God Of Shareholder Primacy, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
The blockbuster merger between AOL and Time Warner, in the twilight of the dot-com boom, is now characterized as perhaps the worst business combination ever. Shareholders lost over $200 billion in value; the deal's architects were forced out in disgrace; and the surviving executives jettisoned the AOL name as if towipe clean our collective memory. Despite the merger's seismic effects, relatively little has been written about its potential legal ramifications. In this article, I suggest that the collapse of AOL Time Warner is a cautionary tale for those who would advocate greater adherence to the norm of shareholder primacy. Before …
Rule 10b-5 And The "Unfitness" Question, Jayne W. Barnard
Rule 10b-5 And The "Unfitness" Question, Jayne W. Barnard
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon
Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
High levels of executive compensation have triggered an intense debate over whether compensation results primarily from competitive pressures in the market for managerial services or from managerial overreaching. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have advanced the debate with their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, which forcefully argues that current compensation levels are best explained by managerial rent-seeking, not by arm's-length bargaining designed to create the optimum pay and performance nexus. This paper expresses three sorts of reservations with their analysis and advances its own proposals. First, enhancing shareholder welfare is not, as a …
The Corporation As Insider Trader, Mark J. Loewenstein, William K.S. Wang
The Corporation As Insider Trader, Mark J. Loewenstein, William K.S. Wang
Publications
With regard to issuer purchases, some of the traditional policy rationales against insider trading do not apply or apply with less force. Nevertheless, courts, commentators, and the SEC have all stated or assumed that a public corporation violates rule 10b-5 by buying its own shares in the market based on material, nonpublic information. In rule 10b-5 cases involving face-to-face transactions, several circuit courts have ruled that the company may not purchase its own stock based on material information not known to the seller. No good reason exists not to apply these precedents to stock market trades by issuers, especially because …
Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard
Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard
All Faculty Scholarship
When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 (“PSLRA”), the Act’s “lead plaintiff” provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel’s compensation.
Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional investors—pension funds, mutual …
The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton
The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Supreme Court, Rule 10b-5, And The Federalization Of Corporate Law, Mark J. Loewenstein
The Supreme Court, Rule 10b-5, And The Federalization Of Corporate Law, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
This Article examines Supreme Court jurisprudence since 1997 under the federal securities laws in light of the Court's earlier securities law decisions and in light of its recent decisions construing the Constitution and federal statutes as they relate to the regulation of business. These post-1977 cases strongly suggest that the much-heralded new federalism philosophy of the Supreme Court is not a factor in securities law cases or in business cases generally. Indeed, the opposite seems to be the case. In this context, new federalism cases appear to be an anomaly, with the reality being that the Court is still as …
Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties In Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors And The Ideology Of Investor Sovereignty, Donald C. Langevoort
Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties In Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors And The Ideology Of Investor Sovereignty, Donald C. Langevoort
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article focuses on independent directors and the processes of mutual fund corporate governance. To be clear, I believe (and research shows) that disinterested directors do add value as a form of shareholder protection, and this fact justifies the SEC's efforts to strengthen their role. But they are far from a panacea. While that point alone is almost trite, exploring some of the unique features of mutual fund governance shows why judges and policymakers should not even try to reason by analogy to governance in other kinds of corporations. Yet that is exactly what Burks and its progeny have done. …
Introduction: The Fifth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, William Michael Treanor
Introduction: The Fifth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, William Michael Treanor
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Welcome and Introduction to the Fifth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, November 9, 2004 at Fordham University School of Law.
Fordham Law School, with the support of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, inaugurated the A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture Series in the fall of 2000 with the timely insights of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (the "SEC" or the "Commission") then-Chair Arthur Leavitt. Since then, the Sommer Lecture has continued to bring to Fordham such heavyweights as Mary Schapiro, President of National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") Regulation, Inc., SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid, and …
Did The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, Michael A. Perino
Did The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, Michael A. Perino
Faculty Publications
In 1995 Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA or the Act) to address abuses in securities fraud class actions. In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and other high profile securities frauds, critics suggest that the law made it too easy to escape liability for securities fraud and thus created a climate in which frauds are more likely to occur. Others claim that the Act has largely failed because it did little to deter plaintiffs' lawyers from filing nonmeritorious cases. This article employs a database of the 1449 class actions filed from 1996 through 2001 to …